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i 
Abstract 
 
This dissertation deals with executive instability in Latin American presidential 
regimes, a phenomenon called Presidential Interruptions. The dissertation analyses 14 
cases of presidential interruptions in Latin America in the period between 1980 and 
2005, and aims to enhance the understanding of presidential interruptions, analyse the 
causes of presidential interruptions in Latin America, and explore the outcomes of 
presidential interruptions in the region.  
 
Conceptually this dissertation situates presidential interruptions as a form of executive 
instability between the democratic breakdown and the unscheduled change of 
government in parliamentary regimes. The dissertation compares directly the causes 
of presidential interruption with the causes of democratic breakdown and finds that 
while the similarities exist, the differences are stark. This finding seriously questions 
the frequently used analogy between the two types of instability. Furthermore, the 
dissertation compares the procedures for presidential interruption with the procedures 
for unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes, and shows that 
procedures of presidential interruptions indeed are similar to the procedures used in 
parliamentary regimes for early executive removal. The differences, on the other 
hand, are that in parliamentary regimes these procedures are constitutional and 
legitimate, whereas in presidential regimes the extent to which procedures for 
presidential interruptions are constitutional and legitimate can be questioned.  
 
The causal analysis distinguishes between triggering and underlying causes of 
presidential interruption. Entering the debate of institutions vs. the streets, the 
dissertation finds that street, or vertical, challenges are the more important triggers of 
presidential interruptions in Latin America, whereas institutional or horizontal 
conflicts are more important than the vertical or street conflicts as underlying causes 
of presidential interruption. The distinction between triggering and underlying causes 
is new, and helps explain the disagreement in this debate among other scholars. 
Further unravelling the causes of interruptions, the dissertation points to the 
emergence of new cleavages and social and political groups challenging the status 
quo, as important causal factors explaining the occurrence of both challenges to 
presidents, and presidential interruptions. The dissertation uses both statistical and 
more qualitative analytical techniques to support this argument.  
 
The outcomes of presidential interruptions, it is argued, depend on the principal 
causes for the presidential removal. The dissertation argues that a presidential 
interruption is a way of holding the chief executive accountable for his or her actions 
or omissions, and therefore should be understood as a reactive sequence. Inductively 
the dissertation identifies three types of interruptions, and shows through a qualitative 
comparative analysis that the outcomes of presidential interruptions depend on the 
principal cause of the interruption, and thus the type of interruption. The three types 
are interruptions motivated by: a presidential scandal, a president’s democratic 
violation, and a president’s policies.  
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Introduction 
In a presidential regime, the president and his administration enjoy fixed terms and 
unless a democratic breakdown provokes a regime change, elected presidents are 
secured survival until the next election. Yet in Latin America since 1980, 15 elected 
presidents have been forced to leave office before the constitutional end of their term 
(see Table 1-1). These presidencies have been interrupted.  
 
A presidential interruption is a regime-shattering event. Interruptions often occur 
during periods of heightened social turmoil, deep inter-institutional conflicts, violent 
episodes between the police and demonstrators, in the midst of economic crises; and 
interruptions occur in a regime type in which one would least expect it, the 
presidential regime. In a period of relative regime stability for Latin America, 
presidential interruptions constitute a new form of instability in the region. The cases 
of interruptions represent the deepest regime crises since democratisation in the 
countries in question, it is therefore important to understand what this new 
phenomenon is, what causes it, and what the consequences are. This dissertation 
seeks to accomplish these tasks. 
 
I argue that presidential interruptions share many similarities with both the democratic 
breakdown at the causal level and with unscheduled changes of parliamentary 
governments at the procedural level. Despite the similarities, the differences are also 
stark, and my conceptual and empirical comparisons in Chapter 3 conclude that 
presidential interruption constitutes a proper phenomenon somewhere between the 
democratic breakdown and parliamentary executive instability.  
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In order to explain interruptions causally, I argue for the importance of distinguishing 
between triggering causes and underlying causes (Chapter 2). In terms of triggering 
causes, interruptions are mainly triggered by challenges to presidents from below, 
what I call vertical challenges, that force a president to resign and flee the presidential 
palace (Chapter 5). In terms of underlying causes, I argue that after controlling for 
other factors, interruptions are caused by the emergence of new cleavages that 
mobilises new social and political groups that challenge the status quo of political 
regimes (Chapter 6). These groups put pressure on presidential administrations both 
from the streets with political demands, but also the legislature by organising as 
political parties.  
 
The processes of challenging and interrupting presidents are not only fights for 
political power, but also forms of holding the chief executive accountable for his or 
her actions or inactions. As such, I argue that the consequences of presidential 
interruptions are intrinsically linked to the causes and motivations of the challenges to 
presidents (Chapter 7). Based on the principal motivation of a presidential challenge, I 
create a typology of presidential interruptions in Latin America and explore the 
consequences of three types of interruptions related to: a presidential Scandal, a 
president’s Democratic violation, and a president’s policies. 
 
The Cases of presidential Interruption in Latin America 
Table 1-1 lists all presidents in Latin American democracies who since 1978 either 
had their terms forcefully shortened, or were not able to finish their term in office at 
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all.1 The table also includes a column indicating whether the case is categorised as a 
presidential interruption.  
Table 1-1: Presidents whose term was forcefully shortened in Latin America since 1978 
Notes: Includes presidents who had their term shortened compared to the term that was expected at the 
point of them taking over the presidency, or being elected, * The ouster of President Zelaya in 
Honduras occurred after the period chosen for this study, and too late to be included for a thorough 
analysis in this dissertation. For analyses of this case, see Llanos and Marsteintredet (2010), Alcántara 
Sáez (2009).  
 
The 20 incidents cited in Table 1-1 constitute all cases of forcefully shortened 
presidencies in Latin American democracies since 1978. Of these 15 are considered 
presidential interruptions, and I will analyse thoroughly 14 of these 15 cases. Three 
cases are excluded as their presidencies were terminated for natural causes (Presidents 
Roldós, Guzmán, and Banzer). The case of Sarney in Brazil is not considered a 
presidential interruption since the shortening of his term, though forced upon him, 
was a permanent change in the electoral calendar. The Duhalde case is also excluded 
since Duhalde was neither popularly elected to the presidency nor was part of the 
                                                
1 Other presidents such as Fabian Alarcón, the successor to Abdala Bucaram in Ecuador, and Valentín 
Paniagua, the successor to Alberto Fujimori in Peru, have also legally had their terms shortened. 
However, when these took power, it was with the clear understanding that their presidencies would be 
caretaker presidencies and one of their primary tasks would be to hold elections at the earliest 
convenience for the political systems in question. Therefore their terms were not forcefully shortened.  
President Country Year Presidential Interruption 
Jaime Roldós Ecuador 1981 No, plane accident 
Antonio Guzmán Dominican Republic 1982 No, suicide 
Hernán Siles Zuazo Bolivia 1984/85 Yes 
Raúl Alfonsín Argentina 1989 Yes 
José Sarney Brazil 1989 No, permanent electoral change 
Fernando Collor de Melo Brazil 1992 Yes 
Carlos Andrés Pérez Venezuela 1993 Yes 
Jorge Serrano Guatemala 1993 Yes 
Joaquín Balaguer Dominican Republic 1994/96 Yes 
Abdalá Bucaram Ecuador 1997 Yes 
Raúl Cubas Paraguay 1999 Yes 
Jamil Mahuad Ecuador 2000 Yes 
Alberto Fujimori Peru 2000 Yes 
Hugo Banzer Bolivia 2001 No, terminal illness 
Fernando de la Rúa Argentina 2001 Yes 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada Bolivia 2003 Yes 
Eduardo Duhalde Argentina 2003 No, not popularly elected 
Lucio Gutiérrez Ecuador 2005 Yes 
Carlos Mesa Bolivia 2005 Yes 
Manuel Zelaya Honduras 2009 Yes* 
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constitutional line of succession to the Argentine presidency, as such he is defined as 
a caretaker president. Other cases are excluded for not meeting the requirement of 
being a democracy, for instance the case of the early exit of President Del Valle in 
Panama in 1988. And, finally, the early elections organised for instance in Venezuela 
in 1999 are excluded first of all because it constituted a potential self-interruption 
initiated by the president, and second of all because the incumbent continued in 
power.  
 
The scope of presidential interruptions and this dissertation 
I define a presidential interruption as a premature, extraordinary and forced exit of an 
elected president that does not entail a democratic breakdown. According to this 
definition, a presidential interruption occurs in democratic presidential regimes, and 
this dissertation further restricts the scope geographically to democratic presidential 
regimes in Latin America.  
 
Although both are forms of executive instability, a presidential interruption is clearly 
different from a democratic breakdown, which often brings down the president, and 
always the democratic regime.2 The regimes dealt with in this thesis are thus 
democratic, and remain so even after a presidential interruption.3 I further restrict my 
analysis to popularly elected presidents, and presidents who became so according to 
the constitutionally prescribed line of succession. This dissertation therefore exclude 
                                                
2 In cases in which the president is the person bringing down the democratic regime, the president 
survives, but not the democratic regime. These incidents are often referred to as autogolpes, or self-
coups.  
3 This dissertation will not discuss the concept of democracy, a clearly contested concept, and will 
follow the definition of democracy given by Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán (2001), which 
focuses on contestation, participation, that the civilian elected leaders enjoy their constitutional powers, 
and respect for civil and political liberties. This is a procedural definition that builds on an 
understanding of democracy that has become rather accepted with time.  
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caretaker presidencies, that is presidents elected by congress from outside the 
constitutionally prescribed line of presidential succession.  
 
The term presidential interruption clearly states that the dissertation deals with 
presidential regimes, which all share two traits: popular, direct, elections of both the 
executive and the legislative powers; and fixed terms of both directly elected 
institutions (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992; Siaroff 2003). In a presidential regime only 
an impeachment of the president can normally remove a president from office 
between elections. A presidential interruption is therefore also different from 
executive instability in parliamentary regimes, the unscheduled changes of 
governments through the vote of no-confidence, the loss of a vote of confidence, or 
the (forced) call for early elections. In parliamentary regimes these types of executive 
instability are expected and allowed as practice in the constitutions in question. I 
discuss how similar and different presidential interruptions are from these two other 
types of executive instability in Chapter 3.  
 
Lastly this thesis deals with democratic, presidential regimes in Latin America. All 
former Spanish and Portuguese colonies on the American continent are today 
presidential as defined above, and Latin America is clearly a presidential region. Why 
only one region? One reason is that regions are important in the study of comparative 
politics. As Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán (2003; 2005b) show, the study of regions is 
important, both due to the issue of causal heterogeneity across regions, but also to 
avoid simplistic assumptions of similarities within regions. In my dissertation I focus 
on both similarities and differences between the cases of interruptions in Latin 
America. So, why Latin America? First, Latin America holds the majority of 
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presidential regimes in the world. Siaroff (2003) counts 26 pure presidential 
democracies in the world, 16 of which are in Latin America.4 Second, Latin America 
is also the region in which most presidential interruptions have occurred the last 
twenty-five years. Only in the Philippines with the ousting of President Estrada in 
2001 has there been a similar event in a presidential democracy in a region other than 
Latin America (Kim and Bahry 2008; Fukuyama et al. 2005; Kasuya 2003).5 A third 
reason for limiting the scope of the analysis to Latin America, relates to the research 
strategy that will be used in this thesis. With the goal of understanding presidential 
interruptions, a wider case-selection would limit even further the possibility of case 
analyses of the interruptions at hand, since there is always a trade-off between breadth 
and depth. Thus the benefits of including more cases in other regions, is weighted 
against the cost of amassing sufficient knowledge about the additional case (-s), the 
political systems, and cultures of these political regimes, in addition to obtaining 
control and oversight over potential additional causal heterogeneity. In the view of 
this author, the costs here outweigh the benefits.  
 
Why presidential interruptions?  
For me there are two reasons for studying presidential interruptions in Latin America. 
The first relates to the importance and gravity of these events in the democracies in 
                                                
4 Bolivia is not in this group since congress until the Constitution of February 7, 2009, elected the 
president if the winner in the popular election does not receive at least 50% of the votes. Peru is the 
other exception since the country also has a prime minister that is accountable to congress. Bolivia is 
still clearly presidential in Siaroff’s scheme, while Peru belongs to a group of what one might define as 
semi-presidential countries. Most analysts, nevertheless, treat Peru as pure presidential. According to 
the definition I gave above, both countries, however, are regarded as presidential.  
5 Another, related, but distinct phenomenon is the coloured revolutions in Eastern Europe. These have 
occurred in semi-presidential regimes that are often called competitive, or electoral authoritarian 
regimes, and have been connected to less than perfect elections (see e.g. Levitsky and Way 2002, 2005, 
2006; Way 2005a, 2005b). Thus, these cases are outside the scope of presidential interruption as I have 
defined the concept.  
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question. The second relates to my academic curiosity and the interesting questions 
that are raised by the occurrence of this new form of executive instability.  
 
A presidential interruption is a critical event in any presidential democracy, and even 
more so in newly established democracies. Often presidential interruptions are 
accompanied by high levels of political protests, increased polarisation between elites 
within and outside political institutions, violent clashes between police and 
demonstrators, and the uncertainty surrounding these incidents have in some cases put 
the whole democratic regime at risk. The attention on the president leading up to a 
presidential interruption and ever increasing the pressure on the chief executive from 
all sides, paralyse any other political activity at the moment. Furthermore, presidential 
interruptions are important events that have consequences for the regimes in which 
they occur. A presidential interruption, and the way it is handled, certainly has short-
term consequences for the political situation in the country, who’s in charge, the 
legitimacy for the incoming president and the regime, but may also entail long-term 
consequences that are not easily identified, and set precedents for future conflict-
handling (Valenzuela 1992). Thus, one might even say that presidential interruptions 
to varying degrees are critical junctures for the regimes in question. It is therefore 
important to identify the causes, and the implications of presidential interruptions.  
 
Presidential interruptions also constitute a relatively new phenomenon in the region, 
which raises the need to understand this type of executive instability. Latin America 
has for a long time been a region with unstable regimes and governments. 
Nevertheless, presidential interruptions, as defined here, have very seldom occurred 
prior to the current democratic period. Most executive instability in the past has 
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involved changes from democracy to authoritarianism, or the other way around. Of all 
presidential crises between WWII and 1980, only three cases fall within the definition 
of a presidential interruption.6 Given the fact that a presidential interruption is a new 
form of instability that separates executive from regime instability in presidential 
regimes, there is also a need for new, conceptual tools to handle these cases 
analytically. This requires careful conceptual analysis, which I try to provide 
throughout this dissertation, but especially in Chapters 3 and 7.  
 
Entering the debates on presidential interruptions 
The last five years, presidential interruptions have received some attention among 
scholars of comparative politics in general and Latin American politics in particular. 
Several comparative studies have aimed at identifying the causes of presidential 
interruptions (Helmke 2007; Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; 
Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2005, 2007; Valenzuela 2004; Kim and Bahry 2008).7 It 
has been argued that factors such as the regime type and institutions cause 
interruptions in similar ways as they affected democratic breakdowns (Linz 1990, 
1994; Valenzuela 1993, 2004; Negretto 2006). Countering the instutionalist claims, 
Hochstetler (2006) on the other hand, argues that most presidential interruptions in 
South America were preceded by street protests, and that congresses, and inter-
institutional conflicts, played a minor role in deposing the presidents. These street 
protests have often been caused by media exposed scandals implicating presidents 
                                                
6 Those are the interruptions of President Velasco Ibarra in Ecuador in 1961, and of Presidents 
Coimbra da Luz and Café Filho in Brazil in 1955, see Pérez-Liñán (2007: 61). However, one stark 
contrast between these three cases and most of the cases dealt with in this dissertation is the level of 
involvement of the military. Both in Ecuador in 1961 and Brazil in 1955, the military was the driving 
force leading the legislatures to remove the presidents, while in the great majority of the Third Wave 
cases, the military has played a minor role.  
7 For a recent review, see Pérez-Liñán (2008). There are also numerous case-studies of several of these 
events, especially the cases of Argentina, Venezuela, and Brazil.  
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(Pérez-Liñán 2003a, 2007). I call this debate the institutions vs. the streets debate, and 
discuss it thoroughly in several chapters of this dissertation. In order to better 
investigate whether actors within institutions or in the streets are more important in 
provoking presidential interruptions, I argue that there is a need to distinguish 
between underlying and triggering causes of presidential interruptions (Chapter 2), 
and that the current literature has been too focused on triggering causes. The 
distinction between underlying and triggering causes exists implicitly in the old 
debate on the causes of democratic breakdowns, and also underpins much of the 
understanding and debate on the causes of interruptions. Failing to make this 
distinction in empirical analysis only muddies the waters, and is one of the reasons 
why the scholars involved in the debate fail to reach an agreement. Through 
comparative analysis combined with process tracing in Chapter 4, I find that street 
challenges, or vertical challenges as I call them in this dissertation, are more 
important as a trigger of presidential interruption than institutional, or horizontal 
challenges. However, when analysing the underlying causes of interruptions in 
Chapter 6, I find that the institutionalist seem to be right. Inter-institutional conflicts, 
or horizontal conflicts, are more important as underlying causes than street protests, 
or vertical conflicts, such as demonstrations, strikes, roadblocks, etc. In Chapter 7 I 
combine qualitative comparative analysis with typologies, and pursue the institutions 
vs. the streets debate further, and explain why in most cases the vertical challenges 
are more important than horizontal challenges, whereas in some other cases the 
vertical challenges are relatively less important.  
 
The finding in Chapter 6 that the general level of vertical conflicts such as 
demonstrations, strikes and roadblocks is not related to either challenges to presidents 
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or interruptions could be somewhat surprising considering the current knowledge 
about presidential interruptions. Nevertheless, I argue that not all types of protests and 
conflicts are related to challenges and interruptions of presidents. Some types of 
vertical conflicts are rather institutionalised in the democracies in question, such as 
strikes organised by labour unions, and often conflicts related to salaries and working 
conditions are relatively more institutionalised through corporatist structures than 
other types of conflicts. Therefore I suggest distinguishing between different types of 
vertical conflicts according to which cleavages or issue dimensions that motivates the 
protesters. Only conflicts motivated by cleavages that are underrepresented and 
therefore also constitute challenges to the status quo, should one expect might 
constitute a threat to a president. In Chapter 6, I therefore provide the first analysis of 
how conflicts motivated by different cleavages, and organised by different types of 
organisations influence the likelihood of challenges to presidents and interruptions. I 
find that conflicts motivated by the traditional left-right cleavage or conflicts 
organised by labour unions, do not influence the likelihood of either challenges or 
interruptions, whereas conflicts motivated by regional or cultural/ethnic cleavages or 
conflicts organised by new social movements or peasant organisations indeed have a 
significant effect on the likelihood of interruptions and challenges to presidents.  
 
Finally, there is even less research done on the consequences and implications of 
presidential interruptions in Latin America. What are the consequences of presidential 
interruptions for democracy, for presidentialism, and for the level of contention in the 
streets and congress? Do presidential interruptions solve the crises leading to 
challenges and interruptions? Some studies have pointed to increased levels of 
accountability, after all, removing a president for his or her actions or inactions is a 
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form of holding a president accountable, and increased congressional powers vis-à-vis 
the presidency (Marsteintredet 2008b; Pérez-Liñán 2005). Others have found few 
discernable implications, and if any, only positive implications for the regimes in 
question (Hochstetler and Samuels Forthcoming). I argue that the consequences of 
presidential interruptions are linked to the causes of the interruption, and should not 
only be seen as a form of holding a president accountable, but also as reactive 
sequences aiming to reverse decisions or provide a change in the status quo. 
Therefore in the search for implications of interruptions, analytical techniques 
assuming causal homogeneity will be hard-pressed to find significant results. In 
Chapter 7 I construct a typology of interruptions in order to trace the consequences of 
interruptions and explore the variation of these consequences across three types of 
interruption.  
Chapter outline 
The next chapter, Chapter 2, discusses some theoretical considerations concerning the 
phenomenon of presidential interruptions, its causes and potential outcomes. I 
particularly focus on theories relating to cleavages and cleavage formation in 
democracies. This chapter also presents a heuristic, causal model of presidential 
interruptions and challenges to presidents, which I use to analyse the topic at hand in 
the following chapters. The causal model clearly distinguishes between underlying 
and triggering causes, and the chapter discusses how this understanding of causality 
underpins the institutional literature on democratic breakdown as well as the literature 
on presidential interruptions. 
 
Chapter 3 combines empirical with conceptual analysis in order to map the semantic 
field of different types of executive instability across time and across presidential and 
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parliamentary regimes. Since this chapter has a clear conceptual goal, it precedes the 
methodological discussion that comes in Chapter 4. Chapter 3 compares presidential 
interruptions with democratic breakdowns, and also with unscheduled changes of 
government in parliamentary regimes. While there are striking similarities between 
interruptions and breakdowns at the causal level, the analysis also clearly shows that 
both phenomena are not caused by the same causes. The comparison with executive 
instability in parliamentary regimes shows that while presidential regimes apply 
similar procedures to remove presidents to the ones used to remove prime ministers, 
an important difference is that these procedures are not always constitutional or 
legitimate in presidential regimes. The chapter concludes that presidential 
interruptions constitute a proper phenomenon of executive instability.  
 
In Chapter 4, I present the data on which the rest of my empirical analyses are based. 
Based on the Latin American Weekly Report I construct a dataset on political 
conflicts in Latin America, which I use for both qualitative and quantitative analysis 
in Chapters 5-7. Chapter 4 presents the key variables in the dataset and 
operationalises these. The chapter also has an appendix in which the coding rules for 
the key variables are spelled out. The chapter further presents the data, and compares 
key variables over time and across space. As such the chapter also functions as a first 
empirical overview of different types of conflicts, challenges and interruptions in 
Latin America.  
 
Chapter 5 discusses the triggering causes of presidential interruptions, and is devoted 
to the institutions vs. the streets debate. I argue that horizontal and vertical challenges 
should be understood as triggering causes of interruptions, and chapter 5 traces which 
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of the vertical or horizontal challenges are the more important triggers of 
interruptions. I find that vertical challenges are more important than horizontal 
challenges as a trigger of presidential interruptions. Accompanying this chapter is a 
longer appendix of the qualitative process tracing of each and every interruption in 
Latin America since 1980. This analysis makes up the qualitative evidence used to 
categorise the cases of interruptions and challenges in Chapter 5 and also Chapter 7.  
 
Chapter 6 analyses the underlying causes of presidential interruptions and challenges 
to presidents through the use of statistical techniques combined with process tracing. 
First, this chapter argues for the importance of studying underlying causes in the 
social sciences in general and in the study of interruptions in particular. Second, the 
chapter takes up the institutions vs. the streets debate again, but this time as 
underlying causes. I find that horizontal conflicts are more important in causing 
challenges and interruptions than vertical conflicts. Third, the chapter distinguishes 
between different types of conflicts based on the explicit cleavage motivating the 
conflict and also on the type of organisation that organises the conflict. These 
variables work as proxies for the emergence and salience of different cleavages in the 
countries studied. I find that conflicts motivated by regional (centre-periphery) and 
ethnic/cultural cleavages cause interruptions and challenges, the same is true for 
conflicts organised by new social movements or peasant organisations, whereas 
conflicts motivated by the left-right cleavage or organised by labour unions are not 
related to either interruptions or challenges. Finally, I provide further qualitative 
evidence for this finding, and come with some qualified speculation as to why I find 
this pattern.  
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Chapter 7 is mostly dedicated to the consequences of presidential interruptions, a 
topic that has not been much studied in the literature so far. I argue that interruptions 
should be linked to the principal cause of the interruption, and provide a simple rule 
for identifying this cause. Based on the primary motivation for the first challenge to 
presidents in each interruption, I create a typology of three types of interruptions and 
use this typology to explain the variation in importance of vertical vs. horizontal 
pressure against presidents in each interruption, and also explain the variation in 
outcomes and consequences of interruptions. Through my inductive mapping of 
interruptions, I identify three types of motivations for removing presidents: a 
presidential scandal, a president’s democratic violations, and a president’s (often 
failed) policies. I show that the consequences of interruptions are related to the causes 
of interruptions, and that they vary systematically across the types of interruption. 
 
Finally, the concluding chapter, Chapter 8, summarises the arguments put forward in 
this dissertation, and briefly looks beyond the scope of this dissertation to presidential 
regimes in other regions, and enters into a relatively normative debate of whether or 
not interruptions are good for democracy in Latin America. 
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Introduction 
This chapter deals with some theoretical considerations regarding the topic of 
presidential interruptions. First, the chapter will discuss the concept of presidential 
interruptions, and relate this to other, similar social phenomena. In order to 
understand what a presidential interruption is, it is important to situate the concept in 
its semantic field. The concept of presidential interruption will be discussed and 
compared to democratic breakdowns, transitions to democracy and governmental 
interruptions in parliamentary regimes. Empirically, I deal with these issues in 
Chapter 3. 
 
Second, the chapter presents a theoretical discussion on the causes of presidential 
interruptions. I create a model that distinguishes between triggering and underlying 
causes. The model identifies challenges, vertical and horizontal, as triggering causes, 
and points to institutions, an administration’s political and economic performance, 
scandals, the role of democracy, and, in particular, the mobilisation of new cleavages 
as underlying causal factors explaining the occurrence of presidential interruptions. 
Empirically, I analyse the triggering causes in Chapter 5, and the underlying causes in 
Chapter 6.  
 
Third, the chapter deals with the outcomes of presidential interruptions. I understand 
presidential interruption as one form of holding presidents accountable for their 
actions, and therefore link the outcomes of interruptions to the principal motivation, 
or cause, for the opposition to seek a president’s ouster. I therefore argue that the 
outcomes are linked to the causes of interruption. Empirically, I analyse these issues 
in Chapter 7. 
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The Concept of Presidential Interruption 
Several concepts for the same phenomenon exists in the literature today, this is not 
unusual for the discipline of comparative politics. Collier and Levitsky counted 
several hundred types of democracy with adjectives in the late 1990s, and despite 
their efforts at conceptual clarification, there is no reason to believe that there are 
fewer today (Collier and Levitsky 1997). This dissertation will use the term 
presidential interruption; a term used by Arturo Valenzuela in what seems to be the 
first treatment of the phenomenon (Valenzuela 2004), and also preferred by Negretto 
(2006) and Kim and Bahry (2008).8 Valenzuela (2004: 7) defines interrupted 
presidents as“...presidents [that] failed to complete their constitutionally prescribed 
terms”, but also calls these presidencies failed presidencies. Kathryn Hochstetler 
(2006: 402) uses the term presidential falls “...to identify all the times elected 
presidents left office before their terms were completed, whether they resigned or 
were impeached or otherwise forced out of office.”
9
 Others prefer presidential 
instability (“inestabilidad presidencial”) (Ollier 2008), whereas Pérez-Liñán (2007) 
prefers either the more generic presidential crisis or presidential removal, but also, 
presidential instability (Pérez-Liñán 2008).10 A forthcoming edited book on this topic 
uses the term presidential breakdown (Llanos and Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010). 
 
                                                
8 Other works had already circulated on topics of the recent impeachments in Latin America, but 
Valenzuela was the first to deal with all interruptions and not only the impeachment, or impeachment-
like, cases. See Pérez-Liñán (2003a; 2003b). 
9 Others such as Llanos and Margheritis (2006), and Weyland (1993) have also used the term 
presidential falls.  
10 Some also prefer constitutional crisis (Pérez-Liñán 2005), or institutional instability (Helmke 2007), 
but these terms normally reflect that the authors have moved up the ladder of abstraction and are 
discussing phenomena that are more general than a presidential interruption for instance by studying 
both democratic breakdown and presidential interruptions over time, or by looking at both 
congressional and presidential interruptions.  
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This dissertation uses presidential interruptions instead of concepts such as 
presidential instability, presidential falls, presidential crisis or presidential removals.11 
The active tense of presidential interruption is preferable to the passive tense 
(interrupted presidencies) used by other authors, and to the term instability, since 
interruption better captures the fact that actions are required in order to remove a 
president. One of the most used assumptions in comparative politics is that politicians 
are power-seekers and thus seek to get elected, and re-elected (e.g. Geddes 1994). 
Thus, politicians are not expected to resign or leave office without any external 
pressure. Furthermore, I prefer interruption to removal, since interruption better 
captures the acuteness and level of crisis involved in these events. Interruptions also 
indicate that these events are not necessarily part of the normal, day-to-day politics, 
but rather extra-ordinary events in politics. Since I myself, by using presidential 
breakdown in a publication (Llanos and Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010), have 
added personally to any potential conceptual confusion, I add that the concept of 
presidential breakdown emphasises more the causes of a president’s ouster, whereas 
the concept of interruption also entails a focus on the succession and consequences of 
a president’s fall. The edited book (Llanos and Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010) 
focuses more on the causes of an interruption, whereas in my dissertation I also focus 
on what occurs after the president’s ouster and therefore prefer the concept of 
interruption. 
 
Regarding the definition of a presidential interruption, however the term is coined, 
there is less disagreement. This dissertation defines a presidential interruption as a 
premature, extraordinary and forced exit of an elected president that does not lead to a 
                                                
11 To vary the language somewhat throughout this dissertation, I will sometimes use other words than 
interruption for the phenomenon of a presidential interruption. 
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democratic breakdown. This definition is in accordance with the authors cited above, 
but is somewhat more open. The definitions cited above refer to the “constitutionally 
prescribed term” and “completed term”, whereas I emphasise the premature exit of a 
president. The reason for this is that the length of the term might be shortened through 
constitutional reforms, as in the case of Balaguer in 1994, or just be shortened after 
external pressure as with Siles Zuazo in Bolivia. It can be argued that both completed 
their terms, one even completed his constitutional term (Balaguer), and would 
according to the definitions given above, be excluded from the sample of presidential 
interruptions.12 Finally, I also add the condition of the presidential interruption not 
being accompanied, or part of, a democratic breakdown.13 All in all there is a general 
agreement on how to define presidential interruption, even though some variations 
occur, and accordingly which cases are covered by the concept.14  
 
The criteria of a presidential interruption 
Four criteria in this definition deserve a short discussion, and I focus on how the 
intension of the concept is related to the extension of the concept (see e.g. Sartori 
                                                
12 Valenzuela (2004) includes both cases, and Hochstetler (2006) excludes the Dominican case, but on 
account of her only treating the South American cases of presidential interruption. I thank Andrew 
Schrank for bringing this discrepancy between the definition of the phenomenon and the sample to my 
attention. For a further discussion on this topic, see Marsteintredet (Forthcoming 2010).  
13 It cannot be part of a full transition towards democracy for that matter since I insist that presidential 
interruptions is confined to democratically elected presidents.  
14 Basically the differences relate to whether to include only elected presidents (which would exclude 
the early exit of President Duhalde in Argentina in 2003), whether to include vice-presidents as part of 
the group of elected presidents (which decides the inclusion or exclusion of the early exit of President 
Mesa in Bolivia in 2005), whether calls for early elections are considered part of the phenomenon 
(inclusion or exclusion of President Siles Zuazo, among others), and whether the focus of the definition 
is on the completion of the constitutionally prescribed electoral term (inclusion or exclusion of 
President Balaguer in the Dominican Republic in 1994). Methodological reasons for different case 
selections include the time-period studied, and where to put the lower threshold for considering a 
regime democratic (often the dilemma of including the fall of Fujimori in 2000 or not). My definition 
includes the case of Mesa since he was elected Vice-president, but excludes Duhalde and other interim 
presidents. I include the Balaguer case, but exclude the Sarney case since I insist that the interruption 
should be extraordinary, the change in the electoral cycle in Brazil, was permanent. I exclude the cases 
of accidents (Roldós), suicides (Guzmán) or illness (Banzer) since I add that the exit should be forced. 
Naturally, the countries included in the study and the time-period covered will also affect which 
interruptions to include for analysis.  
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1970). First of all, it is important to discuss the relationship between these criteria: in 
the definition given above, each criterion is necessary, and together the criteria are 
sufficient for a presidential interruption as understood in this thesis. The criteria thus 
constitute what Goertz (2006: 61) would call a conjunction of necessary conditions, 
and form what is called a classical concept (Collier and Mahon 1993).15 The criteria 
or conditions of my definition are: a) a president must be democratically elected, b) 
the president must be forced to leave, c) the exit of the president must be 
extraordinary, and d) the democratic regime must survive the fall of the president.  
 
A democratically elected president 
Presidential interruptions occur within democratic regimes, and this criterion 
separates a presidential interruption from e.g. transitions towards democracy. The 
change of head of state or government within a non-democratic regime can either be a 
transition to a democracy, or just be the continuation of the non-democratic regime. A 
governmental change involving the change of regime from non-democratic to 
democratic, is just a transition to democracy as occurred in several regimes in Latin 
America when the military left power to elected, civilian authorities. A transition to 
democracy might share some of the causes of a presidential interruption, such as 
economic crisis, low legitimacy (e.g. the military regime in Argentina after the War of 
                                                
15 Pérez-Liñán (2008: 108-109) sees presidential interruptions as a radial concept when analysing it in 
relation to presidential crises and “coup d’etáts”. Thus, the author apparently allows for variation 
within each concept based on substitutable indicators of the phenomena. But, what Pérez-Liñán 
actually does is to change the overarching concept to presidential instability, and argue that presidential 
instability is a radial concept, or possibly a family resemblance concept as Goertz (2006: ch. 2) 
understands it, that is not constituted by criteria that are necessary and jointly sufficient, but by 
substitutable criteria. Presidential interruption, coup d’etát, and autogolpe constitute these substitutable 
criteria. To distinguish between different types of presidential interruptions, the author allows for 
variation of procedures of presidential interruptions, which in the conceptual lingo might be dubbed the 
indicator level. Since all interruptions must share a list of necessary and jointly sufficient criteria, I 
argue that the types constructed on the basis of procedures are that of classical subtypes, not radial 
types. For radial and family resemblance concepts, see Wittgenstein (1967), Lakoff (1987), Sartori 
(1984), Collier and Mahon (1993), Goertz (2006), and Marsteintredet (2007).  
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the Falklands), or dictatorial excesses that resemble modern-day scandals that topple 
presidents. Nevertheless, a transition to democracy is clearly a distinct phenomenon 
from a presidential interruption in that the regime type within which the incidents 
occur are different, and the outcomes are different since one entails a regime change, 
whereas the other does not. A change of head of state in a non-democratic regime is 
also a distinct phenomenon from a presidential interruption. Therefore, the scope of 
our analysis is restricted to presidential democracies in Latin America. This criterion 
excludes for instance the ouster of Presiden Del Valle in Panama in 1988 since 
Panama became a democracy in 1990.  
 
A democratically elected president is a term that includes the vice-president elected 
on the same ticket as the president, and presidents who have gotten the position as 
successors in the constitutionally prescribed line of presidential succession. I exclude 
from causal analysis presidents elected by congress, or by other procedures not 
prescribed in the respective countries’ constitutions. The reason is that these 
presidents are more often than not only caretaker presidents that have as their 
principal mission to rule the country until the next (often early) elections. Caretaker 
presidents are not included in the analysis in this dissertation. This leads to the 
exclusion of President Duhalde’s shortened presidential term in Argentina,16 but 
includes President Mesa’s interrupted presidency in Bolivia. 
 
                                                
16 The criterion also leads to the exclusion of other shortened presidencies, such as Alarcón in Ecuador, 
and Paniagua in Peru. But, these caretaker presidents were not forced to shorten their presidencies, and 
took over the presidencies with the clear agreement of holding elections as soon as conveniently 
possible. Thus, these presidencies are also excluded by the criterion of a forceful removal of president. 
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The forceful removal of the president  
A president must be forcefully removed in order for the case to be considered an 
interruption. That excludes cases caused by natural deaths, suicides, illnesses 
preventing a president from completing the term, and president-initiated early election 
in which the incumbent can run (and win).17 These are what I would define as trivial, 
or accidental cases, and these are not relevant for the topic at hand. Within my time-
period of analysis, this criterion excludes three cases: the death of President Roldós in 
Ecuador due to a plane crash in 1981, the suicide of President Guzmán in the 
Dominican Republic in 1982, and the resignation of President Banzer in Bolivia in 
2001 due to terminal cancer.18 An illness or an accident cannot be predicted by the 
factors a social scientist normally studies in explaining social phenomena. So, even 
though including these cases would have increased the N of the analysis at hand, they 
fall outside the scope of the concept of presidential interruption.  
 
The extraordinary exit of a president 
I also add the criterion that the forced exit of a president should be extraordinary. It 
goes without saying that this criterion excludes changes of government through 
ordinary elections. But, what is more important is that this criterion excludes 
                                                
17 All presidents that have called for early elections and been able to run, have won the election. In fact, 
in Latin American since 1980 only one incumbent president has run and lost a presidential election. 
This was President Mejía of the PRD (Partido Revolucionario Dominicano) in the Dominican Republic 
in the 2004 election. So, this criterion does not exclude any potential cases of interruption.  
18 Kim and Bahry (2008) includes the case of Guzmán in the Dominican Republic in 1982 on account 
of him committing suicide during the outburst of a scandal involving his government, and especially 
his daughter who was a member of the government. This might be so, but there is no way of knowing 
this. Guzmán committed suicide in his private bathroom in the presidential palace without leaving a 
note behind. The reasons for his suicide are still not clear. If this case was to be included, one should 
also have included the case of Banzer who, during duress, resigned due to his health conditions and 
ongoing cancer treatment. Kim and Bahry (2008), however, mysteriously exclude this case. The level 
of social protests against Banzer were clearly much higher than against Guzmán at the time of them 
ending their presidencies (Guzmán is also still remembered in the Dominican Republic of being the 
“cleanest” president in the latest democratic period, which started with his presidency), thus including 
one on account of scandals and protests, should have led to the inclusion of the other. In this 
dissertation I exclude both.  
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permanent changes in the electoral calendar. Often through electoral or constitutional 
reforms, the electoral calendar is also changed. If these changes in addition to 
shortening the incumbent president’s term also constitute permanent changes of the 
electoral calendar, they are not considered presidential interruptions. This criterion 
separates the case of President Balaguer, who got his presidential term shortened to 
two years in 1994, and President Sarney who got his presidential term shortened in 
1988. The difference is that the reform in the Dominican Republic was extraordinary 
and the change in the electoral calendar only affected President Balaguer’s term, 
whereas in Brazil the shortening of the presidential term was permanent and affected 
all presidents after Sarney as well as the incumbent president’s term.  
 
Survival of the democratic regime 
The fourth criterion is that the democratic regime survives a presidential interruption. 
This criterion separates a presidential interruption from a breakdown of democracy, 
i.e. a non-democratic take-over of the democratic government that leads to the end of 
the democratic regime. Again, at the causal level a democratic breakdown and a 
presidential interruption might share causes such as economic distress, increased 
conflict-level in society, etc. But, often the actors are different; a democratic 
breakdown often involves the military (even though the military need not take over 
the government). The level of military involvement in presidential interruptions need 
not be zero, but it is significantly lower than in democratic breakdowns. The crucial 
difference between a democratic breakdown and a presidential interruption, is that in 
a presidential interruption the democratic regime survives the interruption. This 
distinction that separates executive and regime instability, is also a new one for Latin 
America, and one which for the period under study in this dissertation leads to the 
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exclusion of the falls of president Aristide in Haiti in 1991 and 2004, and Fujimori’s 
autogolpe in 1992.19 None of the cases listed in the introductory chapter ended with a 
democratic breakdown, even though in some cases the survival of democracy was 
indeed in peril. Despite democratic breakdowns and presidential interruption being 
two different social phenomena, I show in the following that the study of presidential 
interruptions has borrowed theories from the democratic breakdown literature to 
explain the occurrence of presidential interruptions.  
 
Placing presidential interruptions in its semantic field 
An important part of conceptualising social phenomena is to place the phenomenon in 
relation to other similar phenomena, and consequently, situate the concept in its 
semantic field (Collier et al. nd). Presidential interruptions are interesting because 
they are not supposed to happen given the fact that presidents are elected for fixed 
terms, a trait that actually defines presidentialism (e.g. Shugart and Carey 1992). A 
presidential interruption may thus (at least in some cases) be unconstitutional and 
even undemocratic. In that respect the phenomenon may be compared to democratic 
breakdowns. Both phenomena involve executive instability, both may be 
unconstitutional, involve violence, military actions, etc. Nevertheless, as I pointed out 
above, there is one crucial difference: Whereas democratic breakdown also involves 
regime instability, a presidential interruption only involves executive instability.  
 
Executive instability in presidential regimes is therefore also in a way similar to 
unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes. In parliamentary 
                                                
19 These three cases would also have been excluded by other criteria of presidential interruptions. Haiti 
is a semi-presidential regime, whereas Fujimori was not interrupted, but rather abolished congress, and 
interrupted democracy.  
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regimes governmental changes occur whenever the majority in parliament so desires, 
and of course do not entail democratic breakdown. This feature of parliamentarism is 
what distinguishes parliamentary from presidential regimes. There is, however, one 
great difference between presidential interruptions and unscheduled changes of 
government in parliamentary regimes. In parliamentary regimes executive instability 
between elections or via the calls for early elections is clearly constitutional and even 
expected at times, whereas in presidential regimes, with the exception of 
impeachment, executive instability is normally not a constitutional option, and is 
clearly unexpected. This crucial difference constitutes the basis for one of Linz’s main 
criticism’s of presidential regimes (Linz 1990, 1994). Linz, however, expected critical 
inter-institutional conflicts to end in democratic breakdowns, and therefore 
presidential interruptions defy his expectations. Executive instability (even in 
presidential regimes) is far better than democratic instability, and may entail 
important consequences for presidentialism and not least of all, the understanding of 
how presidential regimes work during moments of crisis.  
 
Presidential interruptions, I argue, can be placed as somewhere between the 
democratic breakdown, a phenomenon well known throughout Latin America’s 
history since independence, and the unscheduled parliamentary changes of 
government known from political systems in Europe, and historically Western-
Europe. Chapter 3 will further investigate how similar and how different the 
phenomenon of presidential interruption is from the historical cases of democratic 
breakdown in Latin America and unscheduled changes of government in 
parliamentary regimes, and discuss whether one can argue that presidential 
interruptions constitute a new phenomenon altogether. The primary goal is to situate 
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the phenomenon in its semantic field through the use of various comparative 
techniques, and improve the understanding of this type of executive instability in 
presidential regimes.  
 
Causes of presidential interruptions 
An important element of comparative politics is causal explanations of social 
phenomena. This section focuses on institutional, economic and socio-economic, 
scandals, and regime-related causes of interruptions. Most space, however, will be 
dedicated to the role of cleavages, representation, party systems, and the role of 
protests motivated by underrepresented cleavages and groups in political systems. The 
reason is that, in my view, these factors play an important, and hitherto ignored role in 
producing presidential interruptions. The section concludes with a look at how several 
causal factors are linked, and provides a causal model of the relationship between the 
explanatory (triggering and underlying) and dependent variables.  
 
A summary: Institutions, the streets, performance, regime and 
presidential interruptions 
Institutions have been at the heart of studies of the democratic regimes in Latin 
America since the 1990’s, much of this is generated by Juan Linz’s two articles that 
criticise the presidential systems in general, and more specifically in Latin America 
(Linz 1990, 1994).20 Linz talked of the perils for democracy caused by presidential 
institutions rather than the perils for presidents. Nevertheless, the literature on 
                                                
20 For two reviews of the institutional debate, see Munck (2004) and especially Elgie (2005). Linz has 
also inspired a lot of students of Latin American politics before these publications as well, see 
Mainwaring (1998). For the latest thorough treatment of the hypotheses within this line of research, see 
Cheibub (2007).  
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democratic breakdown has many insights that are relevant for the debate on 
presidential interruptions.  
 
In the above-cited articles Linz argues that the presidential system is not as good as 
parliamentary systems in upholding stable democratic regimes. The explanation lies 
in the fixed terms for presidents and congress, and the separate elections of the two 
institutions. According to Linz, this creates two separate, but related, problems: the 
rigidity of the presidential system makes solving conflicts, or crises, difficult; and the 
dual democratic legitimacy of the two elected institutions, which ultimately creates 
problems of deadlocks.21 Linz argued that the rigidity and dual democratic legitimacy 
would make these conflicts hard to resolve within the democratic institutions, and 
thus make presidential systems more vulnerable to democratic breakdowns than 
parliamentary systems. These problems were particularly acute during minority 
governments. Needless to say, Linz’s theory has been tested by several other authors 
with diverging results (e.g. Alvarez 1998; Cheibub 2002, 2007; Przeworski et al. 
2000; Stepan and Skach 1994). The findings, however, generally support that 
presidential democracies break down more often, and live shorter lives than 
parliamentary democracies, but Cheibub (2007) argues that this is due to the military 
legacy from the previous authoritarian regime, and cannot be attributed to the 
presidential institutions per se.22  
                                                
21 Deadlocks have however turned out to become quite an elusive concept. Few have operationalised 
this variable despite being central to institutional theories of democracy for quite some time. See for 
instance Ames’s (2001) brilliant book on deadlocks and democracy in Brazil, which does not include a 
definition of the concept. A few exceptions to this rule apply. See Jones (1995), Mayhew (1991), and 
Negretto (2006) for news-based operationalisation of deadlocks. For operationalisations based on 
legislative activity, see Saiegh (2004), and with better data, see García Montero (2004; 2006; 2007). I 
provide a fuller discussion of this topic in Marsteintredet (2008a).  
22 Several authors have also modified Linz’s arguments, mainly by stating different conditions under 
which inter-institutional conflicts and deadlocks were to occur (Cheibub 2002; Cheibub and Limongi 
2002; Cheibub et al. 2004; Jones 1995; Mainwaring 1990, 1993; Shugart and Carey 1992; Shugart and 
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Valenzuela (2004) basically uses Linz’s (and his own previous (Valenzuela 1993, 
1994)) arguments to explain the occurrence of presidential interruptions, thus 
applying a theory of democratic breakdown directly on presidential interruptions. 
Same causes, new outcome: congressionally weak presidents tend to become 
interrupted. Negretto (2006) follows up on Valenzuela’s argument, and argues that 
minority presidents are interrupted when they do not control the median voter in 
congress. The problem with this analysis is not that it is wrong, but that Negretto does 
not control for extrainstitutional factors at all. Empirical evidence from the Latin 
American cases of presidential interruption point to popular protests being of equal or 
greater importance in providing the pressure required to remove a president from 
office (Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007, 2008). One might say that the causal path 
provided by institutionalists, by which a presidential interruption is supposed to occur 
may have problems passing the test of process-tracing since the processes leading to 
presidential interruptions seem to be different from the ones predicted by 
institutionalists.23 
 
People need reasons to protest, and protests occur for many reasons, but one of the 
more important reasons is probably related to an administration’s performance, which 
often in empirical analyses means the state of the economy. There is a disagreement 
in the literature on the direction of the effect neoliberalism has upon social 
mobilisation (see e.g. Kurtz 2004; Hochstetler 2006; Arce and Bellinger Jr. 2007), but 
few doubt that the economy and national economic models affect the level of societal 
mobilisation. Well-known labour union actions such as the strike, are a tactic to get 
                                                                                                                                      
Mainwaring 1997; Tsebelis 1995, 2002). Linz’s original and the subsequent moderated models are 
brilliantly summarised and analysed in Cheibub (2007). 
23 For process-tracing, see George and Bennett (2005). 
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salaries raised, and secure jobs, which ultimately also is related to the economy. A 
grievance model of social protests directed against governments and policies, would 
indicate groups protest when the economy is faltering, either due to bad economic 
results, or through the loss of value of citizens’ money.24 Presidents as heads of state 
and government might often be easy targets to blame in dire economic conditions. 
Thus, bad economic performance, which also works as a proxy for an 
administration’s performance in general, is hypothesised to increase the likelihood of 
presidential challenges, and ultimately interruptions.25  
 
In any democracy, elected officials must abide by the laws. One important difference 
between an authoritarian and a democratic system is that voters (at least theoretically) 
can hold their leaders accountable, independent institutions (are supposed to) control 
each other, everyone, including political leaders, is (supposed to be) equal before the 
law, and free speech allows for critical media. Thus if it is discovered that an elected 
leader, be that a president, a governor or a legislator, has committed any serious 
infraction of the law (or the constitution), the elected official runs the risk of losing 
his or her office. Thus in democratic regimes, scandals involving the president, a 
president’s close advisors, or the government, are likely to affect the survival of 
presidents in office (Pérez-Liñán 2007).26 There are two pre-requisites for a scandal to 
become a peril for the president’s office: independent institutions (or horizontal 
accountability), and a free press. These two conditions are to an increasing degree met 
in Latin America during the last 25 years (Pérez-Liñán 2007: ch.4). First, a 
                                                
24 The relationship need not be linear of course, and might depend for instance on the level of economic 
development. It is quite possible that there is a threshold in economic, technological or educational 
development that must be met before economic results start affecting protest levels. 
25 By presidential challenge, I understand any attempt at presidential removal, see Hochstetler (2006), 
and Chapter 4.  
26 Scandals are also likely to affect ministers and chief executives’ survival in office in parliamentary 
regimes as well (Midtbø 2007).  
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presidential scandal might invoke an impeachment, a procedure that requires 
independence between a congress and a president.27 Regimes that fall into the grey 
zone,28 all fall short of some important features of democracy. The focus has often 
been on elections (see especially Schedler 2002), but often these regimes lack 
horizontal accountability as well,29 which means that congress, or the court system, is 
not able to check executive power. Second, it takes a free press and exposure of any 
presidential wrongdoing in order to create a scandal, which must be exposed during 
the president’s term in order to affect his or her survival in office.  
 
Thus: “Cabe suponer que el grado de democratización del sistema afecta 
sustancialmente la dinámica de las crisis presidenciales...” (Pérez-Liñán 2003b: 
153). The scope of this dissertation is to deal with presidential democracies in Latin 
America. Nevertheless, even within democracies there is ample variation across 
regimes, depending somewhat on one’s definition of democracy. Many have focused 
on what consolidates democracies and (to a lesser extent) authoritarian regimes (e.g. 
Gandhi and Przeworski 2007; Linz and Stepan 1996; Mainwaring et al. 1992), and in 
terms of grey zone regimes several scholars have argued that they are inherently 
unstable because of the contradiction between the regime’s rhetoric of democracy and 
the otherwise authoritarian behaviour, especially during the ultimate democratic test: 
elections (Levitsky and Way 2002; Schedler 2002, 2006). Thus, one hypothesis would 
be that regimes at the lower end of a democracy-authoritarianism continuum, but still 
                                                
27 This is similar, but not equal, to what Baumgartner (2003: 7-8) calls the institutional balance of 
power. Other factors of course also affect the process of impeachment. Baumgartner adds the 
constitutional and statutory provisions for impeachment, the structure of party politics, the president’s 
popularity and other factors such as liberal media (Baumgartner 2003: 8-13).  
28  The grey zone includes hybrid regimes (Diamond 2002), semi-democracies (Mainwaring, Brinks, 
and Perez-Liñán 2001), and competitive (Levitsky and Way 2002) or electoral (Schedler 2002) 
authoritarian regimes. Consult these references for further discussions of the topic of hybrid regimes. 
29 This dissertation will not enter into the dispute of what horizontal accountability actually means and 
whether or not this concept should be part of a definition of democracy. For a discussion of this 
concept in the Latin American context, see Mainwaring and Welna (2003). 
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democratic, are more prone to presidential interruptions than more democratic 
regimes.30 Or, given the discussion above in relation to presidential scandals, one 
might hypothesise that regimes at the higher end of a democracy-authoritarianism 
continuum are more prone to presidential interruptions.  
 
Cleavages, Party Systems and Presidential Interruptions 
There is more to party systems than their numbers.31 These indexes and numbers are 
thought to express some underlying features of party systems that might affect 
political regimes, such as for instance the representation or presence of social 
cleavages in a society (Stoll 2008). In this section I discuss what a party and a party 
system are in order to get at the role of the emergence of new cleavages and its 
importance for presidential interruptions.  
 
Parties and party systems perform important roles in modern, indirect democracies. 
They inhabit political institutions, represent citizens, groups, and central cleavages, 
organise electoral competition, and shape a polity. One could define parties as 
organisations that compete for power through popular elections. Sartori offers further 
specification in his definition, which says that parties are “...any political group 
identified by an official label that presents at elections, and is capable of placing 
through elections (free or nonfree), candidates for public office” (Sartori 1976: 63).32 
However, in this dissertation, I am more interested in parties’ representational roles, 
                                                
30 In this dissertation the threshold for inclusion was being coded as at least semi-democratic in the 
MBP dataset (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Liñán 2001). Competitive authoritarian regimes 
generally seen as a subtype of authoritarianism, rather than of democracy, often qualify as semi-
democracies in the MBP index. For instance, Peru after 1995, Dominican Republic for some periods 
during “los doce años” of Balaguer (1966-1978), and the later Balaguer regime (1986-1996). 
31 Often represented by the effective number of parties, or the electoral volatility index. The effective 
number of parties is also called the Laakso/Taagepera index, and the electoral volatility index is called 
the Pedersen index. See Laakso and Taagepera (1979) and Pedersen (1983).  
32 Sartori on the following page also offers an abridged version that drops the qualification of an 
official label, and whether elections are free or non-free.  
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what Sartori defines as parties’ functions. Parties are supposed to express people’s 
demands and represent the people, and by fulfilling these functions parties should 
form responsive governments (Sartori 1976: 27). Even though parties should serve the 
purpose of the whole (of society) (Sartori 1976: 25), parties have tended to represent 
different groups and issues in society that have given parties their identity (Mair 1997: 
20). As such, parties are vehicles representing groups in society (Mainwaring and 
Scully 1995: 3). According to Rokkan (1970: ch. 3), these identities are forged on the 
basis of cleavages in society, which in Europe, have been created by several critical 
junctures throughout centuries of history in that continent.33 A social, or socio-
political, cleavage can be defined as “large-scale divisions within a society that are 
exogenous to the political system” (emphasis in the original) (Stoll 2008: 1441). 
Lijphart (1999: 78-89) calls cleavages issue dimensions, and thus relates a socio-
political cleavages to important policy issues. Further, Lijphart in line with others 
(Lipset and Rokkan 1967a: 6), argues that cleavages may vary in salience and 
importance. Rokkan (1970: 131) lists four cleavages represented by parties to 
different extents across Western Europe: Centre-Periphery, State-Church, Land-
Industry, and Owner-Worker, which Lipset and Rokkan (1967a) famously stated had 
been frozen since the 1920s. Whereas Lijphart (1999: 78-89), on the other hand, 
operates with seven issue dimensions, some of which overlap with Lipset and 
Rokkan’s four cleavages (in brackets): 1) socio-economic (owner-worker), 2) 
religious (state-church), 3) cultural-ethnic (centre-periphery), 4) urban-rural (land-
industry), 5) regime support, 6) foreign policy dimension, 7) materialist-
postmaterialist. Parties thus may represent groups according to which stand they take 
                                                
33 I do not want to dwell too much on the genesis of different party systems across Europe or in Latin 
America, but just point out that the creation of different party systems in Europe followed a very 
different path than the ones in Latin America, see Coppedge (1998) and Geddes (2003: ch. 4). 
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on central issues of conflicts, cleavages, in society. It is this representative function of 
parties, and party systems that is relevant in this dissertation.  
 
Party systems can shortly be defined as “...the set of patterned interactions in the 
competition among parties.” (Mainwaring and Scully 1995: 4). And “...involves 
something more than the sum of its component (party) parts, and incorporates some 
element of understanding of the mode of interaction between these parties.” (Mair 
1997: 51).34 Party systems are important and relevant in democracies because they 
might promote a centrifugal or centripetal competition, coalition building or zero-sum 
politics, and affect the degree to which the system is institutionalised, which is also a 
measure of how well groups in society are represented (Mainwaring and Scully 1995; 
Sánchez 2009).35 
 
The dimension of party systems most relevant to our topic is the degree of roots in 
society of the party system. To cite Lipset and Rokkan (1967a: 5), the focus is on 
“...conflicts and their translation into party systems.” The roots in society refer to the 
structuring of political preferences, the representative role of parties on issue 
dimensions, or cleavages, and linkages between parties and society created by these 
dimensions, and the regularity of how people vote. One of the reasons for the freezing 
of the party systems in Western Europe until the 1960s was that central cleavages in 
the societies had found their party expressions, and that several important 
compromises on these dimensions had either settled the conflicts, or taken them out of 
the political arena. Something that also reduced the polarisation and ideological 
                                                
34 See also Sartori (1976: 43-44) 
35 About how to measure party systems, the best read might still be Sartori (1976: ch. 5).  
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intensity, if not ideological distance, in the party system, and thus helped consolidate 
the democracies in that region.  
 
So, why do party systems, or the representation of central cleavages, matter for 
presidential interruptions? Besides the discussed relationship between the number of 
parties and ideological polarisation (Sartori 1976: 292; Mainwaring 1993), the point is 
that increased societal polarisation might lead to increased levels of social protests, or 
inter-institutional conflicts, which I, at least theoretically, would link to presidential 
interruptions. The emergence of new cleavages, representation of new groups, 
increased mobilisation and polarisation before WWII in Europe, and during the cold 
war in other regions, such as Latin America, could also be linked to several 
democratic breakdowns, and other regime changes. As the work of Lipset and Rokkan 
suggest, if salient cleavages find their party expression, the level of conflict and 
polarisation decreases. Thus, the degree to which the party system represents central 
cleavages in society is also important for the institutionalisation of conflicts in 
society. Democracy after all, is an attempt to institutionalise conflicts and 
disagreements, and solve these with non-violent means.  
 
But, the fight for representation of new groups is conflictive. The emergence of 
cleavages in societies, as the result of critical junctures, and revolutions, at least in 
Europe, has tended to be violent, and even in some cases led to the split-up of states 
and to the creation of others (see, Lipset and Rokkan 1967a; Rokkan 1970: 72-144). 
Furthermore, in order to accomplish an institutionalisation of conflicts, all relevant 
groups should be represented by partisan actors in nationally elected institutions. The 
fight for suffrage extensions and the representation of all relevant groups is also 
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conflictive, a fact demonstrated by labour unions’ and parties’ fight for full male 
suffrage, and proportional representation.  
  
It is important to mention that I will not take this model of cleavage representation 
based on the development of party systems in Western Europe too far onto Latin 
American terrain, I just point out that the emergence of new, underrepresented 
cleavages may entail conflicts. Party systems in Latin America have existed for a long 
time in several countries without clear cleavage representation. Catch-all parties, and 
populist parties, have been dominant in several countries, and class-based parties, and 
especially cultural, ethnic, religious, or region-based parties have constituted a 
minority, at least in the modern era we are discussing in this dissertation (Madrid 
2005b; Di Tella 2004). Still the notion of group representation is at the heart of what 
parties are, and even though representation in Latin America has taken a very 
different shape from that of Western Europe, that does not mean that cleavage 
mobilisation and representation is impossible, or unimportant if it occurs.  
 
I hold that several of the presidential interruptions and challenges to elected 
presidents can be explained by the conflicts that normally accompany the emergence 
of new cleavages in a society. A central hypothesis of this dissertation is that the 
emergence of new, salient cleavages, or important social or political groups, not 
represented in the party flora, will increase the likelihood of presidential interruptions, 
and challenges to presidents. Groups representing cleavages that have been excluded, 
I believe, have less reason to believe in the turn-over of executives in elections since 
these groups themselves never get represented at the executive level. This increases 
the risk that these groups will become anti-systemic, disloyal or semi-loyal, and, 
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ultimately, fight to remove a president, the highest embodiment of the political 
regime, outside the electoral arena.  
 
The linkage between cleavages and presidential interruptions has not been explored in 
the literature. The effective number of parties, one measure of cleavages, figures as an 
explanatory variable in a statistical analysis by Kim and Bahry (2008). In two of the 
14 statistical models in that article, the authors find a significant, positive connection 
between the effective number of parties, and presidential interruptions, but for the 
model they ran on the Latin American cases, they find no significant causal effects. 
Pérez-Liñán (2007: ch. 6-7) discusses how a legislative shield might prevent a 
presidential interruption, and Negretto (2006) discusses the policy positions of parties 
in congress, and the control of the median voter in congress. Both variables are 
affected by the nature of the party system, the number of parties, and the ideological 
distance between parties, but both authors aim to measure institutional rather than 
societal factors. Cleavages as a variable explaining presidential interruption is 
therefore underexplored.  
 
Causal models of presidential interruptions 
The institutional literature discussed above can be understood in two different ways.  
One is eloquently displayed in Cheibub’s (2007: 8) book on the topic, the other is a 
competing understanding of Linz’s (1978; 1990; 1994) original arguments.  
 
The Cheibub model depicts a view of the Linzian theory of presidentialism and 
parliamentarism, in which institutions hold a primacy with respect to causes of 
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democratic breakdown and presidential interruptions.36 Institutions are not only seen 
as autonomous factors in political life, but also as a primary factor that precedes other 
factors such as the economy, and social factors (March and Olsen 1984) and, thus, 
constitute underlying causes of democratic breakdowns and presidential 
interruptions.37 Another model of the Linzian school of institutionalism emphasises 
institutions’ ability to handle conflicts when they occur, no matter their cause. Here 
institutions are not given primacy in terms of what causes the deadlocks, democratic 
breakdown or presidential interruptions, but institutional factors are rather seen as 
triggering causes that, in turn, may be caused by other underlying factors that are 
exogenous to institutions. This view, however, still maintains that presidential 
regimes are not well equipped to handle political conflicts when they first occur.  
 
Nevertheless, applied to presidential interruptions, both institutional models depict a 
two-step causal chain: From causal factors (institutional or otherwise), through 
deadlocks, to democratic breakdown or presidential interruptions (Figure 2-1). 
Deadlocks is a key variable,38 that is oftentimes just omitted in this causal chain, and 
only assumed to be the immediate cause for a breakdown or an interruption.  
                                                
36 I must add here that Cheibub also controls for a set of other factors than just institutional ones to 
account for presidential regimes’ democratic failure. As such, in his book, he is also very much in line 
with the second view of Linz’s thesis.  
37 The causal processes or paths to breakdown or interruption is the following: the separation of powers 
yields few incentives for coalition formation, and thus often creates minority governments. These 
problems are aggravated in multiparty systems, and party systems with undisciplined parties. These 
factors, in turn, create legislatively ineffective governments, and deadlocks, which due to the 
separation of powers (dual democratic legitimacy and rigidity) might end in breakdown of democracy 
and/or presidential interruptions. 
38 Deadlocks are really just a value on a variable that should be called executive-legislative relations. 
But in line with the general lingo on these issues, I say that deadlock is a variable, see Marsteintredet 
(2008a; 2009) for a discussion. 
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Figure 2-1: Institutionalists' causal model 
 
 
 
However, a particular type of inter-institutional conflicts figures as important in the 
literature on presidential interruptions, namely institutional, or horizontal, challenges 
(Hochstetler 2006). The regular type of deadlocks, or inter-institutional conflicts, is 
therefore moved to the left in the model above, and constitutes an underlying causal 
factor. In the original breakdown literature, however, deadlocks were supposed to be 
an immediate cause, causal mechanism, or a triggering factor (Pierson 2003, 2004), 
for democratic breakdown, the same role is now played by challenges to presidents 
for presidential interruptions.  
 
The competing model to the institutional explanations to presidential interruptions, 
argue that presidential interruptions are triggered by street, or vertical, challenges, 
and the underlying causes are also related to the level of protests in the streets, or 
vertical conflicts. I call street protests, and street challenges against presidents vertical 
conflicts and challenges, respectively, in order to distinguish these types of conflicts 
from horizontal conflicts or inter-institutional conflicts between the legislative and the 
executive (see also chapter 4). Vertical conflicts and challenges, are supposed to be 
more important than horizontal conflicts and challenges as underlying and triggering 
factors for presidential interruptions (Hochstetler 2006). The non-institutional account 
of presidential interruptions also supposes a two-step causal chain: From causal 
factors (institutional and otherwise), through vertical challenges, to presidential 
interruptions. 
Institutional/horizontal 
conflicts, economic, 
social or other factors 
(Institutional) 
Horizontal 
challenges 
Presidential 
interruption 
Underlying causes Triggering causes Outcome of interest 
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Figure 2-2: Non-institutional causal model 
 
 
 
This model covers most of the work on presidential interruptions that do not follow 
the institutional account; the key difference between figures 2-1 and 2-2, is the type of 
challenge one expects to trigger a presidential interruption, but also whether 
horizontal or vertical conflicts are more important as underlying causes.  
 
Few, if any, have tested these steps fully. Either the explanatory factors to the left in 
the figure are left out in order to compare the relative power of horizontal vs. vertical 
challenges (Hochstetler 2006), vertical challenges and protests have been ignored 
(Negretto 2006), or vertical challenges have been moved to the left in the statistical 
model (Pérez-Liñán 2007: 200; Edwards 2007). A recent contribution, however, does 
try to test a similar two-step model (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), but given data 
restrictions such complex models (Heckman selection models) do not provide robust 
results. Furthermore, the authors do not test fully the relative weight of institutional 
vs. street factors as underlying causes.  
 
That either a vertical or a horizontal challenge is required for a presidential 
interruption, is not very surprising. Presidents do not resign voluntarily. Nevertheless, 
to start with these two triggering variables to explain presidential interruptions can be 
illustrative given the predominance of institutionalism in the field of Latin American 
politics. Hochstetler’s (2006) findings are important because they question the causal 
model depicted by institutionalists, but her analysis in part ignores the underlying 
causes of challenges and interruptions.  
Institutional, economic, 
social (vertical or street 
conflicts) or other factors 
(Street)  
Vertical 
challenges 
Presidential 
interruption 
Underlying causes Triggering causes Outcome of interest 
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An integrated model of presidential interruptions 
The model in figure 2-3 summarises the previous discussion, and displays the 
relationship between the explanatory variables and the outcome of interest, or 
dependent variable. The arrows indicate causality. Underlying causes such as 
government support in congress (or deadlocks), presidential scandals, governmental 
(or economic) performance, the emergence and salience of new cleavages, and level 
of democracy, affect the likelihood of a horizontal or vertical challenge to the 
president (triggering causes). These, in turn, affect the survival of a president in 
office.  
Figure 2-3: A model of presidential interruptions 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Arrows indicate causality. The model is inspired by Goertz’s two-level models, see Goertz 
(2006: 237-268). 
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Depending on the research question, one might focus on the mid-to-right hand side of 
the model, skip the middle part of the model, or analyse the full model. I distinguish 
between what I call underlying and triggering causes. Triggering causes could also be 
understood as intervening variables, and may of course be analysed as dependent 
variables in causal analyses, or as causal mechanism, i.e. the mechanism or procedure 
by which a presidential interruption occurs. The signs +/AND/OR indicates various 
potential relationships between the causal factors. The + relates to an additive 
function between the explanatory factors in a typical regression analysis in which 
causes are additive. The AND/OR relates to the typical QCA approach of necessary 
and sufficient causation (Ragin 1987, 2000), which does not measure the relative 
weight of each factor.39 With the arrows and connector AND at the top of the model, I 
do however indicate that the link between underlying and triggering causes and the 
outcome of interest is causal, and that the presence of at least one underlying and one 
triggering cause with values theoretically expected to produce the outcome, is 
necessary for the occurrence of an interruption. 
 
The point of the full model is to display how I understand the relationship between 
different levels of causal factors, and the outcome of interest. The underlying causes 
will not cause a presidential interruption directly, only if they provoke a challenge 
will a president be removed from office. The underlying causes thus create a 
potential, and may increase the likelihood for the presence of either horizontal or 
                                                
39 I do not test whether or not the correct way to model interruptions is through additive causes or 
necessary and sufficient causes. I only display that both ways of seeing the world may fit the model 
depicted in Figure 2-3. 
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vertical challenges.40 So horizontal or vertical challenges are seen as necessary causes 
for presidential interruption, and, thus, an interruption is a subset of presidential 
challenges.  
 
I distinguish between underlying and triggering causes, and one way of thinking about 
the link between the two, is in terms of threshold effects or threshold effects with 
structural causes (Pierson 2003: 182-187, 193-195) (AND/OR). The first story would 
for instance be that bad economic performance over time together with emerging new 
cleavages mobilising as an alternative to the status quo, could push the political 
system on the verge of experiencing horizontal or vertical challenges. In such a 
situation anything, such as an unpopular economic decision, a small scandal, or any 
unforeseen event, might put the system over a threshold and mobilise challenges 
towards the president either from the streets (vertical) or from congress (horizontal), 
or from both. The causes might be long-term and structural, whereas the outcome 
would have a short time-horizon (the challenge, or the interruption). One might also 
think that a structural cause might quickly bring the political system close to the 
threshold level for challenges towards the president. In this case, such a structural 
change could be the the launching of neoliberal or market reforms (by surprise) 
(Stokes 2001), often unpopular with great parts of the societies in Latin America. The 
way of thinking of causality is that of syndromes of causes and complex causes 
together provoking the outcome, and the negative cases would be used as the control 
group (i.e. challenges that did not end in interruptions).  
 
                                                
40 This resembles how Ted Gurr (1970: 6-12) looks at variables or societal conditions that increase the 
potential for collective or political violence (as intervening variables), and then looks at his dependent 
variable’s magnitude and forms of political violence.  
Chapter 2: Theoretical Considerations 
   
44 
Another way to understand the model, would be to think in terms of additive 
causation that increases the probability of the outcome of interest, i.e. a typical 
statistical approach (+). Changes in the values of the explanatory variables increase or 
decrease the likelihood of a challenge to the president, and subsequently an 
interruption. In a probabilistic world one is interested in studying what affects the 
likelihood of producing the outcome of interest, more than in the causal mechanisms. 
In this way of thinking one tests statistically the relationship between the variables 
and uses all instances of non-interruption as the control group. Both approaches and 
ways of thinking are in my view valid and complementary. While for the causal 
analysis of the relationship between the underlying causes and the outcomes of 
interest I use the standard statistical approach, I focus on qualitative comparative 
analysis in my analysis of the relationship between the triggering causes and 
interruptions, and also in linking causes with outcomes. 
 
I argue that the model in Figure 2-3 captures most of our understanding of 
presidential interruptions. It is both a causal model based on my understanding of 
interruptions, and my reading of other contributions, but should also be understood as 
a stylistic and heuristic tool to facilitate understanding and analysis, and the model 
clearly does not represent a “true” version of reality.41 Something causes a challenge 
that triggers an interruption. This something may be a crisis, e.g. economic or a 
scandal, which then creates a challenge, either vertical or horizontal, which develops 
into a crisis of the government. This model, which has not been spelt out in any work 
                                                
41 For instance, it seems clear that one challenge (e.g. vertical) may provoke another (e.g. horizontal), 
yet my model does not envision a causal relationship between the two types of challenges. I thank 
Flavia Freidenberg for pointing this out in reference to an interruption in Ecuador, in a personal e-mail 
communication.  
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that I have seen on this topic earlier,42 is useful in addressing several research 
questions and debates in the current literature on presidential interruptions and 
adjacent topics. Where a researcher puts his or her emphasis, ultimately depends on 
the research question at hand. I will use the model to look at a series of questions. 
Based on this model I focus on the street vs. institution debate when analysing the 
triggering causes of presidential interruptions (Chapter 5). Furthermore, as discussed 
above, I move one step to the left in the model and refer to this debate looking at 
horizontal and vertical conflicts as underlying causes (Chapter 6). Going beyond this 
debate I disintegrate the variable of vertical conflicts and link it to types of cleavages 
to test one of the main hypothesis of the dissertation, namely that if groups mobilise 
on new, and emerging cleavages that are underrepresented, this mobilisation increases 
the risk of a presidential interruption (Chapter 6). And, finally, applying a more 
classical comparative approach, I link the underlying causes of interruptions to the 
outcomes of interruptions (Chapter 7). 
 
Linking causes with outcomes: Implications of presidential 
interruptions 
How, and on what, can presidential interruptions have an impact? A presidential 
interruption has an immediate impact on who runs the country, and at least at this 
level we expect it to have an immediate impact on a number of issues that the 
government deals with on a daily basis. But, can it have an impact that reaches 
further?  
 
                                                
42 Helmke (2007) is the one to come closest to a full-fledged model in several steps, and a test of the 
model, but her objective is to explain which institution falls, the presidency, congress or the supreme 
court, not so much why a president falls.  
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There have been few studies of presidential interruptions in Latin America, and the 
few that have discussed this topic, have mainly done so on a theoretical level 
(Marsteintredet 2008b), or found few consequences at all (Hochstetler and Samuels 
Forthcoming). As with the causality of presidential interruptions, the question of 
implications or consequences can be dealt with at least in two ways. One is the 
statistical, assuming causal homogeneity, which would identify some consequences 
that on average affect some parameter in the period after a presidential interruption. 
Or, the other, would be to look at the different types of interruptions, see whether they 
differ in their implications and outcomes compared to each other.43 In this dissertation 
I will use qualitative methods to investigate the outcomes of interruptions because I 
believe that the outcomes vary tremendously across the cases of interruption,44 and I 
will link the outcomes to the principal causes of the interruption, and more in 
particular to the principal motivation for the challengers to attempt to oust the 
president. 
 
Baumgartner wrote that “Presidential impeachment is the equivalent of a political 
earthquake” (Baumgartner 2003: 1). I argue that the political earthquakes related to 
presidential interruptions are of different magnitudes. It is not uncommon to 
distinguish between instances of the same concept. In studies of similar phenomena 
such as crises and democratic breakdown (O'Donnell 1988), and political violence 
(Gurr 1970), one important goal in addition to explaining the outcome of interest, is to 
                                                
43 Or one could compare the implications of presidential interruptions with the implications most-likely 
negative cases (Goertz 2006: ch. 7), in other words challenges that failed to remove the president from 
office.  
44 And also because the only statistical study done on this topic has come up with null-findings 
(Hochstetler and Samuels Forthcoming), and I argue that causal heterogeneity explains why these 
authors find few consequences of interruptions.  
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explain the variation in the scope, magnitude and type of the outcome. I pursue this 
line of thought when analysing the outcome. 
 
Despite the similarities between the cases of interruption, and the fact that all fall 
within the definition of a presidential interruption, I argue that there is a great 
variation between the cases that is important to analyse. At some levels the 
interruptions are very similar. For instance most are preceded by vertical challenges 
(the triggering causes), and a president is removed as a result of this pressure. It may 
be argued that all cases of interruption are a form of holding a president accountable, 
and clearly the fight for the presidency through elections or otherwise, is a fight for 
power between different actors. Moving up the ladder of abstraction, all interruptions 
are also government crises. And until now, in the literature, and in this chapter, I have 
treated presidential interruptions as being a dummy variable of which we want to 
explain the occurrence.45  
 
Typologies are a common feature in comparative politics, and there are numerous 
examples of their use. Types and typologies of presidential interruptions are important 
because they facilitate the understanding of this new phenomenon in presidential 
regimes, and allows for investigating potentially different paths in and out of 
interruptions (George and Bennett 2005: ch. 11). Typologies may also improve our 
understanding and conceptualisation of the differences across cases within the 
                                                
45 Pérez-Liñán (2007: ch. 3), based on Linz (1978), creates a typology of outcomes of presidential 
crises depending on the destiny of the two elected branches of government and the regime. This 
typology, however, does not distinguish between different types of presidential interruption. Almost all 
of the presidential interruptions treated here fall within the same category of this typology. The goal of 
Pérez-Liñán (2007) is to compare interruptions with types of presidential crisis, whereas one of the 
goals of this dissertation is to compare different types of presidential interruptions.  
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overarching concept of executive instability. Typologies also help avoid conceptual 
stretching and too broad generalisations (Sartori 1970).  
 
The main goal of typologies is often to explain variation within a category, concept, 
or phenomenon, and to create meaningful, and often qualitative, variation to be 
explained as a dependent variable, or to be used as an independent variable for 
explaining other phenomena. There are many examples in the vast literature on 
transitions to democracy of the use of typologies as both dependent and independent 
variables (e.g. Linz and Stepan 1996: 57-60), and regime types have also been used as 
both independent and dependent variables in numerous ways and works (see, Collier 
and Levitsky 1997), typologies are also well-known from the literature on welfare 
states, normally as variation to be explained (e.g. Esping-Andersen 1990), interest 
representation and corporatism (e.g. Schmitter 1974), (political) crises (O'Donnell 
1988), and revolutions (Skocpol 1979). In the literature on presidential interruptions, 
all interruptions are mainly considered to be of the same type, and few have 
distinguished between different types of interruptions.46  
 
The model in Figure 2-3 indicated that the underlying causes may be substitutable, or 
might have different weight in their explanatory powers of predicting vertical or 
horizontal challenges towards presidents. A statistical analysis identifies the mean 
effect of these variables across all cases, and marginal effects may indicate the 
relative importance (on average) of each variable in producing the outcome. Through 
a comparative analysis across all cases, we could identify which factors, and 
                                                
46 For an exception see Marsteintredet and Berntzen (2008).  
Chapter 2: Theoretical Considerations 
   
49 
conjunction of factors that seem to be necessary and/or sufficient to explain our 
outcome.47  
 
In my view it seems clear that the underlying causes for challenges are also related to 
the motivation for groups to challenge their presidents. If there is hyperinflation and 
groups challenge the president on account of bad economic management, the cause 
and motivation are related. What extraordinary event that may motivate groups of 
people to challenge presidents may vary from case to case across interruptions, and 
indicate what type of crisis the presidential interruption is a part of.48 But a crisis can 
take many forms, and it is difficult to create exhaustive and mutually exclusive 
categories in a typology of political crises.49 The notion of different kinds of crises 
creating variation in the outcome is present in O’Donnell’s (1988) work on 
bureaucratic authoritarianism. Similarly, Gurr (1970: 9-11), albeit in a more linear 
vein, argues that the greater the level of the relative deprivation in society, the greater 
the magnitude of political violence (measured as turmoil, conspiracy, and internal 
war).50 Both Gurr and O’Donnell argue similarly to what I think is important to 
                                                
47 An explanation of a single-case would only (in a strict sense) give us the answer to the presence or 
absence of causal factors, however through process-tracing one could be able to address the “how” 
question: How do the underlying variables affect the triggering causes? 
48 A presidential interruption is clearly a subtype of a presidential crisis (Pérez-Liñán 2007) or a crisis 
of government, but also a subtype of other types of crises.  
49 O’Donnell (1988: 24-31), for instance, discusses several types of crises that entail different outcomes 
(different types of authoritarian regimes), and ends up with a typology that clearly does not have 
mutually exclusive categories. O’Donnell argues that only the most profound crisis (a crisis of social, 
or cellular domination) creates the outcome of a bureaucratic authoritarian regime because it is the only 
type of crisis that threatens the state that upholds the position of the capitalist system and the dominant 
classes. Other types of crisis might end in authoritarian regimes, but not in a BA regime. The other 
types of crisis are: government crisis, regime crisis, crisis of the expansion of the political arena, and 
crisis of accumulation. Furthermore, the crisis of social domination or of hegemony, can combine with 
any of the previous types, vary in level, and occur in two variations. In the first a political party or 
other civilian actors attempt to found a new social order, and in the second it is the armed forces that 
attempt to take power from the state. 
50 The outcome in terms of magnitude of political violence is also affected by the coercive control of 
the state, and the level of institutional support for acts of political violence (Gurr 1970: ch. 8-9).  
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address with regard to presidential interruptions. Variation in levels, types and 
strength of explanatory factors will create variation in the outcome.  
 
I understand interruptions and challenges to presidents to be instances of holding the 
president or the executive accountable for their actions or omissions.51 As such 
interruptions are linked to what the challengers argue they hold their president 
accountable for, which is linked (loosely or closely) to objective causes of an 
interruption (which I expect to be the ones presented in Figure 2-3). The removal of a 
president, thus, entails some correction of unwanted behaviour and the motivation for 
presidential removals should affect the outcome. In order to investigate the outcomes 
or implications of interruptions, I suggest distinguishing between interruptions based 
on what motivated the challengers to attempt removing the president. In other words, 
to study the variation in outcomes, I construct a typology of interruption based on the 
challengers’ motivations for removing the president. This is a simplifying exercise 
that I use instead of analysing causal pathways through for instance Boolean methods. 
One reason is that the latter would create 25 logical combinations, but only 14 positive 
instances of interruptions. The other reason is that despite the efforts to create 
complex pathways and map complex causes of each instance, there is no guarantee 
that the types of interruptions would be jointly exhaustive and mutually exclusive.52 
The study of outcomes of interruptions is in its infancy, and I think it makes more 
sense with a somewhat more inductive approach to construct better theories, than a 
full-fledged theoretical approach with clear expectations of outcomes.  
 
                                                
51 I do not address here whether this is a good type or a bad type of accountability, see Schmitter 
(2004) and my discussion in Marsteintredet (2008b). 
52 In the social sciences a perfect typology is difficult to create. Fuzzy cases will always exist, and new 
types not considered yet may always appear. 
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Conclusions 
This chapter has presented some theoretical consideration concerning the 
phenomenon of presidential interruptions. First of all I argued for the importance of 
locating the concept in its semantic field by comparing it to other, related phenomena 
of executive instability such as democratic breakdowns and unscheduled changes of 
government in parliamentary regimes. This is a task I will take up in the next chapter. 
Second, this chapter presented and discussed the contributions in the field of 
executive and regime instability in presidential regimes. I pointed out that a central 
debate had been that of the “streets vs. institutions”, in my model between the causal 
weight of vertical vs. horizontal challenges. In Chapter 5, I revisit the “street vs. 
institutions” debate and focus on triggering causes of interruptions. In terms of the 
underlying causes to interruptions, I particularly argued for studying the dimensions 
of cleavages, cleavage formation, and party systems and their relations to presidential 
interruptions. I argue that these and other causal factors constitute a set of underlying 
causes to the more triggering events that have received much attention in the literature 
so far. My hypothesis is that challenges to presidents and presidential interruptions in 
part may be explained by the surge, and mobilisation of underrepresented new groups 
and cleavages that challenge the status quo of their respective political regimes. This 
is an underexplored dimension of presidential interruptions in Latin America. I will 
further pursue these thoughts in Chapter 6. Finally, I argued for the classical, 
comparative technique of studying differences within a group of cases that are similar 
in many respects. In contrast to techniques that assume causal homogeneity, I argue 
that there may be systematic differences between the cases of presidential 
interruptions when it comes to the outcomes of the phenomenon. In Chapter 7 I 
explore the differences between the cases of interruption.  
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Chapter 3 : Drawing the Semantic Field. What 
Presidential Interruption Is...and Is Not  
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Introduction 
Are presidential interruptions in Latin America simply contemporary expressions of 
democratic breakdowns?53 Political conflict has not disappeared in Latin America: the 
presidential interruptions since the start of the third wave of democratization in 1978, 
the several failed coup attempts in Paraguay, Guatemala and Venezuela, as well as the 
successful coups in Peru and Haiti, are but some examples. Given the fact that 
political conflict continues to prevail, one hypothesis is that the underlying causal 
factors which resulted in democratic breakdown in the past are today more likely to 
lead to presidential interruption. Much of the literature on the topic is based on the 
assumption that presidential interruptions and democratic breakdowns are sufficiently 
similar to use the models of democratic breakdown to explain presidential 
interruptions.54 On the other hand, since democracies survive presidential 
interruptions, could it not be the case that presidential interruptions are more similar 
to unscheduled changes of parliamentary governments?55 Since presidential 
interruptions do not entail democratic breakdown, it is a form of executive rather than 
regime instability. Or is it rather the case that presidential interruptions constitute a 
new phenomenon altogether? This chapter discusses these questions and compares 
presidential interruptions with types of executive instability such as democratic 
breakdowns, and unscheduled governmental change in parliamentary regimes.  
 
                                                
53 This chapter is based on ideas from the following publications: The comparisons with parliamentary 
changes of government are based on Marsteintredet and Berntzen (2008) and Marsteintredet (2008b). 
The statistical analyses and discussion of presidential interruptions and democratic breakdowns are in 
part based on Alvarez and Marsteintredet (Forthcoming 2010).  
54 For a further discussion of this topic, see Marsteintredet and Llanos (2009) 
55 One could also ask whether or not presidential interruptions could be special cases of transitions to 
democracy. This parallell, or metaphor, is not as good since transitions to democracy occur in non-
democratic regimes. A presidential interruption according to the definition of the concept, occurs in 
regimes that are at least semi-democratic. One could, nevertheless, compare some instances of 
interruptions with transitions from electoral authoritarian regimes, for instance the fall of Fujimori, 
who led what has been defined as a competitive, or electoral, authoritarian regime (Levitsky and Way 
2002).  
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Why compare these phenomena? One obvious reason is that several authors have 
based their analyses of presidential interruptions on models of democratic breakdown, 
placing particular emphasis upon political institutional variables as underlying causes 
(e.g. Negretto 2006; Valenzuela 2004). Another reason is that even though 
governments fall unexpectedly in Latin America, democracies survive; a fact that 
raises questions about one of the key differences between presidential and 
parliamentary regimes, namely a president’s fixed terms.56 A third reason is that in 
order to fully understand new social phenomena, one should also strive to fully 
understand what the phenomenon is not, in addition to what it is.57 Doing this then 
fulfils one task of concept formation, namely to situate a new concept within its 
semantic field, that is, to map the constellation of related concepts and terms (Collier, 
La Porte, and Seawright nd: 13).58 
 
All three phenomena compared here end the life of the government; only one spells 
the end of democracy. Of the two phenomena that only end the life of government, 
only one includes the premature end of governments as a regular, constitutional 
feature. All three may be shattering events for the regimes in question and grow out of 
deep political conflicts, but one has tended to be solved by the military and the other 
two by civilian forces. Thus, there are similarities and differences between the three. 
This chapter aims to further explore these similarities and differences. The goal of the 
chapter is to place presidential interruption in its semantic field by comparing 
interruptions with other, similar phenomena. Through this exercise I also seek to 
                                                
56 Congresses are also elected for fixed terms in presidential regimes, which constitutes another key 
difference between the two regime types.  
57 An exercise captured by Schmitter and Karl’s (1991) famous essay: What Democracy is...and is not, 
which, obviously, is where I have taken inspiration for the title of this chapter. 
58 Philippe Schmitter also dedicates quite some space to placing new concepts in its context and 
embedding them in a wider context with other concepts, in his acceptance speech of the Mattei Dogan 
Prize at the IPSA World Congress in Santiago de Chile, July 15, 2009 (see Schmitter 2009).  
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enhance the understanding of this new form of executive instability in presidential 
regimes. As such this chapter could be read as a theoretical, conceptual chapter, but it 
also serves as a first empirical analysis of presidential interruptions.  
 
I start this chapter by creating a typology of executive instability and relating these 
types to parliamentary and presidential types of regime. Then I compare presidential 
interruptions to the undemocratic type of executive instability, the democratic 
breakdown, since the analogy between the two, at least implicitly, has been central for 
much of the writing on the causes of presidential interruptions in Latin America. The 
goal of the comparison is to determine whether the causes of democratic breakdowns 
in Latin America resemble the causes of presidential interruptions across the period 
1950-2005. I address this question via an original use of statistical analysis. First I 
investigate whether both phenomena share similar causes, and can be explained by 
the same causal model. This analysis is also a traditional causal analysis, so I spend 
some space discussing the empirical implications of the statistical results as well. 
Then, I investigate, statistically, whether the causal factors have a significantly 
different effect upon democratic breakdowns than presidential interruptions.  
 
Since the outcomes of democratic breakdowns and presidential interruptions differ, I 
also compare presidential interruptions with democratic types of executive instability, 
in particular unscheduled changes of government in parliamentary regimes. This 
comparison is procedural rather than causal. One reason is that Juan Linz in his 
famous essays argued that presidential regimes lack procedures to solve deep political 
conflicts once they occur, and therefore these tend to end in democratic breakdown 
(Linz 1990, 1994). Another reason is simply that I lack of data for other regions than 
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Latin America on the topic of interest. A third reason is that since my empirical focus 
is Latin America, a full-fledged comparison with regimes in Europe and other 
regions, is outside the scope of this dissertation.  
 
Types of executive instability: Presidential interruption and 
the semantic field 
There are several procedures for removing the government across all regime types. In 
democratic regimes there are prototypically nine types of governmental interruption, 
six of which are democratic. These are outlined in Figure 3-1 below. The types are 
constructed to meet the requirements of being mutually exclusive and jointly 
exhaustive, to minimize within-type variation and maximize between-type variation 
(George and Bennett 2005: ch. 11). Very often, however, the empirical realities of 
social life defy social scientists’ theoretical typologies, and at a low enough level of 
abstraction one could always find differences within types. The operationalisation of 
the types are based on the procedures for removing the chief executive, the coding 
rules are presented in the appendix to this chapter. 
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Figure 3-1: Types of executive instability 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
The figure distinguishes between the democratic and undemocratic types of executive 
instability or governmental removal,59 and presents most, if not all, known forms of 
executive instability in presidential and parliamentary regimes.60 The types of 
democratic breakdown, the coup, the assassination, and the foreign invasion can occur 
in both presidential and parliamentary democracies; therefore I label these procedures 
“regime-independent”. Although this typology distinguishes between three types of 
undemocratic executive instability, I will in the following collapse all into the concept 
of democratic breakdown in order to compare with presidential interruptions.  
 
Among the democratic types of governmental removal, the figure identifies six 
different procedures, two of them related to parliamentarism, two related to 
presidentialism and two that are not specific to any regime type, also named “regime-
                                                
59 For a somewhat similar view, see Pérez-Liñán (2003b: 150-152) who distinguishes between 
institutional and praetorian outcomes.  
60 In semi-presidential regimes (or different types of semi-presidential regimes, Shugart and Carey 
1992), the president may remove the executive, and other procedures also exist. My discussion restricts 
itself to parliamentary and presidential regimes since many of the arguments presented here relates to 
this debate, and excludes semi-presidential regimes. 
Procedure Vote of  
no 
confidence 
Early  
election 
Impeachment Declaration  
of incapacity 
Resignation Popular 
Recall 
Assas-
sination 
Coup Foreign 
Invasion 
Undemocratic 
Executive instability 
Parliamentary Regime independent 
Democratic 
Form of 
regime: 
Type of 
removal: 
Regime independent Presidential 
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independent” in the figure above. In parliamentary regimes a government can be 
forced to resign through a vote of no-confidence,61 and the government can call for 
early elections.62 In Linz’s view, these are two flexible parliamentary procedures 
which make parliamentary regimes better at handling crises than (rigid) presidential 
regimes. In presidential regimes the only procedures to remove the president in 
between elections are through impeachment, and the lesser-known mechanism of 
declaring presidential incapacity.63 The two democratic regime-independent types of 
government removal are the chief executive’s resignation and the popular recall. 
Prime Ministers as well as Presidents may tender their resignation or, which is more 
often the case, be forced to resign. Even though in a parliamentary regime these 
resignations often occur through the procedure of early elections, this is not always 
the case. Thus, the governmental resignation as such is not solely a presidential 
procedure. The popular recall is not much used, but has become more common in 
recent Latin American constitutions, and was used in Venezuela in 2004.64 The recall 
is also in use in several states in the USA today, and there are historical instances of 
recall of parliamentarians in European parliamentary democracies (Christophersen 
1969). This procedure is a regime independent tool that pertains to the relationship 
between voter and representative. And, in contrast to the other democratic procedures 
                                                
61 Furthermore, a government can make a legislative proposal a matter of confidence and resign if the 
proposal does not win a majority (see e.g. Huber 1996). For the sake of simplicity the vote of 
confidence is understood to fall under the type of vote of no-confidence. 
62 Under some constitutionally specified restrictions, the option of early election is also open in some 
presidential constitutions (these are in Uruguay, Peru both 1979 and 1993 Constitutions, Venezuela 
1999 Constitution, and Ecuador 2008 Constitution). This, however, is often an option of last resort to 
be called for only after the exhaustion of the constitutionally prescribed line of succession of vice-
presidents and the presidents of congress and Supreme Court. Therefore I argue that as a type of 
governmental interruption, this is a parliamentary procedure.  
63 The option of impeachment is also open in parliamentary regimes, but is almost never used since the 
vote of no-confidence is available. Therefore I argue that as a type of governmental interruption, 
impeachment is a presidential procedure.  
64 The constitutions that open for popular recall of the president are Colombia 1991, Venezuela 1999, 
Ecuador 2008 and Bolivia 2009. The constitution of Ecuador 1998 opened for recall of all elected 
representatives except the president, the new Constitution of 2008, however, opens for a recall also of 
the President (art. 105).  
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of governmental interruption, the popular recall does not involve congress; it is a 
procedure linking the “will of the people” directly to the “fate” of the president. 
Whereas impeachments and the vote of no-confidence are tools of horizontal 
accountability, the popular recall is a tool of vertical, societal accountability in 
addition to regular elections.65  
 
Presidential Interruptions and Democratic Breakdowns 
A presidential interruption is defined as an extraordinary and premature change of 
president without the breakdown of the democratic regime (see Chapter 2); by 
contrast, a democratic breakdown marks the end of the democratic constitutional 
order and the beginning of non-democratic rule.66 Both presidential interruptions and 
democratic breakdowns occur under regimes that are at least minimally democratic.67 
The outcome of a presidential interruption is obviously qualitatively different from 
that of a democratic breakdown, and there are also stark differences between the types 
of actors that are normally involved in the two phenomena. Up until the Third Wave 
of democratization, the military acted as the poder moderador and intervened in 
politics to interrupt or end democracy, justifying their interventions by claiming the 
duty to restore social order, to wage war against a real or incipient communist threat, 
and to protect the constitution. By contrast, in today’s world congress, civil society 
and street protesters are the most active and important actors for removing 
                                                
65 The popular recall as a tool of vertical accountability is additional to the ones discussed in O’Donnell 
(2003: 47-49), see also Smulovitz and Peruzotti (2003) in the same volume for further discussion of 
these topics. I discuss horizontal and vertical accountability in relation to presidential interruptions 
more thoroughly in Marsteintredet (2008b). 
66 Note that a democratic breakdown does not necessarily mean the change of the head of state and 
government. Autogolpes are clearly democratic breakdowns, but without a change of the chief 
executive.  
67 In this dissertation and for the purposes of the statistical analyses in this chapter, I define a minimally 
democratic regime as one that is classified as at least semi-democratic in the MBP-index of democracy 
in Latin America (Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Liñán 2001). 
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presidents,68 and it has been suggested that civil society has taken over the military’s 
role as poder moderador (Hochstetler 2006: 403).  
 
Despite these differences in the outcomes, processes, and actors involved, it may 
nonetheless be the case that presidential interruptions are caused by underlying 
factors similar to those that also influence the likelihood of a democratic breakdown. 
Predictions generated by Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán’s (2005a: 36) statistical 
models indicate that the likelihood of democratic breakdown after 1978 has not 
decreased or changed significantly relative to previous periods. The fact that one can 
observe a sharp decrease in the number of democratic breakdowns in the world after 
1978 is explained not by the underlying forces specified in their statistical model but 
rather by the new regional context (changes in U.S. foreign policy, the orientation of 
the OAS,69 the Catholic Church, and attitudes towards democracy). After all, while 
the probability of a democratic breakdown in the region has dropped to almost zero 
since the mid 1970s, the probability of a presidential interruption has increased over 
the same period and is now similar or higher than the earlier risks of a democratic 
breakdown (see Figure 3-2). Thus, it is not farfetched to build upon Mainwaring and 
Pérez Liñán’s analyses and compare the causes of presidential interruptions with the 
causes of democratic breakdowns. 
                                                
68 The military has of course not been totally absent during the most recent period particularly in the 
cases of interruptions in Ecuador (see, Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich Forthcoming 2010), but 
also in the most recent case of interruption in Honduras (Alcántara Saez 2009; Llanos and 
Marsteintredet 2010). But the military has been relatively less important.  
69 The OAS’s present role has changed quite a bit since 1965, when the organisation legitimised a U.S. 
invasion of the Dominican Republic that clearly thwarted potential democratic progress. For details, 
see Hartlyn (1998: 89). The transformed role of the OAS is linked to the adoption of Resolution 1080 
(negotiated in Santiago de Chile in 1991). Speedy OAS action helped thwart the autogolpe in 
Guatemala in 1993 (Villagrán de León 1993), and dissuaded General Oviedo from attempting a coup in 
Paraguay in 1997 (Valenzuela 1997). 
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Figure 3-2: Probability of Executive Removal in a democracy in Latin America 1946-2005 
 
 
Notes: Based on my own data on presidential interruptions and on changes from either democracy or 
semi-democracy to authoritarian regimes according to the MBP-dataset (Mainwaring, Brinks, and 
Perez-Liñán 2001). Probabilities calculated on the bases of only democratic or semi-democratic years. 
The Lowess smoother is used to predict probabilities (year as independent variable) and present the 
results.  
 
After all, the incidents of presidential interruption experienced by several Latin 
American countries are the closest several of these regimes have come to a full 
democratic breakdown. In the comparison between the causes of the two phenomena, 
I build a model of democratic breakdowns on four factors (economic performance, 
regime characteristics, civil society mobilization, and political institutions), discuss 
whether these factors may conceivably contribute to presidential interruptions, and 
then test how well it explains the two outcomes of interest, and compare the 
coefficients of the explanatory variables.70 
 
                                                
70 For a longer discussion of these factors, see Alvarez and Marsteintredet (Forthcoming 2010) 
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Some theories of democratic breakdown 
Studies that analyse the breakdown of democracy tend to argue that economic level, 
an administration’s (economic) performance and the effectiveness of a democratic 
regime affect the risk for breakdown (Lipset 1959; Lipset et al. 1993; Mainwaring and 
Pérez-Liñán 2005a; Przeworski et al. 2000). Przeworski et al. (2000: 117) concluded 
that rich democracies do not die, and that economic crises in poor countries increase 
the likelihood of a democratic breakdown.71 Linked to economic and regime 
performance in general, Linz’s (1978) analysed democratic breakdown through 
concepts such as efficacy, effectiveness, and the legitimacy of the political system. 
Similarly, regime performance seems to matter not only for the survival of 
democracy, but also for the survival of presidents, as several of the presidential 
interruptions occurred alongside poor economic performance.72 For instance, the fall 
of President Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador in January 2000 may be linked to the country’s 
abysmal economic performance, its default on its international debt during the fall of 
1999, its problems in defending the national currency, and just prior to his fall, 
Mahuad’s very unpopular decision to dollarise the economy. Likewise the Argentine 
presidential interruptions in 1989 and 2001 occurred during harsh economic times. 
 
While often linked to regime performance, a second factor affecting the survival of 
presidents is social and popular mobilisation.73 Military interventions in democratic 
                                                
71 The richest democracy in the world ever to fall was Argentina in 1976 (a Latin American country, of 
course).  
Argentina (in 2001) can also lay claim to being the richest country ever to experience a presidential 
breakdown.  Measured in 2000 dollars, Argentina’s GDP per capita in 1976 (10,200) and in 2001 
(10,700) differed by only 500 dollars.  
72 See O’Donnell (1988: 22-24, ch. 9) for a comparative case-study of these factors during a democratic 
breakdown.  
73 I refer here to mobilisation without inferring that mobilisation is the same as polarisation. Bermeo 
(2003) convincingly shows in her book that polarisation among ordinary citizens seems not to be the 
most important factor in explaining democratic breakdown in Europe between the two World Wars or 
in South America during the Cold War. Bermeo mainly uses data from voting on parties, and vertical 
mobilisation may still be an important causal factor of democratic breakdowns. Bermeo generally does 
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civilian rule have often been preceded by social mobilisation and street protests;74 so 
too have presidential interruptions been preceded by such forms of activism. 
Presidential interruptions have been linked very clearly to street mobilisations and 
protests against presidents (Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2008; Valenzuela 2004). 
Consider the image of protesters in Argentina crying “que se vayan todos,” 
demanding not only the ouster of President de la Rúa, but apparently also the ouster 
of an entire political elite that had failed the people. With the exception of the fall of 
president Balaguer in 1994-1996 (see, Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010), and also 
the ouster of Manuel Zelaya in 2009, a common link for all other presidential 
interruptions is increased popular mobilisation.  
  
The institutional design of democracy is a third factor found to affect the survival of 
democracy. For students of democracy and political regimes in Latin America, a 
dominant debate over the past 20 years has concerned the operation and performance 
of political institutions under presidential regimes and the question of which 
institutional regime results in a more stable form of democracy (Jones 1995; Linz 
1994; Mainwaring 1990, 1993; Mainwaring and Scully 1995; Shugart and Carey 
1992; Shugart and Mainwaring 1997; Cheibub 2002, 2007; Cheibub and Limongi 
2002; Cheibub, Przeworski, and Saiegh 2004; Przeworski et al. 2000). It has long 
been argued that presidentialism, particularly in combination with proportional 
electoral systems that tend to generate minority governments and/or undisciplined 
                                                                                                                                      
not look at these types of data, but in the cases of Chile and Argentina she presents data on different 
types of mobilisation that does not counter the argument put forth here (Bermeo 2003: 152-153, 189-
194).  
74 See Wedge (1969) for the case of Brazil, O’Donnell (1988: 295) for the case of Argentina, Bermeo 
(2003: 152-153) for the case of Chile.  
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parties, is plagued by congressional-executive conflict which is difficult to resolve, 
given the fixed terms of office and separate origin of presidents and legislators.75  
Using similar arguments, Valenzuela (2004) holds that the difficult combination of 
presidentialism and minority governments can explain the fall of presidents just as 
well as it can democratic breakdown (Linz 1978, 1990, 1994; Valenzuela 1993). 
Negretto (2006) argues that minority governments, particularly those that do not 
control the median voter in congress, are vulnerable to being removed, while Pérez-
Liñán (2007) focuses on a president’s legislative shield to explain the variation 
between the success and failure of impeachment of presidents in Latin America. It is 
evident that institutional factors are important for explaining presidential 
interruptions, if for no other reason than the fact that an impeachment procedure 
requires a qualified majority for removing a president (witness, for example, the case 
of President Collor de Melo in Brazil in 1992).  
 
Linked to institutional design and regimes, one often also considers the regime 
characteristics and legacy as important in explaining regime instability. Much of the 
literature in comparative historical research focuses on how prior regime actions 
affect today’s probability for regime survival through arguments related to various 
levels of path dependency (Collier and Collier 1991; Mahoney 2000, 2001). Cheibub 
(2007) argues that the reason that presidentialism is more unstable than 
parliamentarism is that presidential democracies more often than parliamentary 
democracies are preceded by military dictatorships. This legacy is particularly 
pernicious for democratic stability. Likewise, one might argue that prior regime 
instability might affect executive stability today in presidential regimes. Given the 
                                                
75 For the Chilean case, see Valenzuela (1994), and for a contrasting view on Chile, see Faundez 
(1997). See e.g. Weyland (2006: 22) and Cameron (1997) for Fujimori and Peru.  
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fact that one can observe more than one interruption in traditionally democratically 
unstable countries such as Argentina, Bolivia and Ecuador, one could assume that 
regime legacy may also affect presidential interruptions.  
 
How to compare Presidential Interruptions with Democratic 
Breakdowns? 
Following Goertz’s (2006: 50-53, ch. 9) view of three-level concepts and two-level 
theories, the purpose here is to determine whether both presidential interruptions and 
democratic breakdowns are actually caused by the following four basic-level 
conditions: economic performance, regime characteristics, civil society mobilization, 
and political institutions. In order to measure these basic-level forces concretely, I 
specify various combinations of secondary-level empirical indicators (two indicators 
for each factor).76 Goertz (2006) maintains that the indicators at the secondary level 
are substitutable, whereas the causal factors at the basic level, from which level the 
hypotheses emerge, are often not substitutable. Thus, for example, poor economic 
performance (a basic-level causal factor) might increase the risk of presidential or 
democratic breakdown via secondary-level indicators such as negative growth, 
increased unemployment, deprivation of real salaries, hyper-inflation, etc. I use 
statistical tools to analyse the effects of the secondary-level indicator upon the two 
phenomena – presidential interruptions and democratic breakdowns – first by 
comparing the estimated regression coefficients and t-statistics generated by the 
regression analyses. I can thereby infer whether the basic-level causal factors have 
similar consequences for the likelihood of presidential and democratic breakdowns. 
Then, I recode the dependent variables to compare the causes of breakdown and 
                                                
76 The actual indicators for each basic level condition are the result of not only theoretical expectations, 
but also trial and error with different specifications of variables. See Alvarez and Marsteintredet 
(Forthcoming 2010) for more on this process. Here I present and compare the results.  
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interruptions directly with a focus on whether the causal factors have a significantly 
different effect on interruptions than on breakdown.  
 
Theoretical reasoning, data availability, and a variety of specification tests resulted in 
measuring the four basic-level causal factors in the following manner.77 Regime 
economic performance is measured by a dummy variable flagging prolonged 
recession of at least two years based on economic growth, and a dummy variable 
flagging levels of yearly inflation exceeding 20%. Both measures are based on two 
standard indicators of economic performance. Regime characteristics are measured by 
the nature of the regime in the year prior to breakdown and the past history of 
democratic breakdowns. Civil society mobilization is measured by the number of 
anti-government demonstrations and the level of strike activity, both measures drawn 
from the Arthur Banks Cross-National Time-Series Archive.78 I would hypothesise 
that strikes would have a more negative effect upon government survival before the 
Third Wave and the end of the Cold War, while anti-government demonstrations 
might prove to be relevant for explaining more recent presidential breakdowns. To 
distinguish between types of societal mobilisation and vertical protests is also in 
accordance with what I argue in Chapter 2. Finally, the consequences of institutional 
design are measured by variables such as the number of political parties (Laakso and 
                                                
77 For sources, see notes to Table 3-1.  
78 More reliable data on civil society mobilization are clearly available for more recent years (see the 
next chapters in this dissertation), but Banks’s data extend across a longer time series. In addition, the 
dataset distinguishes between general strikes and anti-government demonstrations. The Banks variable 
General Strikes counts any strike of more than 1,000 industrial or service workers involving more than 
one employer and aimed at national authorities. The variable Anti-Government Demonstrations is 
defined as any peaceful gathering of more than 100 persons with the primary purpose of voicing 
opposition. 
Chapter 3: What Presidential Interruption Is...and Is Not 
   
67 
Taagepera 1979), and the share of legislative seats held by the party of the chief 
executive.79  
 
The question raised is: Does the same causal model explain both phenomena? The 
events of interest is whether or not a president survives and whether – in the event of 
presidential removal – democracy survives or not. The dependent variable is therefore 
a limited dependent variable with three possible outcomes 1) the president survives; 
2) a presidential interruption occurs; 3) a democratic breakdown occurs. In order to 
model statistically factors which influence the likelihood of each of these respective 
outcomes, there are several variants of multinomial probit and logit models available. 
A key consideration concerns the nature of the relationship between the three 
potential outcomes. Does the movement from presidential survival to presidential 
interruption to democratic breakdown entail increases in the “degree” of instability? If 
so, then ordered logit estimation is the preferred technique. A wide variety of 
estimations were conducted utilizing rare events logit and ordered logit.80 Ultimately 
standard multinomial logit with corrections for heteroskedasticity (which in any case 
is marginal) and with robust standard errors was selected as the preferred estimation 
technique.81    
                                                
79 More reliable indicators for executive-legislative relations exist, such as direct measures of deadlock 
(Jones 1995), but again, data availability prevents the use of other indicators. 
80 Rare events logistic regression analysis is a statistical analysis that controls for the uneven 
distribution of the dependent variables, i.e. very few positive observations as compared to negative 
observations in the dependent variable (King and Zeng 2001b, 2001a). It particularly addresses the 
problems of standard logistic regression predicting positive outcomes when these are rare compared to 
the negative outcomes. While this technique is preferable for studying these phenomena in separate 
equations (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005a; Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007), for the present 
purpose the multinomial model is superior. Rare events logistics work with dichotomous dependent 
variables, which means that in order to study presidential interruptions I would either have to code 
democratic breakdowns as a non-event, which would be wrong, or exclude the case (country-year) 
from the analysis, which would not be desirable. 
81 An assumption built into the multinomial logit model is that the results generated for a given choice 
alternative (say, presidential breakdown) are independent of the addition of an irrelevant alternative 
(IIA).  More specifically, the IIA assumption holds that “the relative odds of choosing [one alternative] 
i over [a different alternative] k are the same no matter what other alternatives are available or what the 
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The reason for excluding ordered logit merits a short discussion. Theoretically it is 
conceivable that one could order the outcomes of presidential and democratic 
breakdowns, the former being caused by a lower level of economic crisis, inter-
institutional conflict, or civil society mobilization than the latter. For this reason, I 
sought to test the whether the outcomes actually could be ordered. Although most of 
the results generated by ordered logit and standard multinomial logit were quite 
similar, the ordered logit models consistently underestimated the effects of the 
independent variables upon the highest ordered outcome (the outcome with the value 
2) regardless of whether this corresponded to presidential interruption or democratic 
breakdown. Clearly, then, the data themselves do not support an assumption that 
instability or the specific form of presidential removal is of a “higher degree” for 
democratic breakdowns than for presidential interruptions. This is an important 
finding in and of itself: presidential interruptions are not “light” versions of 
democratic breakdowns. 
 
The comparison built on the multinomial logit model follows two steps. First I use the 
causal model based on theories that explain democratic breakdown to see whether this 
model explains both phenomena, and to investigate whether the same variables 
provide coefficients with the same sign and are significant for predicting both 
outcomes. To do this I code the limited dependent variable as 0: President survives; 1) 
a presidential interruption occurs; 2: a democratic breakdown occurs. This model, 
                                                                                                                                      
attributes of the other alternatives are” (Train 2003: 49-50). If this assumption were proven not to hold 
for our data, then the results generated would be significantly less reliable. The tests conducted, 
however, reveal that the results generated in binomial models using both standard as well as rare events 
logistic regression on both phenomena do not change appreciably from the results generated by the 
multinomial logit model, which indicates that the outcomes are independent of irrelevant alternatives 
(Train 2003: 53). 
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presented in Table 3-1, investigates the causal similarities between presidential 
interruptions and democratic breakdowns. Then, I recode the dependent variable and 
use democratic breakdowns as the base category (value 0), in order to investigate 
directly whether the variables affect breakdowns and interruptions in a significantly 
different manner. Since one might suspect that interruptions and breakdowns are 
explained by the same factors in a similar manner, this latter test is much tougher test. 
If a variable is significant in predicting interruptions with breakdown as base 
category, I can conclude that interruptions and breakdowns are caused by different 
factors, and consequently, that interruptions are not only the modern-day expression 
of a democratic breakdown.  
 
Interruptions and breakdowns compared 
The panel data set contains observations of years of democracy for 19 countries 
spanning the years 1946-2006, generating 692 country-year observations.82 Across 
this time and space I count 16 presidential interruptions and 25 democratic 
breakdowns.83 The number of observations actually utilised in the estimations, 
however, is reduced somewhat by limitations on data availability for several of the 
variables. In effect, this means that the large majority of results presented below are 
based upon a set of 544 observations which includes 15 presidential interruptions and 
                                                
82 The country-year format has certain advantages such as increasing the sample size,  but the format 
certainly has drawbacks as well. If Linz and Stepan’s edited volumes on the breakdown of democracy 
have taught us anything, it is that the process of breakdown takes time and that several causes interact, 
creating endogeneity problems. While I try to avoid endogeneity problems as much as possible, I also 
admit that analyses based on country-year as the unit of analysis might be better for modelling the 
timing of breakdowns rather than identifying the full list of causes and processes of a breakdown. 
83 The following country-years are registered as presidential interruptions: Brazil 1955 and 1992, 
Ecuador 1961, 1997, 2000 and 2005, Bolivia 1985, 2003 and 2005, Argentina 1989 and 2001, 
Guatemala 1993, Venezuela 1993, Dominican Republic 1994 (1996), Paraguay 1999, and Peru 2000. 
The following country years are registered as democratic breakdowns: Argentina 1951, 1962, 1966 and 
1976, Bolivia 1964 and 1980, Brazil 1964, Chile 1973, Colombia 1949, Costa Rica 1948, Dominican 
Republic 1974, Ecuador 1963 and 1970, Guatemala 1954, Haiti 1999, Panama 1963 and 1972, 
Nicaragua 1948 and 1968, Peru 1948, 1962, 1968 and 1992, Uruguay 1973 and Venezuela 1948.  
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17 democratic breakdowns. In particular it is the variable measuring inflation that 
restricts the data to only covering years since 1960.84 Table 3-1 below presents the 
findings and serves as the point of reference for the discussion of the respective 
effects of each independent variable which follows.  
Table 3-1: Determinants of Presidential Interruptions and Democratic Breakdowns
85
  
 
 
                                                
84 I also ran the model excluding the inflation variable, the overall results remained the same. For these 
results, consult Alvarez and Marsteintredet (Forthcoming 2010). 
85 Regression coefficients generated by non-linear models such as logit are log odds, and difficult to 
interpret in their untransformed state (although the t-statistics can be understood in the standard 
manner). I therefore compare the signs, level of significance and corresponding t-statistics, which all 
include relevant information. For reasons of comparison, I also include the marginal effects in Table 3-
1. 
Characteristics in numerator of Prob Y = 1 Presidential Interruption (N-15) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
Constant –5.2177*** (1.5672) –3.329 
Level  –.0003* (.0001) –1.946 
Prolonged Recession  1.3609** (.6570)  2.072 
Past Breakdowns  .2650 (.2399)  1.105 
Semi-Democracy  –.8766 (.7858) –1.116 
Number of Parties  .3906** (.1640)  2.382 
Demonstrations  .4987*** (.1190)  4.191 
Strikes (lagged) –.0374 (.3149) –.119 
Inflation –.3855 (.6957) –.554 
Post-1978   .4604 (1.1107)  .415 
   
   
Characteristics in numerator of Prob Y = 2 Democratic Breakdown (N-17) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
Constant –3.2618*** (.9991) –3.265 
Level –.0008** (.0004) –2.005 
Prolonged Recession  .0180 (.8045)  .022 
Past Breakdowns  1.3850* (.8013)  1.728 
Semi-Democracy  1.7846** (.6116)  2.918 
Number of Parties  .2702 (.1747)  1.546 
Demonstrations  .3891* (.2021)  1.925 
Strikes (lagged)  .9271** (.3881)  2.389 
Inflation 1.6744** (.7653)  2.188 
Post-1978 –5.5603** (2.3389) –2.377 
 
Pseudo R-squared  .34  
Chi squared 97.2970  
N 544  
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Table 3-1 continued  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Notes: Standard errors in brackets. * significant at .1 level; ** significant at .05 level; *** significant at 
.01 level. Definitions of Variables: Level: real gdp/capita; Prolonged Recession: dummy coded 1 for 
consecutive years of negative growth in years t-1 and t-2; Past Breakdowns: count variable for number 
of past breakdowns of democracy; Semi-Democracy: dummy coded 1 if semi-democracy in the 
previous year; Number of Parties: Laakso-Taagepera index for effective number of parties; 
Demonstrations: number of anti-government demonstrations, as defined by Banks (2008); Strikes 
(lagged one year): number of general strikes in the previous year, as defined by Banks (2008); Inflation 
is a dummy variable coded 1 if the current rate of inflation is greater than 20%; Post-1978: dummy 
coded one for country-years after 1978.  
Sources: Level and Prolonged Recession from Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston et al. 2006); Inflation 
from World Development Indicators (WDI 2008). Past Breakdowns (Cheibub 2007); Semi-Democracy 
(Mainwaring, Brinks, and Perez-Liñán 2001); Number of Parties: Cheibub (2007), Nohlen (2005b; 
2005a), electoral reports in various issues of the journal Electoral Studies as well as official websites of 
electoral authorities for data on the most recent elections, and assistance on some missing data from 
Aníbal Pérez-Liñán (the same sources apply for the seat share of the president’s party in 
congress/lower chamber); Anti-Government Demonstrations and General Strikes from Arthur Bank's 
Cross-National Time Series Data Archives (2008). 
 
The model in Table 3-1 controls for the effect of the economic level, measured as per 
capita gross domestic product, and for the democratic sea change constituted by the 
Third Wave with a dummy variable dividing the periods before and after 1978. The 
model as such does not perform badly considering the Pseudo R-square of .34. By 
controlling for the period effect, I adopt a conservative approach which minimises any 
artificial inflation of the significance of the other specified variables which could 
result from the omission of time controls. The two control variables behave as 
expected. There is a statistically significant positive relationship between the level of 
economic development and the likelihood that a president will survive in office – 
richer countries experience fewer removals of presidents. The marginal effects, 
Marginal Effects Averaged Over 
Individuals    
Variable Y = 0 Y = 1 Y = 2 
Constant .1906 –.1217 –.0689 
Level .0000 .0000 .0000 
Prolonged Recession –.0318 .0322 –.0004 
Past Breakdowns –.0358 .0055 .0304 
Semi-Democracy –.0180 –.0218 .0398 
Number of Parties –.0148 .0091 .0057 
Demonstrations –.0199 .0116 .0083 
Strikes (lagged) –.0190 –.0014 .0204 
Inflation –.0270 –.0101 .0371 
Post-1978 .1087 .0141 –.1227 
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however, are negligible. The likelihood of a democratic breakdown in the post-1978 
period is much lower than for the pre-1978 period, at the same time there is no period 
effect upon the likelihood of a presidential interruption.86 
 
Economic Performance Factors: Prolonged Recession and Inflation 
Does economic performance have consequences for the likelihood of presidential 
removals? Prolonged recession measured dichotomously as minimum two 
consecutive years of negative rates of growth (lagged one year), has a positive and 
significant (5% level) effect on the likelihood of a presidential interruption, the same 
variable is positive, but has no significant effect on the likelihood of a democratic 
breakdown. High inflation (above 20% yearly) has a positive and significant (.05 
level) effect on democratic breakdown.87 By contrast, this variable proved to be 
negative and have no significant effect on the likelihood of a presidential interruption. 
The results should not come as a surprise, as problems associated with extreme rates 
of inflation began to affect the region in 1973 (with great intra-regional variation),88 
and ended effectively in 1994 with Brazil’s last year of hyperinflation. After 1994, 
there have been ten presidential interruptions and only one democratic breakdown. 
The period before 1979 exhibited a much higher regional average rate of inflation 
                                                
86 This finding, which simply indicates a trend, does not contradict the findings generated by 
Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán that the likelihood of a democratic breakdown post-1978 has not 
decreased, as based upon the predicted probabilities generated by their statistical model. 
87 There is no clear definition of what constitutes a crisis, and the results from a battery of dummy 
variables flagging different levels of negative growth proved to be wildly inconsistent, furthermore 
using economic growth as a continuous variable turned out not significant. As with inflation and other 
variables, an inductive approach for the best measure was used experimenting both with lags and 
creating dummies. The effects and significance of the variable prolonged recession, however, proved 
to be strongly robust with respect to presidential interruptions across model specifications and 
estimation procedures, generating t-statistics of about 2.0, depending upon model specification. 
88 An examination of the data reveals that 12 of the 15 observations of presidential interruption 
experienced rates of inflation of only 31% or lower. The three extreme observations above this level 
were Argentina 1989, Brazil 1992, and Bolivia 1985, with annual rates of inflation of 3,000, 1,000 and 
12,000, respectively. By contrast, years of democratic breakdown were characterized by generally 
higher rates of inflation: eight of the 17 observations experienced inflation rates greater than 25%, with 
five of these above 69% and two of these around 400% (Argentina in 1976 and Chile in 1973). 
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than the period after 1994, with greater variation and higher maximum levels. The 
varying levels of inflation across different time periods are of course linked to 
different models of development and economic management (import substitution vs. 
neoliberalism), which again loosely correspond to periods of democratic breakdown 
and presidential interruption.  
 
In sum, both presidential interruptions and democratic breakdowns are affected by 
economic performance in the way that theory predicts. Different indicators, however, 
of the same basic-level determinant seem to affect the two phenomena. Thus, 
presidents who want to survive should work hard to avoid recessions and high rates of 
inflation.  
 
Mobilisation of Civil Society: Anti-Government Demonstrations and 
General Strikes 
Higher levels of mobilization are linked to an increase in the probability of a 
presidential interruption or democratic breakdown. The findings are strongly 
consistent with Hochstetler’s (2006) observations, as the demonstrations variable 
proves to be highly significant (with a t-statistic greater than 4.0, significant at .01 
level) in its positive effect upon the likelihood of a presidential interruption; on 
breakdowns the variable reaches a level of significance of 10%, but its effect is less 
robust across specifications.89 The marginal effects of anti-government 
demonstrations on interruptions is larger than that on breakdowns, a finding that is 
consistent with what is known about the military intervening to end democracy.  
 
                                                
89 In a model excluding inflation the variable reveals a slightly weaker effect and is not significant at 
the .1 level. 
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Strike activity, lagged one year,90 is positive and significant and thus influences the 
likelihood of a democratic breakdown (significant at .05 level), but negative and not 
significant for the likelihood on presidential interruptions.91 Military interventions to 
overthrow a sitting president in Latin America have often been motivated at least in 
part by an effort to stop the spread of “communism”. Hence, it is not surprising that 
general strike activity, a powerful weapon of unions, affects the chances for 
democratic breakdown more strongly than do more general forms of anti-government 
demonstrations.92 Again I find that a basic level variable affect both democratic 
breakdown and presidential interruption in the expected fashion, but that two different 
indicators are required to capture these effects.  
 
                                                
90 The motivation for the lag comes from reading Bermeo (2003), who in several of the cases of 
breakdown she studies reports a decrease in polarisation and mobilisation in the year of the breakdown 
compared to the one-two years prior to the breakdown. In models run with general strike activity in the 
current year, the variable plays no role in influencing the likelihood of either a presidential interruption 
or a democratic breakdown. 
91 But, how can strikes operate with a lagged effect while demonstrations do not? Anti-government 
demonstrations in the current year increase the likelihood of presidential interruption; strike activity in 
the previous year increases the likelihood of democratic breakdown. The difference can be explained 
by the fact that demonstrations tend to be more spontaneous, without a plan to overtake the government 
itself. In fact, following the fall of a president, there usually exists confusion concerning who should 
take over the reins of government. In only in one case of presidential interruption (Mahuad in Ecuador 
in 2000) did a group claiming to represent the protesters immediately take power, and in this case it 
only lasted a couple of days before the civil-military junta fell. Democratic breakdowns, on the other 
hand, require planning because the group toppling the president also plans to take over the government 
itself for some extended period. It is these differences which might explain why the mobilisation of 
civil society generates a more immediate effect upon presidential breakdowns than it does upon 
democratic breakdowns. 
92 In Chapter 6 I discuss how different forms of mobilisation affect the likelihood of presidential 
interruptions in the 1980-2005 period. Interestingly, the findings in this chapter help explain the 
apparent contradictions between Hochstetler’s findings in two different articles (Hochstetler 2006; 
Hochstetler and Edwards 2009). In 2006 she finds that vertical challenges (she calls it street 
challenges) affect presidential survival, and argues that societal mobilisation in general may interrupt 
presidents. In 2009, she and Edwards find that general societal mobilisation does not affect the 
likelihood of presidential interruptions. The likely reason for this contradiction is that the variable used 
to measure social contention conflates demonstrations and strikes. Seeing as the latter only affect 
democratic breakdowns, this may have caused the variable to lose significance. I discuss these matters 
further in Chapter 6. See also Arce and Bellinger Jr (2007) and Kurtz (2004) for an interesting and 
similar debate.  
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Regime Characteristics: Level of Democracy and Past Regime 
History 
Democratic regimes vary with respect to the degree to which they are free and 
competitive both today and historically. The question is whether the nature of the 
existing or previous regime affects the chances that a president will be removed.  
 
Semi-Democracy has a positive and strongly significant (.05 level) effect upon the 
likelihood of a democratic breakdown,. Interestingly, the variable semi-democracy is 
negative, but not significant for the outcome of interruptions (t-statistics of about -
1.1). The causal mechanisms between semi-democracies and breakdowns cannot be 
identified via the methodology of this chapter, but one could speculate that a semi-
democratic regime would be more likely to degenerate (for example via an autogolpe) 
into an authoritarian regime, as occurred in Peru in 1992. Another causal route could 
be a military intervention as an ostensible reaction to a deterioration of rights and 
freedoms (particularly under left wing governments) in the name of “saving 
democracy.” Often semi-democracies are not fully democratic because the chief 
executive is very dominant (delegative democracies, cf. O'Donnell 1994), which 
might make the president more liable to use repression to quell anti-government 
demonstrations, and stop attempts at presidential removal early, but maybe more 
importantly institutions such as congress and the courts are often relatively speaking 
weaker in these regimes and may therefore not be able to hold the president 
accountable.  
 
The past history of democratic breakdowns in a country matters for the likelihood of a 
similar breakdown taking place in the present and future, the variable is positive and 
significant at the .1 level. Past breakdowns never matter for explaining presidential 
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interruption, but is positive, so it is more difficult to know whether this variable 
affects breakdowns in a significantly different way than interruptions. I have no clear 
explanation for this difference, but observe that several traditionally stable 
democracies or non-democracies such as Paraguay, the Dominican Republic, and 
Venezuela, have experienced presidential interruptions. Thus, the past legacy of 
democratic breakdown might not matter for presidential interruptions because they 
are not driven by the actors that formerly had a tradition for interrupting democracy.93  
 
In sum, regime characteristics, roughly measured as level of democracy and past 
democratic instability, do not affect the likelihood of presidential interruptions, but 
seems to affect the likelihood of a democratic breakdown in the direction one would 
expect.  
 
Institutional Factors: Number of Political Parties and Seat Share of 
President’s Party 
The model in Table 3-1 uses the effective number of parties as a proxy for a 
president’s ability to govern successfully and thereby enhance the prospects for 
survival.94 
 
                                                
93 Another explanation may be that scandals, which have toppled several presidents (Pérez-Liñán 
2007), are distributed randomly with respect to regime legacy. At any rate, given the few cases of 
breakdown and interruption, caution is called for when concluding on the basis of these statistical 
results. 
94 The seat share of the president’s party in the lower (or single) chamber is another oft-used proxy. 
Due to the high correlation between number of parties and head share (.81), these two variables were 
never specified together in the same equation. Rather, the full model specification was estimated with 
each of these variables specified one at a time. None of the meaningful statistics that corresponded to 
the other independent variables were affected at all by the choice of specifying either the parties 
variable or the seat share variable. I therefore only refer to the results in table 3-1 instead of both. 
(None of the other variables specified in the statistical model exhibited a degree of correlation with 
each other greater than .3.) 
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The variable proves to be positive, and strongly statistically significant (at the .5 
level) in the effects upon the likelihood of a presidential interruption;95 by contrast, 
the variable is positive, but has no significant effect upon the likelihood of a 
democratic breakdown (but it is close, being significant at the .12 level, and a t-
statistics of 1.546), which is not consistent with previous findings (Mainwaring 1993). 
Furthermore, the former’s marginal effect is almost double the size of the latter’s.96  
 
The lack of significance in explaining democratic breakdowns may be explained by 
the relatively few outcomes of breakdowns, or model specifications. Nevertheless, 
institutions seem to play a bigger role in Latin America with respect to presidential 
interruptions than they do for democratic breakdowns, at least according to the 
analysis presented here.97 One reason might simply reflect the distribution of data on 
the variables across time.98 On the other hand the data show that democratic 
breakdowns before 1960 took place alongside very low effective numbers of parties 
and rather high presidential support, therefore the results in table 3-1 actually 
produces estimates of the effects of institutional factors upon democratic breakdown 
                                                
95 This is consistent with findings presented in studies where the effects of other measures of 
institutional factors have been tested (Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Valenzuela 2004), and with 
my findings in Chapter 6. 
96 The effects of the president’s share of seats variable actually contrasts better between the two 
outcomes: it is significant at the .01 level for explaining presidential interruptions, but irrelevant for 
explaining democratic breakdowns (t-statistics of around -.19). 
97 The reason for the relatively weak effects of institutions upon democratic breakdown may be that 
societal mobilization driven by the left-right ideological cleavage, as measured in the model by general 
strikes, is probably more important than institutional factors for explaining democratic breakdown.  
98 The data show that the average effective number of parties has increased considerably since the mid-
1980s, and this corresponds to the historical disjuncture before which democratic breakdowns were 
more common and following which presidential interruptions have become the norm. The 
consequences of this distribution are magnified by the fact that a larger number of country-years in the 
sample fall in the latter historical period due to more recent waves of democratization. To illustrate, the 
average effective number of parties pre-1979 is 3.14 and the average president’s seat share is .46, while 
the respective numbers from 1979 onwards are 3.43 and .41. Even more telling, the data indicate that 
years in which presidential interruptions have occurred have been characterised by more challenging 
circumstances facing presidents: the average effective number of parties and president’s seat share in 
years of presidential interruption are 4.43 and .34, respectively, while the corresponding numbers for 
years of democratic breakdown are only 3.05 and .5. 
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which are larger in significance than if I were to include all years since 1950.99 In the 
end, the fact that institutional factors prove to be more important for explaining 
interruptions than democratic breakdowns is not that surprising. Given that 
interruptions appear to be relatively more constitutional than breakdowns, and that 
congress plays an important role in presidential interruptions, institutional factors 
should be more important. 
 
Again I have identified a difference in terms of the causes of democratic breakdown 
and presidential interruptions. Institutional factors, measured as either the effective 
number of parties or the president party’s share of seats in congress only seem to 
affect the likelihood of presidential interruptions, and not the likelihood of democratic 
breakdown.  
 
Table 3-2: A summary of the causes of breakdowns and interruptions 
Basic level causal factors Democratic Breakdown Presidential interruption 
Economic performance Yes, inflation positive and 
significant 
Yes, prolonged recession 
positive and significant 
Mobilisation Yes, strikes positive and 
significant 
Yes, anti-government 
demonstration, positive and 
significant 
Regime legacy Yes, semi-democracy and past 
breakdowns positive and 
significant 
Semi-democracy and past 
Breakdowns: Not significant 
Institutions Not significant  Yes, number of parties (and 
president strength in congress) 
positive and significant 
 
Table 3-2 summarises the results so far. The findings reveal that there are similarities 
in terms of the causes across the two phenomena. Both are affected by economic 
factors in the way theory predicts. Furthermore, societal mobilisation seems to affect 
both democratic breakdown and presidential interruption. The different time-periods 
                                                
99 Excluding inflation and thus including all years since 1950 makes effective number of parties lose 
significance, and reports t-statistics of 1.057, and level of significance of .29.  
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in which breakdowns and interruption have tended to occur, however, explain why 
different indicators turn out significant within each basic-level factor. In terms of 
regime characteristics and institutional factors, the difference between breakdowns 
and interruptions is greater. Institutions affect interruptions, but not breakdown to the 
same degree, and I find the opposite result with respect to regime characteristics. 
Despite clear similarities in terms of the causal factors at the basic level, there seems 
also to be differences in what explains interruptions and breakdowns. The findings 
can only partly support adopting models of democratic breakdown to presidential 
interruptions, and it is clear that presidential interruptions are at least not merely the 
modern expression of a democratic breakdown. 
 
Do the causal factors have a significantly different effect on 
interruptions and breakdowns? 
This question is somewhat different from the previous comparison. The previous 
section investigated whether the same factors caused both interruptions and 
breakdowns, based on a model of democratic breakdowns. The reason for testing this 
is that several authors have based their analyses on the analogy between breakdowns 
and interruptions. Whereas the previous section investigated the similarities in the 
causes of the two phenomena, this section focuses on how the causes affect 
interruptions and breakdowns differently. Now, I ask whether the causal factors in the 
model have a significantly different effect on interruptions than on breakdowns. Since 
I expect that the causes of interruptions and breakdowns are similar, this is a tougher 
test on the differences between the two outcomes than the previous analysis. 
Significant coefficients clearly indicate that the causes of the two outcomes are 
different. 
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In table 3-3 the same model as in table 3-1 is used, only that I have recoded the 
dependent variable and democratic breakdown is now the base category (value 0), 
whereas “president survives” is value 2. The coefficients thus do not measure whether 
the causal factors are significant predictors of the outcomes when compared to a 
country-year in which the president survives, but rather whether the causal factors are 
significant when compared to a country-year of democratic breakdown. 
Table 3-3: Causes of democratic breakdowns and interruptions compared 
Characteristics in numerator of Prob Y = 1 Presidential Interruption (N-15) 
(Democratic Breakdown as base category) 
Variable Coefficient t-statistics 
Constant -1.9560 (1.8421) -1.062 
Level .0006 (.0004) 1.320 
Prolonged Recession 1.3428 (1.0005) 1.342 
Past Breakdowns -1.1200 (.8292) -1.351 
Semi-Democracy -2.6612*** (.9814)  -2.712 
Number of Parties .1204 (.2349) .513 
Demonstrations .1096 (.2183) .502 
Strikes (lagged) -.9646* (.4967) -1.942 
Inflation -2.0600** (1.0155)  -2.028 
Post-1978  6.0207** (2.5661) 2.346 
Notes: Here I only report the results for interruptions, as the results for predicting outcome 2: president 
survives are identical to the ones predicting outcome 2 in table 1-1, but with the opposite signs. I do not 
report marginal effects. Standard errors in brackets. * significant at .1 level; ** significant at .05 level; 
*** significant at .01 level. Sources: See notes to table 3-1.  
 
Table 3-3 shows whether the causes of interruptions are significantly different from 
the causes of breakdowns, not whether the various variables are significant predictors 
of either or both of the phenomena. Semi-democracy is negative and significant (1% 
level) for presidential interruptions,100 which means that the current status of the 
regime has a significantly different effect upon interruptions than breakdowns. The 
variable strikes is also negative and significant (.1 level) for interruptions.101 This is a 
variable that was positive and significant for breakdowns, and has a significantly 
different effect upon interruptions. Finally, inflation is negative and significant (.05 
                                                
100 Recall that semi-democracy was a dummy coded 1 for semi-democracy and 0 for democracy.  
101 The control variable post-78 is also positive and significant (.05 level) as expected. 
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level) on interruption, confirming that this is a variable that has a significantly 
different effect upon the two outcomes of interest. What about the variables that were 
significant for one of the outcomes in table 3-1, but not in table 3-3? These are 
prolonged recession, past breakdowns, the effective number of parties and anti-
government demonstrations. All naturally maintain the expected signs considering the 
results in table 3-1. Prolonged recession and past breakdowns reach levels of 
significance of about .17-.18, and may still be considered to have an almost 
significantly different effect upon interruptions than breakdown. Regarding the 
effective number of parties and anti-government demonstrations the differences are 
more negligible. There seems to be no significant differences in the effect on either on 
the two outcomes of interest, which is a finding that does not contradict the fact that 
both variables were significant for predicting interruptions, but not for predicting 
breakdowns.  
 
The results then seem rather mixed. It is clear that different variables seem to have a 
significant effect on the two outcomes of interest. On the basic level the economy and 
social mobilisation have a significant effect on both outcomes and in the expected 
direction, whereas regime legacy has a significant effect on breakdowns, and 
institutions only on interruptions (Tables 3-1, 3-2). Table 3-3, however, compares 
directly the effects of the variables on both outcomes. Since the expectation would be 
that there would be no significant differences in the effects of the variables between 
the two outcomes, any significant coefficients predicting either outcome, would 
seriously question the analogy between interruptions and breakdowns. The results are 
that four variables have a significantly different effect upon the two outcomes: semi-
democracy, general strikes, inflation and the post-78 control variable. Clearly then, 
Chapter 3: What Presidential Interruption Is...and Is Not 
   
82 
there is something more than the zeitgeist that explains the difference in outcomes 
between the two, and equally supported is my conclusion that interruptions are not 
solely the modern equivalent of a democratic breakdown. One of the more important 
reason for this conclusion is not found in the statistical analyses above, but rather lies 
in the fact that while government changes after a presidential interruption, 
democracies survive. 
 
Presidential interruptions as unscheduled changes of government 
I argue that presidential interruptions in some ways defy the “forecast” for Latin 
American democracy, especially given institutional theories of democratic 
breakdown. The very fact that presidential interruptions have become more prevalent 
while democratic breakdowns have declined in frequency (see figure 3-2) 
demonstrates that presidentialism as an institutional variety of democratic regime, like 
its parliamentary counterpart, possesses the capacity to handle deep political conflicts 
in a flexible manner (Carey 2005; Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008). This enhanced 
flexibility via the potential for removing presidents without destroying democracy 
may also function to mitigate another problem associated with presidentialism in 
Latin America: delegative democracy (Marsteintredet 2008b), which in O’Donnell’s 
words “rest[s] on the premise that whoever wins election to the presidency is thereby 
entitled to govern as he or she sees fit, constrained only by the hard facts of existing 
power relations and by a constitutionally limited term of office” (O'Donnell 1994: 
59). Therefore, since the analysis above demonstrates that presidential interruptions 
are clearly not identical to democratic breakdowns, and the outcomes clearly differ 
between the two, a comparison between interruptions and other types of early 
governmental removal further sheds light on the topic of interest.  
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This section compares presidential interruptions with other types of governmental 
change at the procedural level (see figure 3-1). The main reason for a comparison at 
the procedural level relates to Linz’s (1990; 1994) comparison of presidential and 
parliamentary regimes, in which he argued that presidential regimes, due to the fixed 
terms and direct democratic elections of both the executive and the legislature, lack 
flexible procedures for solving deep political crises.  
 
The procedures for interrupting presidents in Latin America 
Table 3-4 categorizes all interrupted presidencies in Third Wave Latin American 
democracies,102 according to five of the nine procedures of governmental interruption 
laid out in Figure 3-1, above: coup, impeachment, declaration of 
incapacity/abandonment of presidency, and resignation with our without early 
election. Not all of the democratic procedures are envisioned constitutionally, but I 
find instances of the use of all these procedures in Latin America since 1980.  
                                                
102 See the appendix to this chapter for coding rules. It is important to recall that I only discuss 
interruptions in democracies (see chapters 1 and 2 for further discussion).  
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Table 3-4: Procedures of presidential interruption in Latin America 
 Impeachment 
 
Resignation 
 
Majority vote/ 
Incapacity/ 
abandoned post 
Resignation 
through early 
presidential 
election  
Coup 
Cases Venezuela 
1993, Paraguay 
1999,  
Brazil 1992 
 
Argentina 
1989, 2001,  
Bolivia 2003 
 
Ecuador 1997, 2005 
(Guatemala 1993 
Espina), Bolivia 2005 
(lost vote of 
confidence) 
 
Forced  
Bolivia 
1984/85, DR 
1994/96 
Ecuador 2000, 
(Honduras 
2009?) 
  
 
 
 
Resignation and Post-
facto congressional 
vote Ecuador 2000*, 
Peru 2000*, 
Guatemala 1993 
(Serrano)*,  
(Honduras 2009?) 
Transitional  
Ecuador 1998,  
Peru 2001,  
Argentina 2003, 
Bolivia 2005 
 
Regime form 
associated 
with 
procedure 
Presidential Regime-
independent 
Parliamentary Parliamentary Regime-
independent 
Sources: Categorization of the cases and data are based on Latin American Weekly Report, NotiSur 
and NotiCen, Keesing’s Record of World Events, Europa World Yearbook Online, and the cited 
secondary literature. Notes: The table also includes caretaker presidencies, these are all placed under 
transitional early elections (even though the early election called by Duhalde was clearly forced), italic 
above. Guatemala 1993 Espina is in brackets since his time as President was so short-lived that it is not 
regarded as a presidential interruption in this dissertation. He was however, voted out of the position by 
Congress only days after Serrano had left the country. Bolivia 2005 is listed twice because the 
interruption of Mesa’s presidency is one case, the call for early election by President Rodríguez the 
same year constitutes a transitional early election. The debacle in Argentina 2001/02 is only counted as 
one case. Honduras 2009 is listed in brackets as a fuzzy case with question marks as a coup, but also as 
a post-facto congressional vote that the president was removed due to treason.  
* These cases are originally resignation, but followed by a post-facto vote in congress confirming the 
presidential interruption. 
 
Previously the literature only predicted the undemocratic coup as the outcome of a 
deadlock conflict in presidential regimes,103 and until recently the impeachment has 
generally been ruled out as unfeasible. Table 3-4 conveys a different impression: of 
all cases of interruption, there have been only one, potentially two (Manuel Zelaya in 
Honduras in 2009), successful coup during the Third Wave,104 and three successful 
cases of impeachment. Recall the comparison between presidential interruptions and 
                                                
103 Another outcome has been discussed: increased presidential dominance, see O'Donnell (1994). 
104 There are three additional cases: the cases of Peru in 1992 and the two coups in Haiti. None of these 
are interruptions of presidencies, and are therefore not listed as cases in Table 3-4: Haiti is not part of 
my case-selection for this dissertation, and the case of Peru did not constitute a removal of the 
president. In addition many have considered the removal of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras on June 28, 
2009 as a coup.  
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democratic breakdowns above: Only one of the presidential interruptions since 1980 
can procedurally be considered a coup, that is the case of Mahuad in Ecuador in 2000. 
All other cases of presidential interruption treated in this dissertation follow other 
procedures than the ones that can be categorised as types of democratic breakdown. 
Even though causally presidential interruptions and democratic breakdown may share 
some similarities, interruptions do not follow the same procedures as democratic 
breakdowns. Interestingly, procedures of interruptions in some instances look like 
parliamentary types of governmental removal. There have been two cases of the 
lesser-known procedure of declaration of presidential incapacity (Ecuador 1997 and 
2005), which only requires a regular majority to pass in Congress, President Mesa in 
Bolivia lost a vote of confidence in June 2005,105 and Serrano’s Vice-President 
Espina, was deposed as President through a vote in Congress just five days after 
Serrano had resigned.106 In addition Table 3-4 distinguishes between two types of 
presidential resignations, one without either a congressional vote or early election as 
e.g. in the case of Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia in 2003, and one type of resignation 
through early election as e.g. in the case of Balaguer in the Dominican Republic in 
1996. I find that there have been five cases of presidential resignation without a prior 
congressional vote or early election during duress, but two of these five cases  
(Guatemala 1993, Peru 2000) have led to a congressional declaration of a president’s 
abandonment of the presidency after the fact. The most famous of these incidents was 
when Congress in Peru refused to accept Alberto Fujimori’s resignation via fax sent 
from Japan, and then proceeded to remove Fujimori as President of Peru. Finally, six 
                                                
105 He also won a vote of confidence in March 2005, see the Appendix to Chapter 5 for details. 
106 One could also argue that Serrano was deposed by Congress since Congress declared already on 
May 27, two days after Serrano’s autogolpe that Serrano had effectively abandoned his post. I choose 
to code Serrano’s ouster as a resignation since Congress’s decree did not have any (immediate) effect 
on Serrano’s destiny. For these and other official documents surrounding the Serranazo, see INCEP 
(1993). 
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cases of resignations have been organised through early elections, four of which have 
been early elections called by caretaker presidents, whereas two early elections have 
marked the end of elected presidents (Siles Zuazo in Bolivia in 1985 and Balaguer in 
Dominican Republic in 1996).  
 
Linz (1990; 1994) and also Valenzuela (1993; 2004) have argued that presidential 
regimes lack flexible procedures for conflict resolution, and in the previous chapter I 
stressed that one of the ways to understand Linz (and others’) criticism of presidential 
regimes was that the lack of flexibility in presidential regimes could lead to 
democratic breakdown no matter the cause of the political conflict. The problems 
resided in the lack of flexibility to solve conflicts between institutions or between 
institutions and civil society.107 As mentioned above, several authors have built upon 
the parallel between democratic breakdowns and presidential interruptions to analyse 
the causes of interruptions (e.g. Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Samuels 
Forthcoming; Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007; Slatopolsky Cantis 1995; Valenzuela 
2004). Table 3-4, which categorises the presidential interruptions according to their 
procedure, seriously questions Linz and Valenzuela’s arguments. Constitutionally 
Linz is correct: when it comes to the separate origin and survival of congress and 
presidents in presidential regimes, there is little room for flexibility in Latin American 
constitutions.108 However, in practice, political actors within presidential regimes 
seem to understand their constitutions in a flexible manner when the crisis is 
sufficiently deep and leads to an interruption of the presidency.  
 
                                                
107 A stricter institutionalist view is to argue that the conflicts that topple presidential democracies also 
originate in the institutions.  
108 Some exceptions to the “rigid” presidential constitutions in Latin America are listed in 
Marsteintredet and Berntzen (2008).  
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The use of early elections to unseat elected presidents or to shorten the term for 
caretaker presidents is clearly used as a flexible way to get out of the crisis that led to 
the presidential interruption.109 The use of majority votes, instead of impeachments, to 
remove presidents is also clearly a flexible feature to solve a crisis within the 
presidential regimes in Latin America that was not expected by the critics of 
presidentialism. In Ecuador, Congress has removed presidents twice by majority votes 
declaring that the president has abandoned his post or that the president is 
incapacitated; in Bolivia Congress voted President Mesa out of office when he tried to 
muster congressional support with a vote of confidence; and in Guatemala in 1993 
Congress removed President Espina, who briefly took over after Serrano, through a 
simple congressional vote. Using other procedures than impeachment lowers the 
requirements to removing the president by democratic means, since when other 
procedures are chosen only a regular or absolute majority is needed.110 In addition, 
congresses have also confirmed presidential interruptions after the fact in order to 
give the prior ouster of presidents more democratic legitimacy. This occurred in 
Ecuador in 2000 after the failed civil-military coup, with Fujimori in Peru in 2000, in 
Guatemala in 1993 with Serrano, and most recently with Zelaya in Honduras after he 
had been sent to Costa Rica. Finally, in Venezuela in 1993 after the impeachment of 
Carlos Andrés Pérez, in Guatemala the same year after the removal of both Serrano 
and Espina, in Ecuador in 1997 after the congressional declaration of Bucaram as 
crazy, and after the ousters of de la Rúa and Rodríguez Saá in Argentina, Congress sat 
down to elect the caretaker presidents.  
                                                
109 Recall the former Israeli Prime Minister Sharon’s words from November 2005 after it became clear 
that the Labour-Likud coalition would not survive an ongoing political crisis: "As soon as it became 
clear that the existing political framework was falling apart, I came to the conclusion that the best 
thing for the country is to hold new elections as soon as possible." Cited from BBC World’s webpages 
on November 17, 2005. http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/middle_east/4444630.stm.   
110 For rules of impeachment of presidents in Latin America, see Pérez-Liñán (2007: 140-141). 
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It is clear from Table 3-4 that in the majority of presidential interruptions procedures 
other than the one prescribed for early executive removal in presidential regimes, are 
chosen. The procedures chosen clearly highlight the similarities between 
parliamentary procedures for executive removal and the interruption of presidencies 
in Latin America. Most of these interruptions have followed obscure constitutional 
procedures that have been interpreted creatively (such as declaring a president 
mentally incapable of holding office), while others have been ad-hoc and invented 
then and there (such as the calls for early election in the cases of the Dominican 
Republic and Peru), few cases have been blatantly unconstitutional (maybe the only 
case being the failed coup against President Mahuad in Ecuador). Congressional and 
popular action seems to drive the procedures of interruption, not military action, a fact 
that also distinguishes interruptions from breakdowns. Finally, given the fact that the 
democratic regimes continue and the only change is that of the executive, presidential 
interruptions share many traits with unscheduled changes of parliamentary 
governments, maybe more so than with democratic breakdowns.  
 
Conclusions. Presidential interruptions: Neither democratic 
breakdown nor parliamentary change of government  
Are presidential interruptions then just special cases of the parliamentary types of 
unscheduled executive removal? Or, given the argument held by many that 
interruptions of presidents are unconstitutional,111 are interruptions similar to 
democratic breakdowns just falling short of ending democracy due to the change in 
the international zeitgeist? For a couple of reasons, my answer to these questions are 
                                                
111 These arguments often come from the ousted presidents themselves. See for instance Bucaram’s 
book entitled “Golpe de Estado”(Bucaram Ortiz 1998).  
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no. In my view, presidential interruptions constitute a proper phenomenon that shares 
traits with both democratic breakdowns and unscheduled parliamentary changes of 
government. One might say that the phenomenon could be placed somewhere 
between these two “traditional” forms of executive removal, one being clearly 
undemocratic and unconstitutional, the other being democratic and constitutional.  
 
First of all, compared to breakdowns, my causal analysis demonstrates that despite 
some similarities, interruptions are not merely new forms of breakdowns caused by 
the same factors in a time in which coups and full-fledged democratic breakdowns are 
non-starters due to a changed international environment. Secondly, an interruption as 
the phenomenon is defined, does not end democracy.  
 
Compared to unscheduled parliamentary changes of government, the similarities are 
actually more striking. Yet, one cannot ignore the differences. Interruptions occur in 
presidential regimes, and these regimes should theoretically follow a different logic 
than that of parliamentarism. The popular expectations are that the president 
completes the full electoral term unless the president is impeached. A declaration of a 
president having abandoned the office is controversial even though it may be 
defended as being within the limits of the constitution. One clear difference between 
parliamentary executive removals and presidential interruptions is thus the degree to 
which the procedures are understood to be legitimate, and in some instances, even 
constitutional. Another difference is the level of social and political tension. 
Presidential interruptions seem to be surrounded by higher levels of popular 
mobilisation and political tension at the elite level than unscheduled changes of 
government in parliamentary regimes. Another insight into Linz’s perils of 
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presidentialism gained from this comparison was that presidential institutions, 
contrary to his claims, seem to prove themselves capable of adopting flexible 
procedures to deal with deadlocks and other political crises.  
 
Interruptions of presidencies thus constitute a proper phenomenon, but one that shares 
some traits with both democratic breakdown (at least causally) and parliamentary 
types of government removal (at least procedurally): Clearly more democratic, and 
less violent and problematic than democratic breakdowns, which marred the region 
prior to the Third Wave of Democratisation, yet also more questionable 
constitutionally in light of democratic theory than its parliamentary counterparts. 
Given the fact that presidential interruptions clearly are not only modern forms of 
democratic breakdowns, one should not, by fiat, assume that the outcomes of 
interruptions are pernicious for democracy. Likewise, interruptions are more critical 
events with greater consequences for democracy and the regime than unscheduled 
government changes in parliamentary regimes, in part since Latin American 
democracies are younger and less institutionalised than their Western-European 
counterparts, but also because interruptions are not supposed to happen in presidential 
regimes.  
 
Finally, through a careful comparison of interruptions with other related phenomena 
this chapter has demonstrated the need for building models and interpretations of 
presidential interruptions based on the phenomenon itself, and not only borrowing 
from work analysing similar phenomena. The conceptual comparison showed that 
interruptions are not identical to either breakdowns or parliamentary procedures for 
governmental change, but the analysis of the procedures of interruptions also showed 
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that not all interruptions are identical, and that there may be interesting variation 
among the cases that is worth exploring further. The next chapters will deal with 
presidential interruptions in Latin America, the causes of interruptions (Chapters 5 
and 6), and the variation between interruptions and the implications for presidential 
democracies in the region (Chapter 7).  
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Appendix to Chapter 3 
Coding rules for a procedural typology of governmental removal 
Undemocratic presidential removals 
1) The undemocratic procedures for governmental removals are the foreign invasion, 
the assassination of a chief executive and the coup. Here, the focus is on the coup. A 
coup is a termination of the presidency (and often other democratic institutions) by 
the use of violence often supported by military force. A coup is considered to be 
successful if the president is forcefully and permanently ejected from office, even 
though the coup makers are unable to stay in power, and democracy as such survives. 
In this sense the military coup that ejected Mahuad from office in Ecuador in 2000 is 
successful since Mahuad was not able to return to power after the coup, while the 
coup attempt in Venezuela 2002 was unsuccessful since Chávez returned to power 
after only 48 hours.  
 
Democratic presidential removals 
2) An impeachment is the legal procedure in which the legislature, in some cases 
together with the Supreme Court, through a vote that requires a supermajority, can 
remove the president. Even though impeachments may often be used politically, it is a 
legal procedure because the president stands accused of some serious violation of the 
law. Often congress’s use of impeachment is also restricted to some specific types of 
felonies (as e.g. high treason). I categorize an interruption as impeachment, if an 
impeachment procedure is initiated in the legislature even if the president should 
resign before the final vote in congress takes place, as was the case with Cubas in 
Paraguay in 1999. 
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3) The declaration of presidential incapacity is a vote in congress that unseats the 
president through a declaration that the president is either physically or mentally 
unable to rule the country. Another variant of this type of removal is for congress to 
declare that the president has abandoned his office. If this vote only requires a 
plurality or an absolute majority (50% + 1 vote) to unseat the president, I argue that 
the declaration of presidential incapacity is procedurally equivalent to the 
parliamentary vote of no-confidence. The motive for the vote of no-confidence may 
vary from case to case, but the defining criterion is that only an absolute majority is 
required to remove the president. A vote taken after a presidential resignation (as in 
the case of Fujimori in Peru in 2000), does not qualify as an equivalent of the vote of 
no-confidence.  
4) A presidential resignation is a situation in which a president, during popular 
protests, duress or the loss of congressional support, resigns without a previous 
impeachment procedure or a congressional vote that unseats the president.  
5) A presidential resignation can also happen through the call for an early election, 
which is a presidential and/or legislative election that is called prematurely compared 
to the regular electoral calendar. An early election can be called either by the 
president, the congress or the Supreme Court.  
6) A popular recall is a formal constitutional recall of the president by electoral means 
before the end of the presidential term.  
 
Fuzzy-cases, some further rules 
Several of the interrupted presidencies are difficult to categorize within a single 
category: they are fuzzy cases. Most cases across our different types of presidential 
interruption, share the traits of street protests, strikes, and high levels of popular 
mobilization. Some cases involve a military coup attempt and strong, direct popular 
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protests (as in the case of Mahuad in Ecuador in 2000). Other cases might involve 
impeachment procedures and popular protests (as in the case of Cubas in Paraguay in 
1999). In order to categorize such cases I focus on the procedure that finally removed 
the president (see Table 3-4 which separates votes taken before or after the president 
was removed). If a president resigns in the midst of popular protests, but is not 
physically forced out of office and there is no previous legislative vote against the 
president, I categorize the case as a presidential resignation. In the case of Mahuad in 
Ecuador, there was both a civil-military coup attempt, direct popular pressure, and a 
post-facto legislative vote to depose the president. In keeping with my criteria the 
case is classified as a successful coup since the civilian-military coup-makers used 
physical force to remove and permanently end Mahuad’s presidency. In the case of 
Cubas in Paraguay the impeachment process had come sufficiently far as to be 
considered a case of impeachment, even though the final vote in congress was never 
held.   
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Introduction 
The idea of this chapter is to present and discuss the data that makes up the basis for 
the analyses of the next two chapters, and give an empirical introduction to central 
variables and cases to be analysed in the following chapters. The chapter thus 
combines empirical analysis with some methodological considerations. The first part 
is more methodological and gives a short introduction to the dataset I have developed 
on the basis of Latin American Weekly Report, in addition to presenting and 
discussing the measurement of some of the central variables. More details on coding 
of variables, sources, etc. can be found in the appendix to this chapter. The second 
part presents a series of descriptive data of the content of the dataset. This empirical 
section aims to give comparative presentations and insight into the cases at hand, and 
into the variation of central variables across time and space. First I focus on variation 
over time, and second I focus on variation across space (countries, regions and 
governments).  
 
A dataset on political conflicts and presidential interruptions 
in Latin America 
In order to investigate what causes presidential interruptions and challenges to 
presidents, I constructed a dataset on political conflicts. The basis for the dataset on 
political conflicts in Latin America is the Latin American Weekly Report (LAWR),112 
which reports political and economic “events” and news for interested parties such as 
business sectors, politicians, and academics. LAWR is published from London, and 
has been used for similar purposes by other authors especially the last few years 
(Helmke 2007; Hochstetler 2006; Jones 1995; Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007). The 
                                                
112 All references to LAWR in text refers to year and number that year, for instance LAWR: 97-05, 
refers to LAWR number 5 in 1997. 
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unique elements with LAWR that is attractive is that LAWR offers a long time-series 
of data, since 1980, LAWR is regionally sensitive, and offers high quality reports 
with good insight into each country and event covered. My dataset based on LAWR 
subsequently covers all democratic and semi-democratic years for any Latin 
American country since 1980 till the end of 2005.113 The countries and years are listed 
below in Table 4-1. The basis for the dataset is all political news with politics as 
primary or secondary topic in these democratic years. All these news-items are 
registered in the database with a short, one-to-two line summary.114 Some of these 
news are also coded as a political conflict, and thus enter as count variables into my 
statistical analyses in chapter 6. 
Table 4-1: Countries and periods included in dataset 
Countries and first democratic year:  
Argentina 1983 
Bolivia 1982 
Brazil 1985 
Chile 1990 
Colombia 1980 
Costa Rica 1980 
Dominican Republic 1980 
Ecuador 1980 
El Salvador 1984 
Guatemala 1986 
Honduras 1982 
Mexico 1988 
Nicaragua 1984 
Panama 1990 
Paraguay 1989 
Peru 1980 
Uruguay 1985 
Venezuela 1980 
 
                                                
113 With Latin American I here mean countries south of Rio Grande with an Ibero-american colonial 
legacy. This excludes countries such as Haiti, Belize, Suriname, Guyana and French Guyana, in 
addition to other smaller island states in the Caribbean. Democratic and semi-democratic years are 
defined according to the coding of Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán (2001). I have also collected 
data on Haiti in semi-democratic and democratic years since 1980, but the country is not dealt with in 
this dissertation. Cuba is not included in the dataset since the country is not democratic or semi-
democratic for any of the years analysed. 
114 Available from the author in Excel or Filemaker format. 
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Central variables in my dataset 
The dataset of course records any presidential interruption, the phenomenon of 
interest in this dissertation, in addition the dataset covers set of variables related to 
political conflicts. 
Political conflicts  
In the dataset I register as political conflicts all registered conflicts in LAWR, in 
which the content is of national, political interest, that is in which groups express a 
disagreement with or present political demands to nationally elected politicians. 
Regional or local conflicts, which anyway tend not to be reported in LAWR, are 
excluded from the dataset, so are conflicts or protests directed directly at private 
companies, or foreign states. Conflicts occurring in one region of a country, and 
conflicts relating to foreign states, or international organisations, may still be recorded 
as long as the topic of the conflict relates to the national level, and the state’s relation 
to foreign companies, organisations, or states.  
 
Horizontal and vertical conflicts and challenges 
In order to investigate the “institutions vs. streets” debate, I divide political conflicts 
into two dimensions, each with two types. Thus a political conflict is registered as 
belonging to one of four types. The first dimension regards the aim of the conflict: 
whether one of the parties aims at removing the president (challenges),115 and whether 
the conflicts are political in nature (but in which no actor expressedly seeks to remove 
the president) (regular conflicts).116 The second dimension relates to the central actors 
of the conflict: whether the conflict is inter-institutional (horizontal), e.g. between 
                                                
115 These are called challenges by Hochstetler (2006), and presidential crisis by Pérez-Liñán (2007). I 
use challenges here, but what Hochstetler calls street challenges, I call vertical challenges.  
116 I call these conflicts that excludes challenges for conflicts or regular conflicts for the lack of a better 
term. Admittedly, this might be somewhat confusing that some types of the overarching concept of 
conflicts also are called conflicts. See Table 4-2. 
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congress and the president, or the conflict is vertical, i.e. conflicts with actors from 
civil society acting outside institutions, e.g. street protests, strikes, demonstrations, 
riots, etc. I base my coding on horizontal conflicts on the coding scheme in Jones 
(1995: 41-43, n. 8-10) with some important modifications.117 Jones for instance does 
not distinguish between challenges and other conflicts. The four types conflicts are 
summarised in table 4-2.  
Table 4-2: Types of political conflicts 
 Aim 
Arena 
Other aims (policy or office 
related) 
Removal of presidents 
Horizontal Horizontal conflicts 
(Deadlocks) 
Horizontal challenges  
Vertical Vertical conflicts (e.g. street 
protests) 
Vertical challenges  
 
In relation to the ”institutions vs. the streets” debate (see Chapter 2), institutionalists 
expect that either institutions work as underlying causes for interruptions (horizontal 
conflicts, deadlocks), or as triggering causes (horizontal challenges), whereas the 
non-institutional causal model would expect vertical conflicts to be an underlying 
cause for interruptions, or vertical challenges would be a triggering cause.  
 
Cleavages and organisers of conflicts 
As the theoretical chapter (Chapter 2) indicated, I believe that for vertical and 
horizontal conflicts the cleavage mobilising the actions is important. In particular, I 
argued that conflicts mobilised by new, emerging cleavages (that hitherto was under- 
or unrepresented) could increase the likelihood for challenges to and interruptions of 
the presidents. There are many ways to measure the number, type and importance of 
cleavages. One such measure is for instance the effective number of parties (Laakso 
                                                
117 See the appendix for further operationalisation and coding rules of vertical and horizontal conflicts 
and challenges. 
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and Taagepera 1979), and to measure the stability of party systems, and by extension 
the cleavages one may use electoral volatility as a measure (Pedersen 1983). One of 
the problems with the use of party system data to measure the number or type of 
cleavages is that they presuppose programmatic parties. The extent to which parties in 
Latin America are programmatic vary across countries, time and party systems. The 
second problem is that I study events and developments that occur relatively quickly. 
By relatively quickly I mean within one electoral period. This means that the 
emergence of a new cleavage in a country at point t may not be registered in the 
election at point t-1, and thus would not be registered by changes in the 
Laakso/Taagepera or Pedersen indexes until after the fact.118 The third problem is that 
these measures are anyway better suited for counting the number of cleavages rather 
than looking at the content or type of cleavages, and I am more interested in the latter. 
Thus for my purpose party system measures are not suitable for measuring cleavages. 
Historical analyses can also be used to analyse the emergence of new cleavages (e.g. 
Coppedge 1998; Di Tella 2004; Lipset and Rokkan 1967a, 1967b; Rokkan 1968). 
While there is little wrong with this approach, and indeed historical analyses clearly 
could only enrich and deepen my own analyses, my attention is to current events and 
recent changes. Often such historical analyses are better equipped for explaining 
stable patterns than changes, it is no surprise, therefore that Lipset and Rokkan 
mentioned a freezing of party system hypothesis.  
 
For my purpose, however, I believe that coding each conflict according to what the 
expressed motivation for the conflict is, is the best measure. By expressed motivation 
I understand cleavage. Furthermore, as Stoll mentions, there is an inherent dilemma in 
                                                
118 Stoll (2008) provides a further discussion of measuring cleavages. 
Chapter 4: Empirical Overview and Data Presentation 
   
101 
measuring social cleavages: should one count issue diversity, or group diversity (Stoll 
2008: 1443-1444)? Therefore for each conflict I also register which actors are most 
dominant. This variable in part overlaps with the cleavage variable, for instance the 
classical left-right cleavage is most often organised by unions, and as such the 
variable also works as a reliability test on my data collection and a validity test of my 
variables. I will run statistical analyses using both these measures in chapter 6. In 
table 4-3 I list all cleavages used for coding conflicts, and all types of organisations 
that were the primary organisers of registered conflicts in LAWR.  
Table 4-3: Lists of type of organisation and cleavages, active in conflicts 
Organisation:  Cleavages/issue dimensions: 
Civil society organisation (environment 
and cultural/ethnic based) 
Centre-periphery (cultural)  
Labour union-business organisation International Centre-periphery 
Political party (horizontal conflicts) Peasant-consumer (economical) if distinguished from 
Centre-periphery (national) 
Students Left-right (economic, and socio-economic), labour-
industry.  
Peasant-farmer unions Ethnic (cultural): indigenous vs. latin/Spanish/catholic  
Terrorist-guerrilla organisations 
Military 
Terrorist, civil war or guerrilla-related  
Residual category, undefinable Residual category, case-or country specific, or undefinable 
 
The cleavages or issue dimensions follow classical thoughts on cleavages in political 
societies (Lijphart 1999; Lipset and Rokkan 1967a), but I have made some regional 
adjustments. I have for instance registered an international centre-periphery 
dimension, which relates to conflicts and protests directed at the central government 
on the issue of international organisations such as the World Bank and the 
International Monetary Fund. The centre-periphery dimension is understood to be 
cultural, whereas the peasant-consumer is more related to the economy (primary vs. 
secondary economy, Lipset and Rokkan 1967a: 14-16). The left-right is a classical 
issue dimension related to owners vs. workers on topics such as salaries, working 
conditions, unemployment levels, etc. Finally, an important dimension relates to 
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ethnicity, roughly understood as indigenous vs. Spanish-Catholic population. I also 
operated with a cleavage related to terrorism, civil war or guerrilla activity,119 and 
separated out conflicts that were reported in LAWR, but that I could not categorise.  
 
Concerning which organisation was the primary organiser of the conflict registered, I 
use a category for unions and business organisations,120 political parties is another 
type, this category basically covers all horizontal conflicts, students is another group, 
peasant/farmer unions, and a broader category covering civil society organisations 
that are not labour or farmer unions. This latter category covers basically 
environmental organisations, movements such as Movimento dos Trabalhadores 
Rurais Sem Terra (MST) in Brazil,121 and ethnically or culturally defined 
organisations. I also registered whether civilian conflicts were organised by the 
military, for instance the protests in Argentina during Alfonsín against the trials of the 
military under the authoritarian regime, and whether terrorist or guerrilla 
organisations organised civilian protests in favour of their cause.122  
 
Other variables 
I also register some other variables on the basis of LAWR, the two most important 
being internal splits in a presidential administration on account of internal conflicts, 
                                                
119 I did not count terrorist or guerrilla attacks, but rather civilian protests related to the matter of 
terrorism or guerrilla warfare. For instance a pro peace demonstration in Bogotá would be counted, but 
not a FARC vs. Colombian military shoot-out.  
120 Which basically means unions since business organisations, with some exceptions, regularly do not 
mobilise people to protest in the streets.  
121 Which could have been coded as a farmers’ union as well.  
122 These two latter, like the cleavage related to terrorism, civil war or a guerrilla, were in the end 
excluded from the analyses because there were few civilian conflicts registered on these issues, the 
conflicts were period-specific for a country, and when included in statistical analyses they turned out to 
have no effect, and the inclusion/exclusion of these variables did not affect the other variables. In the 
analyses in Chapter 6 I also exclude conflicts that I was not able to code as belonging to a cleavage or 
an organisation. These were few, and have little theoretical relevance anyway, and excluding them did 
not affect any overall results of any analysis in Chapter 6.  
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and presidential scandals. Internal splits as a variable is a count variable for each time 
a government minister quits or is forced to leave the government due to an expressed 
conflict with the president.123 Scandals I use as a dummy variable for any year a 
president is involved in a media exposed scandal, or close relatives to the president, 
close advisors in the administration or the president’s party are involved in a media 
exposed scandal in a way that implicates the president. Both these variables have been 
found to have an effect on interruptions and challenges (Hochstetler 2006; 
Marsteintredet and Llanos 2009; Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich Forthcoming 
2010; Pérez-Liñán 2007), and thus will be controlled for in the statistical analyses in 
Chapter 6.  
 
As for the other independent variables, data used in the previous chapter and in 
Chapter 6 are gathered from open sources such as Penn World Tables 6.2 (Heston, 
Summers, and Aten 2006) and World Development Indicators (WDI 2008) for 
economic data. For electoral and party system data, I have used the edited volume of 
Dieter Nohlen (Nohlen 2005b, 2005a), with updates from official electoral webpages, 
and the journal Electoral Studies for the respective countries.124 Chapter 3 also used 
some data from Cheibub’s PPP dataset and fill in some country-years with data 
provided to me by Aníbal Pérez-Liñán for political parties and other regime variables 
for the period prior to 1980 (Cheibub 2006, 2007), and Banks data for conflicts before 
1980 (Banks 2008), but in chapter 6 my conflict data comes from LAWR.  
 
                                                
123 Varies between 0 and 3 in my dataset. 
124 More details on sources for electoral and party data can be found in the appendix to this chapter.  
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My dataset compared to other similar datasets 
As mentioned in the introduction, other authors have gathered data on similar issues. 
How does my dataset compare to other datasets? Table 4-4 gives an overview.  
Table 4-4: A comparison of datasets 
Author Period Countries/ 
regions 
Conflict variables Other 
conflict-
related 
variables 
 
Marsteintredet 1980-2005 Latin America Horizontal and 
vertical, challenges 
and regular conflicts  
Cleavages, 
Scandals, 
internal 
splits in 
adm. 
Organisations 
 
 
Hochstetler 1980-2003 South 
America 
Horizontal 
challenges and 
vertical challenges  
Scandals, 
deaths in 
protests, 
type of 
policing 
Type of 
actor, Level 
of violence, 
strike vs. 
protests. 
Pérez-Liñán 1990-2004 Latin America Vertical challenges  Level of 
horizontal 
challenges: 
Separates 
between 
accusation 
and crisis* 
Number of 
organisations 
protesting 
Negretto  
(Jones) 
1978-2003 
(1984-1994) 
Latin America Horizontal conflicts 
and challenges 
  
Helmke  1995-2005 Countries 
covered by 
Latinobaromet
ro 
Institutional crisis Legitimacy/
popularity 
of 
institutions 
 
Notes and sources: All datasets based on Latin American Weekly Report. Jones (1995) and Negretto 
(2006) reported together, since Negretto updates Jones’s data. Hochstetler has also communicated to 
me of additional variables included in her dataset in addition to what is published in Hochstetler 
(2006), these are included in table 4-4, and she uses Keesings Record of World Events for a cross-
regional analysis (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009). Pérez-Liñán dataset is used in Pérez-Liñán (2007).  
* As dependent variables, not as explanatory variables.  
 
Negretto (2006), following Jones (1995),125 focuses on horizontal conflicts, 
particularly the ones that have been called deadlocks, in the literature. That is 
conflicts between congress and presidents that negatively affect the normal workings 
of both institutions, for instance the production of laws. Negretto builds on the 
institutional literature on regimes and inter-institutional relations especially in 
                                                
125 Jones originally created his dataset to test what creates deadlocks in Latin America. Sadly this is 
only a small part of his book (Jones 1995: 41-53), and the question he raised has remained largely 
untested for the Latin American region until Negretto’s study.  
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presidential regimes,126 and studies how these factors affect presidential interruptions, 
but he does not distinguish between two types of horizontal conflicts that I identify in 
table 4-2, or between underlying and triggering causes. Hochstetler (2006), in a 
discussion challenging the institutional literature for its causal model of presidential 
interruptions, is interested in challenges from the streets, what I call vertical 
challenges, in particular in contrast to horizontal challenges. In her article she does 
not focus on regular horizontal or vertical conflicts. Pérez-Liñán (2007) primarily 
focuses on presidential scandals and impeachments of presidents in Latin America, 
but collects data on challenges to the president, and other inter-institutional, or 
horizontal, conflicts, for one chapter of the book, and uses the data as dependent 
variables to be explained by a set of institutional and other variables. The data also 
cover a shorter time-period than the remaining authors.  
 
Table 4-4 shows that the dataset I have created is the most complete of all in terms of 
the countries and period covered and in terms or types of conflicts. However, what 
really distinguishes my dataset from the others is first of all my focus on both 
horizontal and vertical conflicts, and horizontal and vertical challenges, and second of 
all my focus on cleavages, or issue dimensions of each and every conflict, in addition 
to the type of organisers of the conflict. As I lay out in Chapter 2, I believe these are 
dimension that may be important to take into account when explaining presidential 
interruptions.  
 
All of the above-cited works analyse presidential interruptions as a phenomenon to 
explain, however, there are also some differences between which cases of presidential 
                                                
126 Negretto only uses institutional variables to explain the occurrence of presidential interruptions, in 
my view, a clear weakness of his analysis.  
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interruptions that the authors analyse, see Table 4-5. One natural reason is that the 
authors analyse different time-periods. None of the cited works analyse the 
interruptions of Presidents Lucio Gutiérrez in Ecuador in 2005 and Carlos Mesa in 
Bolivia the same year. Hochstetler (2006) only deals with elected presidents in South 
America, which excludes the Dominican and Guatemalan cases, and would also have 
excluded the fall of Carlos Mesa in Bolivia in 2005 since Mesa originally was 
Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada’s Vice-President.  
Table 4-5: Presidential interruptions analysed in the comparative literature 
President interrupted Authors including case Authors excluding case 
Siles Suazo, Bolivia 1984 Marsteintredet, Negretto Hochstetler*, Pérez-Liñán 
Alfonsín, Argentina 1989 Marteintredet, Negretto, 
Hochstetler 
Pérez-Liñán 
Collor de Melo, Brazil 1992 All  
Serrano, Guatemala 1993 Marsteintredet, Negretto, Pérez-
Liñán 
Hochstetler 
Pérez, Venezuela, 1993 All  
Balaguer, Dominican Republic 
1994 
Marsteintredet, Negretto,  Hochstetler, Pérez-Liñán** 
Bucaram, Ecuador 1997 All  
Cubas, Paraguay, 1999 All  
Mahuad, Ecuador 2000 All  
Fujimori, Perú 2000*** All  
De la Rúa, Argentina 2001**** All  
Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivia 
2003 
All  
Gutiérrez, Ecuador 2005 Marsteintredet Pérez-Liñán, Hochstetler, 
Negretto 
Mesa, Bolivia 2005 Marsteintredet Pérez-Liñán, Hochstetler, 
Negretto 
Zelaya, Honduras 2009  All 
Notes: This table also includes authors not using data from LAWR. *Not known for what reason, 
potentially coded as non-elected president. ** Included in the author’s Boolean analysis as a crisis, but 
not as a positive case of interruption, see Pérez-Liñán (2007: ch. 7). The exclusion is due to the fuzzy 
nature of the fall of Balaguer (e-mail communication with Pérez-Liñán). ***But in a recent work 
Hochstetler and Edwards (2009) exclude this case on account of Peru not being democratic at the time. 
**** Pérez-Liñán counts the Argentinean debacle as the fall of two presidents, de la Rúa and 
Rodríguez Saa. 
 
Despite some variations,127 there is a general agreement on most cases to include. 
Other authors have included the falls of Aristide in Haiti in 1991 and 2004 (e.g. 
Valenzuela 2004). This case is often excluded either on account of the democracy 
                                                
127 There is more variation between the authors than the table presents, but not significantly more. For 
instance Negretto includes premature closures of congress as well, which makes him include the 
closure of congress in Venezuela and the early elections called by Chávez in 2000. 
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criterion (see Chapter 2) or on account of Haiti being semi-presidential and thus not 
relevant for many of the discussions regarding presidential interruption.  
 
Table 4-5 also shows that I include more cases of presidential interruption for 
analyses than do the other authors, due to my longer time-frame. Thus, my dataset in 
this comparison to the others, covers more variables of interest, longer time-periods, 
and more cases than the other datasets on the topic of presidential interruptions 
discussed in this section.  
 
Descriptive statistics of central variables and basic analyses 
of the data: some methodological considerations 
The following sections focus on the content of the dataset, presenting overviews of 
central variables that I have created from LAWR. The goal is to give a general idea of 
the nature and number of conflicts of all types across time and space. I start by 
presenting the number of political news registered in my dataset. Political news is the 
basic unit in this dataset, and is a superset of political conflicts. Second, I present the 
number and types of conflicts compared over time and space.  
 
News and Conflicts in the dataset 
Table 4-6 shows how many news have been registered in the dataset compared to the 
number of conflicts (of any type) registered.128  
                                                
128 In the full dataset including Haiti and democratic periods before the full democratic years, the 
number of news increases to 7917 news.  
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Table 4-6: Political news and conflicts in dataset 
Category Number 
All political news 7716 
In brief/News updates 754 
All conflicts  1445 
Notes: Based on personal dataset from LAWR. 
The Latin American Weekly Report distinguishes, in certain periods of the 1980-2005 
period between full stories and “In Brief” or short news updates. Table 4-6 shows that 
about 10% of the news items I registered come from these shorter stories.129 For the 
construction of the conflict variables used for later analyses, I include all conflicts 
even though they are only registered in “In Brief” news. The argument for including 
conflicts from “In Brief” news is that conflicts in this section also should be included 
if they fall within the definition of the conflicts I am registering. Secondly, including 
the “In Brief” news helps prevent some of the large country and South America bias 
in the Latin American Weekly Report.130 Since the 1990’s Central America was less 
well covered than South America in LAWR, thus one might think that LAWR’s 
scarce coverage of these countries could present a validity problem for the data for 
this sub-region. Including the short “In Brief” news help mitigate this problem. 
Furthermore, since the focus of this dissertation is on events of national political 
conflict, I believe that most relevant conflicts are included LAWR even for the 
smaller Central American countries. The problem is therefore not the under-
representation of conflicts in the Central American region, but rather the over-
representation of conflicts relative to other political news for these countries.  
                                                
129 I also made an attempt to flag conflicts that were the continuation of previous conflicts, but it was 
difficult to be consistent in the coding. I therefore ignore whether conflicts may be considered totally 
new, or just the continuation of previous conflicts. The reason for including the continuation of a 
conflict as a separate conflict is that the more times a conflict is reported, the higher the intensity or the 
seriousness of the conflict. Thus including all conflicts, even though there is little to no development in 
the conflict from week to week, helps me construct a continuous variable that captures the level of 
conflicts in a country during a certain time period. Furthermore, including the continuation of a conflict 
does not have any negative effects in terms of constructing dummy variables or ordinal variables to 
capture different elements of conflicts. 
130 This bias made Hochstetler (2006) focus only on South American cases in her article.  
Chapter 4: Empirical Overview and Data Presentation 
   
109 
 
Table 4-7: News average per year 
Country 
News annual 
average 
Conflicts annual 
average 
Proportion of 
Conflicts to news 
Argentina 34.26 6.26 0.18 
Bolivia 22.33 6.50 0.29 
Brazil 43.86 7.52 0.17 
Chile 18.63 1.25 0.07 
Colombia 32.31 2.00 0.06 
Costa Rica 4.16 0.84 0.20 
Dominican Republic 7.88 1.83 0.23 
Ecuador 22.92 7.62 0.33 
El Salvador 8.76 0.95 0.11 
Guatemala 9.84 1.79 0.18 
Honduras 6.41 1.05 0.16 
Mexico 37.61 3.44 0.09 
Nicaragua 13.05 2.64 0.20 
Panama 6.14 1.50 0.24 
Paraguay 17.24 4.29 0.25 
Peru 28.46 4.38 0.15 
Uruguay 11.38 1.57 0.14 
Venezuela 22.85 4.31 0.19 
South America 25.84 4.69 0.18 
Central America and 
Caribbean 11.09 1.71 0.15 
Latin America 19.4 3.28 0.17 
Notes: Conflicts include all types of conflicts in Table 4-2. Central America and the Caribbean are all 
countries from Panama to Mexico, in addition to the Dominican Republic.  
 
Table 4-7 lists the average of news items per year in each country in the dataset, in 
addition to the average of conflicts per year, and yearly average of the proportion of 
conflicts to news in a year. The overall average per country per year is 19.4 news 
items, and 3.28 conflicts. The table shows that the Central American countries 
(excluding Mexico) and the Dominican Republic get less news reported than all other 
countries. Costa Rica, the longest-living democracy in Latin America, and maybe the 
most stable country in the region even today, is the least covered country with on 
average 4.16 news items per year. Brazil, by far the largest country in extension and 
population, has an annual average of 43.86 news, followed by Mexico with 37.61 
news. The bottom of the table also reports the sub-regional comparisons of Central 
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America and South America, which shows that there are more than twice as many 
news reported per year in the South American countries compared to the Central 
American countries (including Mexico).  
 
The annual average of conflicts shows that countries with many news registered also 
report, on average, more conflicts, see for instance Brazil 7.52 conflicts on average 
per year. Nevertheless, this category also presents some interesting findings that are in 
accordance with the general knowledge of the region, thus validating my coding and 
the variable. Even when the number of news registered is not controlled for, countries 
such as Ecuador and Bolivia, typically identified with many political conflicts, score 
among the highest on this category. The column to the right presents the average 
proportion of conflicts to news in a country. Again Ecuador and Bolivia have the 
highest levels of conflicts reported, followed by Paraguay, and somewhat surprisingly 
Panama. Panama’s and also Costa Rica’s high scores are probably a result of the over-
representation of conflicts to news from these countries compared to other countries, a 
problem I discussed above. Despite these odd findings, some of the other numbers 
reported for countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, and Brazil as high-conflict 
countries, and for instance Chile as a low-conflict country, fit well with a general 
perception of political life in these countries and thus yields credibility to the 
collection of data (reliability) and also to the variables constructed (validity).  
 
Controlling for large-country bias 
In the statistical analyses in Chapter 6, however, I will follow Jones’s (1995) advice 
and exclude any country-year with fewer news than six per year. This corrects some 
of the Central American bias that is created by the lack of coverage in some years in 
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this region. Figure 4-1, below, is based on the numbers reported in Table 4-7, and 
shows a clear picture of the number of annual mean of news and conflicts in the 
countries included in the study.  
Figure 4-1: News and conflicts in dataset 
 
Source: Personal dataset based on LAWR. 
 
Another way to control for the large-country bias would be to create variables based 
on the proportion of conflict to news in a country-year (see the far-right column in 
Table 4.7). In the statistical analyses in Chapter 6, I generally decide against doing 
this for two reasons: First of all, all observations of different types of conflicts in 
country-years with challenges and interruptions are truncated. This means that any 
conflicts registered after February 5 in 1997 in Ecuador, the day President Bucaram 
was removed, are not included in the observations made for that country-year. This is 
to avoid the problem of potential reverse causation. However, if the same technique 
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was applied to measures of the proportion of conflicts to news, a variable that may 
vary between 0 and 1, but with a mean below .2 (standard deviation of  .15) for all 
conflicts, the variable would show extreme values in the country-year with 
interruptions or challenges (often getting close to .8). Therefore in order to use the 
variable of the proportion of conflicts, I would have to use the full country-year as the 
unit of observation in a year of interruption or challenges. This would open for the 
problem of reverse causation. The other reason is that I in Chapter 6 will use panel 
regression techniques that also take into consideration the variation within units, in 
this case countries, over time, and thus, diminish the problem of the large-country 
bias (Kennedy 2003: 302).131 Therefore the conflict variables used in the analyses in 
Chapter 6 are based on the number of conflicts, not the proportion of conflicts to 
news, and I correct for the large-country bias in LAWR by excluding all country-
years with fewer than six news per year. 
 
Comparison Across Time: Interruptions and Conflicts in Latin 
America 
The above sections have focused on methodological considerations. The following 
sections will focus on variation over time and across countries and regions of central 
variables: interruptions and conflicts. This section focuses on comparisons over time, 
the next compares countries and regions. First I discuss interruptions, then conflicts in 
general, and finally I specify different types of conflicts.  
 
Table 4-8 below displays the timing of presidential interruptions, controlling for the 
number of democratic years in each decade. The table shows that only two 
                                                
131 I have also ran all models presented in Chapter 6 with conflict variables based on the proportion of 
conflicts to news instead of the number of conflicts. The results from these analyses only confirm the 
results presented in Chapter 6. These results and analyses are available from the author. 
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interruptions occurred during the 1980s, six in the 1990s, and six more between 2000 
and 2005.  
Table 4-8: Interruptions and democratic years in Latin America 
 1980s 1990s 2000-2006 
Interruptions 2 6 6 
Democratic years 112 181 125 
Interruptions per 
democratic year 
.018 .033 .048 
Notes: Democratic years based on Mainwaring, Brinks and Pérez-Liñán (2001) dataset on regimes in 
Latin America. These figures do not include the ouster of Manuel Zelaya in 2009.   
  
Considering that the 1980s generally has been dubbed the lost decade for Latin 
America in terms of economic and social development, it may be surprising that this 
decade only saw two presidential interruptions, and no democratic breakdowns. 
Inflation was at its highest during this period, reaching peak levels in Bolivia in 1985 
and Nicaragua in 1988 higher than 10,000% a year, and growth was at its lowest in 
the whole period under consideration in this dissertation (WDI 2008). There is an 
increase over time of interruptions even when controlled for democratic years, but it 
is not a very strong one. It increases from 1.8% interruptions per democratic year in 
the 1980’s to 4.8% during the 2000s (ending after 2006).132 Figure 4-2 shows the 
average of news and conflicts in a democratic country per year, thus the figure 
controls for the increasing number of democratic countries over time in Latin 
America. In 1980 only six countries were included in the dataset, whereas ten years 
later all 18 countries were considered democratic. Figure 4-2 shows that in terms of 
conflicts, the average number shows no clear trend over time. Regressing the sum of 
conflicts on years gives a positive, but not significant relationship.133 So there has 
                                                
132 There has been one more interruption in this decade: Honduras on June 28 2009 with the ouster of 
Manuel Zelaya, summing the number of interrupted presidencies to 7 for this decade, one more than in 
the 1990s.   
133 The b-coefficient is 0.10, t-stat of 1.23 from a standard OLS regression.  
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been a slight increase in presidential interruptions since the 1980’s, and a slight, but 
non-significant, increase in political conflicts as well.  
 
Figure 4-2: News and Conflicts over time 
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Figure 4-3: Likelihood of challenges and removals across time in Latin America 
 
Notes: The graphs show the likelihood of either event occuring in a democratic country in Latin 
America during a year. This figure and several of the next figures in this chapter and Chapter 6 present 
running averages calculated with a lowess smoother in Stata 10.1 (stata command lowess). Stata 
calculates a weighted regression using years as the x-variable. The graphs can be read as running 
averages, and as displaying real values (where applicable) despite being calculations from a regression 
analysis. I use the lowess smoother basically because it makes graphs that display time-trends over 
many units (countries) well. All lowess calculated graphs show changes somewhat later than real 
changes due to the calculation of a locally weighted regression.  
 
Figure 4-3 demonstrates that there is a low probability of a presidential interruption at 
any time, but that, as Table 4-8 above indicates, there is an increasing risk of it 
occurring. The likelihood of a vertical or horizontal challenge in a democracy has also 
increased over time, and that vertical challenges is now as frequent as horizontal 
challenges. Vertical, or street, challenges were few and far between, almost as seldom 
as interruptions in the early 1990s, at that time we see that vertical challenges to 
presidents increase reaching the levels of horizontal challenges in 2005, the last year 
covered in my dataset.  
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Figure 4-4: Vertical and horizontal conflicts across time in Latin America 
 
 
Notes: The actual number of conflicts in this or the subsequent graphs is not that important. There will 
always be conflicts not reported in LAWR. The real value of the figures is comparative, and the trends 
displayed. 
 
Figure 4-4, above, shows that general vertical conflicts, excluding challenges, decline 
steadily till about the mid 1990s, and increases again to about 1980s levels. The 
increase in vertical conflicts occurs at about the same time as the increase in the 
likelihood of a vertical challenge (see Figure 4.3), that is from the mid 1990s. There 
are probably many reasons for the decrease in vertical conflicts, one is that Bolivia, a 
country with many vertical conflicts registered, was one of only 6-7 democracies in 
the early period and had a relatively higher weight than in later periods. Another 
reason is probably that unions grow weaker over time in this period as neo-liberal 
reforms get implemented in more and more countries. The implementation of these 
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reforms met tough reactions at the outset, but may have weakened unions over 
time.134  
 
Figure 4-4 also shows that the number of horizontal conflicts, excluding challenges, 
increases over time, peaking around the mid 1990s. Thereafter the number of 
horizontal conflicts stabilises. One reason for the early increase in horizontal conflicts 
might be that as democracies in the region have become more stable, congress has 
become stronger and more self-confident in picking policy battles with the presidency 
(Pérez-Liñán 2005). Congresses across the region have also become more 
professionalised, many have received support financially and technically, from 
international organisations and banks, which also may have strengthened congresses 
and their comparative power relative to the president’s.  
 
Figure 4-5 (next page) contrasts the number of conflicts on average per country per 
year on the classical left-right cleavage with conflicts on regional and ethnic 
cleavages.135 The graph demonstrates that the number of conflicts on left-right issue 
increased somewhat in the eighties, was stable since 1990 until about the mid 1990s, 
and since then has decreased steadily. Regional and ethnic cleavages show the reverse 
development, stable, but increasing, till the mid 1990s and since then a rapid increase. 
This latter rapid increase may explain the recent increase in vertical conflicts overall 
since the latter part of the 1990s (see Figure 4-4). Conflicts mobilising on these types 
of cleavages were more dominant than the traditional left-right conflicts by 2005 
according to my data from LAWR. 
                                                
134 I discuss these issues further in Chapter 6.  
135 Regional and ethnic cleavages in Figure 4-6 includes the two centre-periphery cleavages, the 
peasant-consumer cleavage and the ethnic cleavage (see table 4-3). Due to variations across countries 
these are merged here, and in the subsequent analyses as well.  
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Figure 4-5: Development of conflicts and cleavages in Latin America 
 
Figure 4-6 (next page) focuses on the organisers of conflicts in Latin America (see 
table 4-3), and contrasts labour union conflicts with conflicts primarily involving civil 
society or new social movements, and peasant or farmer organisations. Actors and 
cleavages will often correlate strongly, but there is not a perfect match.136 Figure 4-6 
confirms the impression from the previous figures that the left-right dimension is 
decreasing in level and importance in Latin America. The fall in union action seems 
to be greater than the fall in importance of the left-right dimension, falling steadily 
since the mid 1980s. On the other hand, one can see that conflicts organised by 
peasant organisations and civil society organisations have been increasing since the 
start of my dataset, but in an accelerating fashion since about the mid 1990s. Civil 
society and peasant organisations both now organise as many conflicts or protests as 
labour unions across the region.  
                                                
136 For instance, labour union conflicts and left-right conflicts correlate at .64.  
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Figure 4-6: Labour union, civil society (NSM), and peasant organised conflicts 
 
Notes: Number of conflicts involving labour unions, peasant-farmers, or civil society (New Social 
Movements) in a country year. 
 
A note on validity and reliability of the data 
The trends that I show here might be biased by the dataset, or by my coding. 
However, in at least two cases, Peru and Bolivia, with much more fine-grained 
national data, the same trends are demonstrated. Arce (2008: 42) shows with data 
from Peru that while strike actions (equivalent to my conflicts organised by labour 
unions, and conflicts mobilised by the traditional left-right cleavage) decreased or 
maintained the same level from 1995-2004, other types of protests more than doubled 
in the same period. As a support for my claim in this chapter, the biggest one-year 
increase in “other types of protests” was from 1999-2000, the latter year was the year 
of Fujimori’s fall.137 A study in Bolivia on social conflicts shows much of the same 
trend, thus also validating in this case my own data (see Laserna et al. 2006). There is 
                                                
137 The division between strikes and other protests in Arce (2008) coincides with the distinction on 
types of contention in the Banks data that I used in chapter 3.  
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a clear downward trend in labour and worker related conflicts in the period 1994-2005 
compared to the 1970-1993 period, and in the same period non-labour conflicts 
increase and constitute almost 50% of all registered conflicts in the latter period 
(Laserna, Ortego, and Chacón 2006: 93). Data from Banks (2008) show the same 
declining trend in the number of strikes on average for the whole of Latin America, 
and a similar rise in anti-government demonstrations (a variable that conflates regular 
conflicts and challenges). Therefore, I have no reason to believe that the trends I show 
with my data should be either biased, or have problems in terms of validity and 
reliability.  
 
Comparison across space: Interruptions and conflicts across 
countries and regions 
In a region and continent as large as Latin America there are of course extreme 
variations. The figures above have overshadowed this variation by presenting 
averages for the whole region to present variation and trends across time.  
 
This section, however, will focus on the same variables and compare their values 
across countries and regions. I also compare regions because empirically South 
America has been pointed to as an exception with respect to presidential interruptions 
(Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009).138  
 
Table 4-9 shows that ten countries have experienced a presidential interruption.139 
Three of these are in Central America or the Caribbean, and seven in South America, 
                                                
138 I must add here that since these lines were written, President Zelaya in Honduras has been removed 
on June 28, 2009, and president Colom in Guatemala was challenged in May of 2009. Even though the 
Central-South American divide seems to be smaller than presented in these pages, it, nevertheless, still 
exists.  
139 Note that in this table I include the interruption of Zelaya.  
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constituting, respectively 38% and 70% of the countries in each sub-region, and 56% 
of all countries in Latin America.  
Table 4-9: Countries and interruptions 
Country Interruption Number of interruptions 
Argentina Yes 2 
Bolivia Yes 3 
Brazil Yes 1 
Chile No 0 
Colombia No 0 
Costa Rica No 0 
Dominican Republic Yes 1 
Ecuador Yes 3 
El Salvador No 0 
Guatemala Yes 1 
Honduras Yes 1 
Mexico No 0 
Nicaragua No 0 
Panama No 0 
Paraguay Yes 1 
Peru Yes 1 
Uruguay No 0 
Venezuela Yes 1 
South America Yes 12 
Central America and 
Caribbean 
Yes 3 
 
There is, therefore, still a geographical divide between South and Central America 
and the Caribbean with respect to interruptions of presidents. The following table, 
Table 4-10 (next page), presents the various types of conflicts across countries and 
sub-regions in Latin America, and this table also confirms a regional divide.140  
                                                
140 Since these data are based on my dataset from LAWR, no conflict after 2005 is registered. 
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Table 4-10: Number of news registered as different types of conflicts across countries and sub-
regions, 1980-2005 
Country 
Horizontal 
challenges 
Vertical 
Challenges 
Horizontal 
conflicts 
Vertical 
conflicts 
Argentina 0 3 (2) 66 75 
Bolivia 9 (5) 7 (3) 31 108 
Brazil 10 (3) 2 (2) 83 64 
Chile 0 0 14 6 
Colombia 6 (3) 0 13 32 
Costa Rica 0 0 12 9 
Dominican Republic 0 0 12 32 
Ecuador 12 (7) 12 (3) 93 80 
El Salvador 0 0 7 13 
Guatemala 0 2 (1) 9 17 
Honduras 0 0 5 18 
Mexico 0 0 47 15 
Nicaragua 2 (2) 0 42 14 
Panama 0 0 11 10 
Paraguay 23 (7) 3 (3) 18 29 
Peru 2 (1) 2 (2) 29 71 
Uruguay 0 0 11 20 
Venezuela 6 (2) 21 (5) 36 48 
Region     
South America (N-224) 68  (28) 50(20) 394 533 
Central America (N-170) 2 (2) 2 (1) 145 128 
Total 70 (30) 52 (21) 539 661 
Notes: The table displays the number of news registered as either type of conflict. The number of 
actual challenges in a country is inflated since several challenges here are not unique (compare with 
table 5-2, next chapter), and do not represent perfectly the variable “challenges” used for statistical 
analyses in Chapter 6. The table shows sum of conflicts in a country during completely democratic 
years, number of country/years with challenges in brackets (even this number is also somewhat inflated 
compared to Table 5-2, next chapter).  
 
 
The table clearly demonstrates that there are many fewer horizontal challenges and 
especially fewer vertical challenges in Central America than in South America. As 
pointed out in Chapter 2, unless someone actually challenges a president it is unlikely 
that he or she will fall. In Central America there are only two news items registered as 
horizontal, and two news items registered vertical challenges registered over 170 
country years compared to 70 and 52 in South America over 224 country years. These 
numbers refer to only two country-years of horizontal challenges, and one country-
year of vertical challenges in Central America (in brackets), and 28 and 20 for South 
America, respectively. Merging vertical and horizontal challenges, I get that of the 30 
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unique country-years with horizontal challenges and the 21 unique country-years of 
vertical challenges, there are 40 unique country-years of challenges that will be used 
in the statistical analyses in Chapter 6. In other words in eleven country-years there 
are simultaneous vertical and horizontal challenges against a president.  
 
The table also displays which countries have fallen prey to Linz’s perils of 
presidentialism in terms of frequent deadlocks and horizontal conflicts in general. 
Ecuador is the number one country with 93 news items registered as horizontal 
conflicts since 1980, and 13 registered news items registered as horizontal challenges 
between congress. Paraguay also fell into this pattern with horizontal challenges to 
every president since President Cubas. In both countries there have been horizontal 
challenges in seven different years. Brazil seems to score high as well, but with regard 
to horizontal challenges to the president, eight of the ten registered are from the 
relatively protracted impeachment process of president Collor de Melo in 1992. The 
table also confirms that Bolivia, as the literature holds, is the country with most 
vertical conflicts, followed by Ecuador. Curiously Venezuela is the country with most 
registered vertical challenges, which stems from the conflict-ridden presidencies of 
Pérez, Caldera, and Chávez. In total there have been more country years with 
horizontal than vertical challenges, but remember that vertical challenges are now as 
likely as horizontal challenges (Figure 4-3).  
 
What about cleavages and actors across countries and regions? Table 4-11 (next page) 
conveys a simplified picture in which the right-left cleavage is contrasted to regional 
and ethnic cleavages.  
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Table 4-11: Cleavages and conflicts in Latin America 
Country 
Left-Right (economic)  
cleavage 
Regional and ethnic 
cleavage 
Argentina 108 2 
Bolivia 62 54 
Brazil 83 27 
Chile 7 1 
Colombia 15 8 
Costa Rica 17 1 
Dominican Republic 30 1 
Ecuador 98 14 
El Salvador 13 0 
Guatemala 15 2 
Haiti 2 0 
Honduras 8 7 
Mexico 38 7 
Nicaragua 12 2 
Panama 8 1 
Paraguay 14 16 
Peru 59 11 
Uruguay 23 1 
Venezuela 47 1 
South America 516 135 
Central America 143 21 
Total 659 156 
Notes: Regional, ethnic cleavage includes conflicts which primary cleavage was centre-periphery, 
international centre-periphery, peasant-consumer and ethnic conflicts (Table 4-3).  
 
What is evident from this table is that left-right conflicts dominate, this is not 
surprising as many of the vertical conflicts are strikes, furthermore, on a more 
impressionistic basis, many of the protests one comes across in LAWR relates to price 
hikes, and (end of) subsidies of foodstuff and fuel. Finally, many of the horizontal 
conflicts also concern typical left-right or economic issues. Table 4-12, below, 
portrays much of the same picture as Table 4-11, but with the type of organisations 
active in conflicts. Again, I distinguish between a broad category including Civil 
society and new social movements, labour-business organisations, political parties 
(mainly horizontal conflicts), student protests, and peasants/farmers’ organisations.  
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Table 4-12: Types of organisations in conflicts in Latin America 
Country 
Civil Society/ 
New Social Movements 
Labour- 
business 
Political  
parties 
Students/ 
teachers 
Peasant- 
Farmers 
Argentina 12 34 67 0 3 
Bolivia 9 60 45 0 27 
Brazil 1 40 110 0 19 
Chile 1 5 14 0 0 
Colombia 2 19 22 3 5 
Costa Rica 0 7 13 0 0 
Dominican Republic 1 19 13 3 1 
Ecuador 18 43 110 4 0 
El Salvador 0 13 6 0 0 
Guatemala 1 9 13 1 2 
Honduras 3 6 5 1 5 
Mexico 2 7 47 0 4 
Nicaragua 0 7 45 2 0 
Panama 0 6 13 0 0 
Paraguay 1 4 44 1 16 
Peru 4 48 36 2 5 
Uruguay 0 15 15 0 1 
Venezuela 12 28 42 12 1 
South America (N-960) 60 296 505 22 77 
Central America (N-255) 7 74 155 7 12 
Total 67 370 660 29 89 
Notes: Sum of all conflicts does not sum up to correct total number as some categories are left out. 
Also the total sums do not match that of table 4-11 since table 4-12 includes more types of conflicts.  
 
Labour-business and political parties dominate as the main actors in political 
conflicts, which is congruent with the picture from table 4-11. The table also brings 
out the fact that countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Brazil, Venezuela and Argentina 
have organisations outside the labour organisations and political parties that are 
active.  
 
Comparison Across Space: Interruptions and conflicts across 
governments 
The dataset presented above can also be used in country-government format. There 
are advantages and disadvantages with both formats. The country-year format yields a 
higher N, which increases the probability of significant results in statistical analyses 
by decreasing the standard error. A country-government format is the best option 
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when your interest is in institutional variables since governments and other 
institutional variables change values at the same time, but economic and 
socioeconomic variables are coded on a calendar-year basis and thus do not fit a 
country-government format. If the researcher is more interested in structural or 
economic conditions, a country-year format might be better because all variables and 
units follow the calendar year. The decision of which format to use for statistical 
analysis basically follows the logic of picking the format that the researcher believes 
to be the most valid for the research question at hand. In the following chapter I will 
use the country-year format, but here I present the data in a country-government 
format to provide a broader picture of the data. 
 
In the statistical analyses in Chapter 6 (and in Chapter 3) I use the country-year 
format instead of the country-government format since I include socioeconomic 
variables. Another reason is that since the part of what I am trying to measure with 
my conflict data, for instance the emergence of new cleavages, may appear rather 
quickly, using the country-government format may not capture the relevant changes 
in the data, and average out many important developments across the full period of a 
government. 
 
The purpose of this section is, however, just to present the data across governments 
and, thus, compare between another unit of analysis than countries/region and time, 
presented above. I have already presented which presidencies have been interrupted. 
My data from 1980-2005 cover 107 presidencies or governments (see Table 4-16, 
Appendix to this chapter), and in order to present some of the data in the text here, 
only the 15 most conflict-ridden presidencies and the five least conflict-ridden 
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presidencies are included. Table 4-13 shows the 14 most challenged presidencies 
since 1980.  
Table 4-13: Most challenged-ridden presidents (horizontal and vertical challenges) 
Government Country 
Horizontal 
challenges 
Horizontal 
conflicts 
Vertical  
challenges 
Vertical  
conflicts 
González Macchi Paraguay 11 7 2 11 
Cubas* Paraguay 9 2 1 0 
Collor de Melo* Brazil 8 16 1 2 
Pérez* Venezuela 6 11 4 13 
Gutiérrez* Ecuador 6 8 3 4 
Siles Zuazo* Bolivia 4 3 2 21 
Samper Colombia 4 4 0 6 
Chávez 2 Venezuela 0 4 17 9 
Mahuad* Ecuador 0 8 5 8 
Sánchez de Lozada 2* Bolivia 2 1 4 6 
Duhalde** Argentina 0 4 2 6 
Noboa Ecuador 0 12 2 9 
Palacio Ecuador 0 4 2 3 
de la Rúa* Argentina 0 11 1 9 
Notes: * Interrupted presidents; ** Caretaker presidents (forced to resign). Challenge-ridden based on 8 
most horizontal challenges, and 7 most vertical challenges (in bold). The presidencies are listed in that 
order. The number of challenges in this table reflects the number of news items registered as a 
challenge. See Table 4-10. 
 
Table 4-13 shows that of the 14 most challenged presidents, only one president 
(Samper, Colombia) comes from a country that has not experienced a presidential 
interruption. Eight of the 14 presidents listed were interrupted, and Duhalde 
(Argentina) was forced to call early elections as a caretaker president. González 
Macchi (Paraguay) and Samper (Colombia) both experienced impeachment 
procedures against them, the Chávez 2 administration experienced a failed coup 
attempt, whereas Noboa and Palacio (both Ecuador) took over from interrupted 
presidents, as did also González Macchi in Paraguay.  
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Table 4-14: Most conflict-ridden presidents (horizontal and vertical conflicts) 
Government Country 
Horizontal  
challenges 
Horizontal  
conflicts 
Vertical  
Challenges 
Vertical  
Conflicts 
Durán Ecuador 0 32 0 25 
Cardoso 1 Brazil 0 28 0 12 
Zedillo Mexico 0 25 0 2 
Chamorro Nicaragua 1 24 0 7 
Menem 2 Argentina 0 23 0 17 
Fox Mexico 0 21 0 8 
Menem 1 Argentina 0 17 0 19 
Bolaños Nicaragua 1 17 0 3 
Sánchez de Lozada Bolivia 0 5 0 26 
Sarney Brazil 0 12 1 23 
García Peru 0 3 0 23 
Siles Zuazo* Bolivia 4 3 2 21 
Lula Brazil 1 10 0 20 
Belaúnde Peru 0 7 0 20 
Paz Estenssoro Bolivia 0 4 0 18 
Notes: * Interrupted presidents. Conflict-ridden based on the 8 governments with most horizontal 
conflicts and 7 most vertical conflicts (in Bold). Some cases overlap.  
 
Table 4-14 shows the 15 most conflict-ridden presidents,141 and demonstrates that 
conflict-ridden and challenge-ridden (Table 4-13) are two different dimensions. This 
fact is also a support for my idea of distinguishing between underlying causes (where 
regular conflicts appear), and triggering causes (where challenges appear), see 
Chapter 2. Only one president, Siles Zuazo, Bolivia, appear in both tables.142 Siles 
Zuazo was the first president to be interrupted and the only one to confront very high 
levels of vertical conflicts in the streets. Vertical conflicts, as I pointed out above, are 
driven by strikes and union actions, and Siles was driven out in part by unions at a 
time before the neo-liberal reforms would weaken unions in several countries.143  
 
The correlation between the conflicts and challenges is not higher than .16, whereas 
horizontal and vertical conflicts correlate at .45. This may or may not indicate that 
                                                
141 I include 15 presidents here since Menem 1 and Bolaños experienced the same number of  
horizontal conflicts.  
142 Sánchez de Lozada also appears in both, but in table 4-13 he appears for his second administration, 
in table 4-14 for his first administration.  
143 What is more, Siles also attempted to run the government in part with the unions, and gave the 
unions co-responsibility over important factories at the time. A political move that did not help Siles’s 
survival in office.  
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governments deadlocked by horizontal conflicts foster vertical conflicts, or that 
vertical conflicts create more horizontal conflicts. Further case-studies may tap into 
the relationship between the different types of conflicts.   
 
Not surprisingly, an Ecuadorean president figures as the one with most horizontal 
conflicts, this is President Durán (also with the president with second-most number of 
vertical conflict). The first Cardoso government is number two. Cardoso’s conflicts 
were caused by his attempts to reform the constitution and win control over 
hyperinflation, both very conflictive issues that Cardoso succeeded with. As can be 
appreciated by the Cardoso example, horizontal conflicts and deadlocks do not 
necessarily mean that a president is unsuccessful in implementing the agenda. If I 
were to guess, however, I would still believe horizontal conflicts, as measured here, 
should correlate with a president’s ability to implement his or her desired political 
agenda.  
 
Conclusion 
This chapter has presented the dataset that will make up part of the evidence used in 
this dissertation to further analyse presidential interruptions in Latin America. The 
focus has been on different types of conflicts, which I have registered from LAWR, 
and their variation across time and space. To display various facets of the data, years, 
governments, countries and regions have been used as the unit of analysis. The 
presentation of data demonstrated that there has been a slight increase over time in the 
number of presidential interruptions, and that at the same time, presidents are more 
challenged by the streets than ever before, while inter-institutional challenges have 
remained at much the same level over time. Furthermore, the data showed that new 
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cleavages have grown in importance and in real numbers. Regional and ethnic 
conflicts started to gain importance in the mid 1990s, so did new actors in civil 
society and peasant organisations. From the late nineties there was a clear decrease in 
the conflicts related to the traditional left-right cleavage, whereas union actions have 
been decreasing overthe whole time period under scrutiny here. Comparing across 
nations and regions, there was clear evidence of the South American exceptionalism, 
not only in interruptions, but also in terms of horizontal and vertical challenges. In 
terms of cleavages and organisations, countries such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Paraguay, 
and Brazil represented much of the increasing trend over time with regard to conflicts 
related to geography and culture. What is also interesting is that there does not seem 
to be a relationship between the general level of conflicts and the challenges to, or 
falls of presidents. I discuss this topic further in Chapter 6. Conflicts as such, it seems, 
do not create interruptions, whereas when congress or actors from civil society 
(broadly understood) challenge a president, they seem to succeed from time to time. 
What is not clear, however, harking back to the perennial debate on institutions 
started by Linz (1978; 1990; 1994) is what is the more important triggering cause: 
horizontal (congressional) or vertical (street) challenges? The next chapter will 
discuss this question.  
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Appendix to Chapter 4:  
 
Table 4-15: All presidents and registered conflicts in Latin America 1980-2005 
Government Country 
Horizontal  
Challenges 
Horizontal  
Conflicts 
Vertical  
Challenges 
Vertical  
Conflicts 
Alfonsín* Argentina 0 10 1 15 
Menem 1 Argentina 0 17 0 19 
Menem 2 Argentina 0 23 0 17 
de la Rúa* Argentina 0 11 1 9 
Duhalde** Argentina 0 4 2 6 
Kirchner Argentina 0 1 0 9 
Siles Zuazo* Bolivia 4 3 2 21 
Paz Estenssoro Bolivia 0 4 0 18 
Paz Zamora Bolivia 1 3 0 10 
Sánchez de Lozada Bolivia 0 5 0 26 
Banzer Bolivia 0 0 0 9 
Quiroga Bolivia 0 0 0 5 
Sánchez de Lozada 2* Bolivia 2 1 4 6 
Mesa* Bolivia 2 10 1 12 
Rodríguez** Bolivia 0 5 0 1 
Sarney Brazil 0 12 1 23 
Collor de Melo* Brazil 8 16 1 2 
Franco Brazil 0 8 0 2 
Cardoso 1 Brazil 0 28 0 12 
Cardoso 2 Brazil 1 9 0 5 
Lula Brazil 1 10 0 20 
Aylwin Chile 0 5 0 2 
Frei Chile 0 6 0 3 
Lagos Chile 0 3 0 1 
Turbay Colombia 0 1 0 5 
Betancur Colombia 0 0 0 2 
Barco Colombia 0 1 0 12 
Gaviria Colombia 0 3 0 3 
Samper Colombia 4 4 0 6 
Pastrana Colombia 2 2 0 4 
Uribe Colombia 0 2 0 0 
Carazo Costa Rica 0 0 0 0 
Monge Costa Rica 0 0 0 1 
Arias Costa Rica 0 3 0 1 
Calderón Costa Rica 0 2 0 2 
Figueres Costa Rica 0 5 0 1 
Pacheco Costa Rica 0 1 0 4 
Gúzman Dominican Republic 0 3 0 7 
Jorge Dominican Republic 0 2 0 6 
Balaguer Dominican Republic 0 1 0 6 
Balaguer 2 Dominican Republic 0 2 0 4 
Balaguer 3* Dominican Republic 0 1 0 5 
Fernández Dominican Republic 0 1 0 0 
Mejía Dominican Republic 0 2 0 3 
Fernández 2 Dominican Republic 0 0 0 1 
Roldós Ecuador 1 4 0 5 
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Hurtado Ecuador 1 2 0 5 
Febres Cordero Ecuador 1 7 0 5 
Borja Ecuador 2 9 0 10 
Durán Ecuador 0 32 0 25 
Bucaram* Ecuador 2 2 0 5 
Alarcón** Ecuador 0 5 0 1 
Mahuad* Ecuador 0 8 5 8 
Noboa Ecuador 0 12 2 9 
Gutiérrez* Ecuador 5 8 3 4 
Palacio Ecuador 0 4 2 3 
Duarte El Salvador 0 3 0 12 
Cristiani El Salvador 0 0 0 0 
Calderón Sol El Salvador 0 2 0 1 
Flores El Salvador 0 2 0 0 
Saca El Salvador 0 0 0 0 
Cerezo Guatemala 0 0 0 9 
Serrano* Guatemala 0 0 1 1 
De León Carpio** Guatemala 0 7 0 3 
Arzú Guatemala 0 0 0 0 
Portillo Guatemala 0 1 0 2 
Berger Guatemala 0 1 0 2 
Suazo Honduras 0 2 0 5 
Azcona Honduras 0 0 0 4 
Callejas Honduras 0 0 0 5 
Reina Honduras 0 2 0 2 
Maduro Honduras 0 0 0 2 
Salinas Mexico 0 1 0 5 
Zedillo Mexico 0 25 0 2 
Fox Mexico 0 21 0 8 
Ortega Nicaragua 0 0 0 1 
Chamorro Nicaragua 1 24 0 7 
Alemán Nicaragua 0 1 0 3 
Bolaños Nicaragua 1 17 0 3 
Endara Panama 0 8 0 4 
Pérez Balladares Panama 0 3 0 2 
Moscoso Panama 0 0 0 3 
Rodríguez Pedotti Panama 0 3 0 0 
Wasmosy Paraguay 1 5 0 7 
Cubas* Paraguay 9 2 1 0 
González Macchi Paraguay 11 7 2 11 
Duarte Paraguay 2 1 0 11 
Belaúnde Peru 0 7 0 20 
García Peru 0 3 0 23 
Fujimori Peru 1 8 0 6 
Fujimori 2 Peru 0 1 0 2 
Fujimori 3 Peru 0 2 0 8 
Fujimori 4* Peru 0 3 1 1 
Paniagua** Peru 0 0 0 0 
Toledo Peru 0 6 1 12 
Sanguinetti Uruguay 0 6 0 6 
Lacalle Uruguay 0 3 0 8 
Sanguinetti 2 Uruguay 0 0 0 2 
Batlle Uruguay 0 2 0 3 
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Vásquez Uruguay 0 0 0 1 
Herrera Venezuela 0 2 0 5 
Luschinsi Venezuela 0 1 0 5 
Pérez* Venezuela 6 11 4 13 
Velásquez Venezuela 0 1 0 0 
Caldera Venezuela 0 10 0 14 
Chávez Venezuela 1 7 0 1 
Chávez 2 Venezuela 0 4 17 9 
Total 107/19 70 538 52 660 
Notes: * Interrupted presidency, ** caretaker president. President Majluta of the Dominican Republic 
is excluded as he served only 43 days during mid-1982.  
 
Coding and Operationalisation of conflicts 
Recall that I distinguish between challenges and other conflicts that do not aim to 
remove the president, these I call (for the lack of a better term) regular conflicts, and 
that I distinguish between horizontal and vertical types of conflicts and challenges. 
 
Horizontal conflicts and challenges:  
The operationalisation of this variable is based on Jones (1995).144 Some changes 
from Jones’s original contribution are made: I code all years from 1980 even though 
the format of LAWR was changed in 1984. This in order to get a time-series as long 
as possible. Jones (1995) only included presidential years for which a minimum of six 
articles of politics were written. I collect evidence on all country-years, but control for 
the bias of a limited coverage of some countries using the same threshold as Jones 
(1995) in my statistical analysis in Chapter 6.  
All horizontal conflicts are political in nature, and inter-institutional at the national 
level. That means that horizontal conflicts (both challenges and regular conflicts) 
relate to conflicts between Congress and the Presidency. I distinguish between two 
types of horizontal conflicts:  
1) Horizontal challenges are conflicts that have as the expressed aim to depose 
the president. Coding: These are the news items in LAWR including the 
                                                
144 See also Negretto (2006).  
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following as primary or secondary subject: The legislature threatened to 
remove (or removed) the president from office in between elections or 
credibly threatened or actually engaged in the censure or impeachment of the 
president. 
2) Horizontal conflicts are general conflicts between the presidency and 
congress (excluding challenges). Coding: These are the articles that have as a 
primary or secondary subject one of the following themes: 1) the Legislature 
defeated/was going to defeat, delayed/going to delay, blocked/going to block, 
modified/was modifying in a significant manner a bill proposed or strongly 
supported by the president; 2) The president was going to veto or vetoed a bill 
passed by the legislature, or made a credible threat of such a veto; 3) the 
legislature credibly threatened or actually engaged in the censure or 
impeachment of a government minister; 4) There was a general conflict 
between the president and the legislature or there were generic problems 
which the president was having with the legislature (and vice versa). 
 
Vertical conflict and challenges: A vertical conflict must be political in its nature, 
and must be directed against politicians at the national level (even though it might 
start at a sub-national level, it will only count as a conflict when it is raised to a 
national level and directed towards the political system in the nation or the 
government).  
 
If there is a strike, protest in the streets with political aims directed at the national 
levels and elected authorities, and it is registered in LAWR, it is a vertical conflict. 
Types of conflicts may include, but not exclusively, strikes, piquetetes, cacerolazos, 
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and other similar protests. (Protests directed at a Trans-National Company are not 
registered as a political conflict, a protest against the US president is not included as 
long as it is not at the same time directed at the national political system or national 
politicians as well) 
 
The vertical conflicts are separated and coded according to two types:  
1) Vertical challenges are conflicts that have as the expressed aim to depose the 
president. Coding: These are the articles that include the following as a 
primary or secondary subject: A strike, riot, protest, demonstration, etc. that 
LAWR reports expresses the goal of deposing the president.  
2) Vertical conflicts that are political in their nature, but have other goals than to 
remove the president. Coding: These are the articles that include the following 
as a primary or secondary subject: A strike, riot, protest, demonstration, etc. 
that LAWR reports expresses some type of political demand, critique, political 
message at politicians at the national level.  
 
 
Data for variables based on electoral results 
Below I cite all sources conferred to construct the variables based on electoral 
support. These come in addition to Nohlen’s (2005b; 2005a) edited work and the 
country chapters in those two volumes. I only use other sources than Nohlen for the 
most recent electoral results, or if there are reported missing data in Nohlen. 
Furthermore, some of the source listed below were only used for validation of results 
in Nohlen, or in the other sources. 
 
 
Argentina: Dirección Nacional Electoral, Ministerio del Interior: 
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http://www.resultados2007.gov.ar/paginas/f_top.htm 
Election resources on the internet: 
http://www.electionresources.org/ar/deputies.php?election=2005 
Adam Carr’s electoral archive: http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/a/argentina/  
Bolivia: Sources: Singer (2007); Georgetown’s PDBA database: 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Bolivia/pres05.html.  
Brazil: Jairo Nicolau’s pages: Banco do dados eleitorais do Brasil 1982-2002, 
http://jaironicolau.iuperj.br/database/deb/port/. Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Brazilian_general_election,_2006. Election resources on 
the internet: http://electionresources.org/br/deputies.php?election=2006.  
Chile: Tribunal Calificador de Chile http://www.tribunalcalificador.cl/;  
http://www.tribunalcalificador.cl/ficha_noticia.php?noticia_id=72. Biblioteca 
Nacional de Chile: http://www.bcn.cl/elecciones/pdf/DIPU2005TRICON.pdf; and 
Heath (2007).  
Colombia: Wikipedia: 
http://es.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elecciones_presidenciales_de_Colombia_%282006%29; 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_Colombia;   
Costa Rica: 
Tribunal Supremo Electoral: http://www.tse.go.cr/; Asamblea Nacional: 
http://www.asamblea.go.cr/  
Dominican Republic: Junta Central Electoral: www.jce.do, Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_the_Dominican_Republic; 
Ecuador: Conaghan (2007).  
Guatemala: Georgetown Electoral database: 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Guate/congre2007.html 
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http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Guate/presi2007.html  
Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Guatemalan_general_election%2C_2007 
Honduras: Tribunal Supremo Electora www.tse.hn. Wikipedia 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Honduras; IPU: 
http://www.ipu.org/parline%2De/reports/2139.htm; Taylor-Robinson (2007).  
Mexico: IFE: http://www.ife.org.mx/. And, Adam Carr’s electoral webpage: 
http://psephos.adam-carr.net/countries/m/mexico/mexico20063.txt.  
Nicaragua: Lean (2007).   
Paraguay: Justicia Electora, República de Paraguay  http://www.tsje.gov.py/ 
(accessed May 19, 2008) 
Peru: Schmidt (2007).   
El Salvador: Wikipedia: http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Politics_of_El_Salvador 
Venezuela: CNE (Consejo Nacional Electoral): 
http://www.cne.gov.ve/divulgacionPresidencial/resultado_nacional.php; Wikipedia: 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Elections_in_Venezuela; Georgetown: 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Elecdata/Venezuela/pres06.html 
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Venezuelan_parliamentary_election%2C_2005  
 
All web-pages accessed December 18, 2007 - January 18, 2008, unless otherwise 
specified.  
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Introduction 
This chapter compares the cases of presidential interruption following to some extent 
the Method of Agreement (Mill 1868), an admittedly weak method for causal 
analysis, in which the goal is to find the similar cause to a similar outcome across 
different cases.145 The method will be combined with process tracing to study the 
triggering causes displayed in Figure 2-3 in Chapter 2, and to revisit a debate that has 
been prominent in the studies of presidential interruptions: What triggers presidential 
interruptions: Street (vertical) or institutional (horizontal) challenges?  
 
The cases analysed in this chapter are selected depending on their value on the 
dependent variable, as the cases all share the same value: presidential interruption. 
Without going into the list of pitfalls of selecting on the dependent variable (Collier 
1995; Collier and Mahoney 1996; Geddes 1990, 2003), I hasten to say that the goal of 
this chapter is not to identify, or causally explain fully presidential interruption, rather 
to discuss a debate in the literature. Furthermore, this chapter combines the Method of 
Agreement with process tracing in order to approach a question that has been central 
to the debate on presidential interruptions. Process tracing as a technique, focuses on 
identifying causal processes, chains and mechanisms (George and Bennett 2005: 
205), and is a case-study technique that does not build on the experiment as an ideal 
for the social sciences. The method builds on what the same authors call the method 
of congruence, a somewhat weaker investigative logic that juxtaposes various theories 
and in a case study evaluates which theory is congruent with the evidence at hand. 
Both, however, are convenient methods when testing more general theories and their 
                                                
145 But, for a strong defence of this logic of inquiry when combined with multi-level analysis, see 
Przeworski and Teune (1970), and the method they name Most Different Systems Design. 
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explanatory power in a case study or, as the authors advocate, to produce new 
theories.  
 
This chapter revisits the institution vs. street challenge debate by focusing on two 
issues: the interaction between institutional and societal factors,146 and the causal 
order of the two factors. The evidence from analyses so far is that both vertical 
(street), and horizontal (institutional) challenges have been important in removing 
presidents, but with the street being the more prominent or important of the two 
(Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Morgenstern et al. 2008). By 
looking at whether vertical or horizontal challenges appeared first, this chapter aims 
to study the question of whether congress only acts against presidents by reacting to 
public pressure, or whether it is the other way around: that the streets are mobilised 
when actors in civil society see that a president is weak vis-à-vis congress. 
 
The empirical evidence from this chapter comes from my dataset based on LAWR, 
and from a case-based analysis of all presidential interruptions in Latin America since 
1980.147 The case-based analysis is gathered in the appendix to this chapter instead of 
presenting it in this chapter in order to not interrupt the reader from the ongoing 
argument. All the details in those accounts are not necessary to follow my arguments, 
but may be consulted for a full account of the interruptions and a full list of 
references. The goal of this chapter is to identify which actor, congress or the street, 
was first in demanding the resignation of the president, and to study the interaction 
                                                
146 Institutional and street challenges are what I refer to, respectively, as horizontal and vertical 
challenges. 
147 I also base much of my evidence on case-chapters of presidential interruptions to be published in an 
edited volume on presidential interruptions in Latin America (Llanos and Marsteintredet Forthcoming 
2010), secondary sources in the form of academic books and articles are listed in the list of references 
and cited throughout, and I have used Latin America Data Base which publishes NotiSur and NotiCen 
for additional journalistic accounts of the events, see LADB (2009): http://ladb.unm.edu/.  
Chapter 5: Triggering Causes. Presidents between Institutions and the Streets 
   
141 
between the two political arenas in order to address the institutions vs. street debate. 
Finally, the analysis serves to identify the triggering causes of presidential 
interruptions. 
 
A short theoretical recap: the institutional-societal debate 
It should come as no surprise that institutions could be important in removing a 
democratically elected president. After all, in presidential democracies congress, 
sometimes together with judicial bodies, is the institution with the right to remove a 
president in case the president is involved in impeachment-qualifying behaviour.148 
More surprising, however, might be the role of civil society and street actions in the 
removal of presidents. Non-institutional actors clearly have no formal or legal role in 
the premature removal of presidents, or executives in other regimes, from office. On 
the other hand, a president is not likely to resign from office without the presence of 
external pressures, be that congressional, street-based or military. Politicians, after all, 
are interested in being elected and re-elected, and are office-seekers (e.g. Geddes 
1994: 7-11). Much of political science is based upon this assumption. Whether it is 
congress or the streets that trigger a presidential interruption is therefore only 
interesting in terms of the academic debate regarding the importance of institutions 
for democracy. Underlying causes are in my view, more interesting in terms of getting 
to the real issues of the phenomenon, and Chapter 6 and partly Chapter 7 discuss 
these underlying causes. 
 
                                                
148 For requirements on impeachments, see Pérez Liñán (2007: 140-141).  
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Linz (1978; 1990; 1994) started a debate on presidential regimes that still has not 
ended, at least with respect to Latin America.149 His original argument was that, due 
to presidentialism’s fixed terms and direct elections of the executive and legislative, 
the regime type would suffer deadlock problems. The fixed terms created rigidity for 
the institutions, which would make crisis and conflict resolutions more difficult, 
whereas the direct elections of the executive and legislative would give both president 
and congress direct, and dual, democratic legitimacy, thus, in case of conflicts 
between the institutions, it would not be clear who would prevail.150 Since democratic 
breakdowns do not occur that frequently in Latin America in recent years, several 
scholars have changed the dependent variable to presidential interruptions and 
restarted the debate (e.g. Valenzuela 2004). It was early acknowledged, however, that 
institutions were at least not the only factor causing the interruptions (Hochstetler 
2006), but pure institutional analyses also appeared (Negretto 2006). Hochstetler 
argued that it was not the institutions, but rather challenges from the streets that 
interrupted presidencies, and therefore that the mechanisms that have ousted 
presidents have not been the ones identified by Linz as the perils of presidentialism. 
Pérez-Liñán (2007) also highlighted street mobilisation as important, and thus with a 
new, but related, dependent variable, Linz’s, sometimes persuasive, arguments did not 
find empirical support.151 Defenders of the institutional paradigm, however, have later 
argued that street challenges alone have not been sufficient to remove presidents 
(Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008; Pérez-Liñán 2008), and that institutional 
                                                
149 For a review, see Elgie (2005). 
150 Other problems were also related to presidentialism, such as lack of incentives for coalition 
building, the polarisation during elections due to the personal election of the chief executive, weak 
parties and a myth of strong leadership, see Linz (1994). O’Donnell (1994) later also argued that 
despite weak leadership, the personal election of presidents helped create strong, decree-happy 
presidents, which made up a new species of regime, the delegative democracy.  
151 Furthermore it was pointed to the fact that democracies did not break down after presidential 
interruptions and that procedures chosen for removing presidents were inspired from or equivalent to 
parliamentary procedures (Carey 2005; Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008).  
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challenges also play an important role. Several case-studies also focus on the role of 
institutions (e.g. Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich Forthcoming 2010; Llanos 
Forthcoming 2010).  
 
None of the above, however, authors distinguish between what I define as underlying 
and triggering causes. I believe that in order to provide good answers to the debate 
regarding institutions vs. the streets and presidential interruptions, such a distinction is 
important. In the following pages, I analyse the triggering causes of presidential 
interruptions focusing on vertical vs. horizontal challenges to presidents, in the next 
chapter I discuss underlying causes to interruptions.  
Horizontal and vertical challenges and presidential 
interruptions 
Between 1985 and 2005 there have been 14 interrupted presidents in Latin 
America,152 three successful coups including two in semi-presidential Haiti, and 
several failed coup attempts. My dataset registers 51 country-years with presidential 
challenges, either horizontal or vertical, during democratic years (see Table 4-10), 40 
of these are unique country-years that will be used in the statistical analysis in 
Chapter 6. Several of these challenges, however, certainly pertain to the same 
“event”, as for instance the challenges to Bucaram in both 1996 and 1997, and in 
Table 5-2 below, I operate with 37 registered challenges.  
 
                                                
152 Since my dataset ends in 2005 and the analysis ends that year, I exclude from the analysis any 
challenge and interruption occurring after this year.  
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Table 5-1: Challenges and interruptions 
 Vertical challenge No vertical challenge 
Horizontal Challenge Siles Zuazo, Bolivia 1984/85 
Mesa, Bolivia 2005, Collor de 
Melo, Brazil, 1992, Bucaram, 
1997, Ecuador, Gutiérrez, 
Ecuador, 2005, Cubas, 
Paraguay, 1999, Pérez, 
Venezuela, 1993 
 
No horizontal challenge Alfonsín, Argentina 1989,  
De la Rúa, 2001, Argentina, 
Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivia 
2003, Mahuad, 2000, Ecuador, 
Serrano, Guatemala, 1993?, 
Fujimori 2000, Peru? 
Balaguer, Dom.Rep. 1994/96 
Notes: ? refers to fuzzy cases in these categories. Based on dataset from LAWR, and secondary 
sources, for further details, see the Appendix to this chapter.  
 
Table 5-1 summarises the interrupted presidencies, and presents whether the 
interruptions were preceded by either vertical or horizontal challenges.153 The table 
clearly indicates that vertical and horizontal challenges seem to affect the survival of 
presidents, and trigger interruptions. The table also displays that six presidencies were 
prematurely terminated after only vertical challenges, seven after both vertical and 
horizontal challenges, and no interruption was triggered by a horizontal challenge 
alone. As such, my data confirm Hochstetler’s (2006) findings. Finally, one 
presidency ended prematurely without any vertical or horizontal challenge, this is the 
fall of Balaguer in the Dominican Republic. Balaguer, whose membership in the 
category of presidential interruption can be questioned (Marsteintredet Forthcoming 
2010), was indeed challenged, but not by congress or actors in the streets (see chapter 
7 for further discussion).154 Two cases are registered as fuzzy cases, these are the 
                                                
153 As a reminder: By challenges I refer to anti-government protests in the streets that states the demand 
of presidential removal as the primary motivation for the protests, and congressional attempts to 
remove the president as for instance a motion to start impeachment procedures. The latter is somewhat 
broader than both Hochstetler and Pérez-Liñán who both insist on impeachment or impeachment-like 
procedures to have been initiated.  
154 The principal reasons for questioning Balaguer’s fall as a presidential interruption is that Balaguer 
completed his constitutionally altered term, and that by being fraudulently elected his regime should 
not qualify as a democracy. Furthermore, the case appears in the cell with no challenges, which goes 
against the theoretical expectations of presidential interruptions.  
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cases of Serrano and Fujimori, but both are registered as only being preceded by 
vertical challenges. Serrano is fuzzy because there were no challenges registered 
before his autogolpe, and after the autogolpe till his ouster, the most important 
challenge came from elites outside the institutions, namely CACIF, the military, and 
from international organisations and forreign countries. In the case of Fujimori, the 
vertical challenge was La marcha de los cuatro suyos on July 28, and another 
challenge is registered in September. These, however, could not have triggered 
Fujimori’s resignation as late as November. Congress also comes close challenging 
Fujimori, but never officially did. In Peru, international pressure was also mounting 
for reforming the Peruvian democracy, and shortening Fujimori’s presidency. To 
conclude, table 5-1 supports Hochstetler’s arguments: In terms of triggering causes, 
vertical challenges are more important than horizontal challenges as triggers for 
presidential interruptions.  
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Table 5-2: Challenges, interruptions and failures 
 Street based Street and 
Institutions 
Institutions None 
Interrupted Alfonsín, 1989,  
De la Rúa, 
2001, 
Argentina, 
Sánchez de 
Lozada, Bolivia 
2003, Mahuad, 
2000, Ecuador, 
Serrano, 
Guatemala, 
1993? Fujimori 
2000, Peru? 
Siles Zuazo, Bolivia 
1984/85 
Mesa, Bolivia 2005, 
Collor de Melo, 
Brazil, 1992, 
Bucaram, 1997, 
Ecuador, Gutiérrez, 
Ecuador, 2005, 
Cubas, Paraguay, 
1999, Pérez, 
Venezuela, 1993 
 Balaguer, 
Dom.Rep. 
1994/96 
Failed 
challenge 
Sarney, 1987, 
Brazil, Chávez, 
2002/03, 04, 
Venezuela, 
Noboa, 
Ecuador, 2000 
Gonzalez Macchi, 
2001, Paraguay  
Paz Zamora, 1990, 
Bolivia, Cardoso (2), 
Brazil, 1999, Lula, 
Brazil, 2005, Samper, 
Colombia, 1996, 97, 
Pastrana, Colombia 
2000, Roldós, Ecuador 
1980, Hurtado, Ecuador 
1982, Febres Cordero, 
Ecuador 1987, Borja, 
Ecuador 1990, 1992, 
Chamorro, Nicaragua 
1995, Bolaños 
Nicaragua, 2004, 
Wasmosy, Paraguay 
1994, Gonzalez Macchi, 
2000, 2002/03, Duarte, 
Paraguay 2005, 
Fujimori, Peru 1991,  
(Toledo, Peru 2005) 
- 
N: 14/37 6/10 7/8 0/19 1/? 
Notes: Toledo 2005 not registered in LAWR based dataset, but added from Keesing’s Record of World 
Events Volume 51, May, 2005 Peru, Page 46617 (Keesings 2009), and is therefore in brackets. I 
exclude caretaker presidents. Question marks refer to fuzzy cases. One caretaker president has been 
challenged, Duhalde in Argentina in 2003. If years separated by forward slash, then the challenge is 
counted as one that occurs in both years, if years separated by comma the challenges are separate 
events. 
 
Table 5-2 compares successful with non-successful challenges of presidents in Latin 
America. All in all, for this analysis I register 37 challenges to presidents in the 
region,155 14 of which have been successful. The ratios of failed to successful 
                                                
155 In this count I merge several challenges that belong to the same “event” even though they may 
occur in two different years in the dataset, and challenges that occurred at the same time are counted as 
one, not two. These factors explain the difference between the 40 registered country-years with 
challenges reported in the previous pages and the 37 reported here. In the statistical analysis in the next 
chapter I use all country-years with registered challenges, for the qualitative comparative analysis in 
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challenges in Table 5-2 strengthens the impression given in Table 5-1 above. Seven 
out of eight simultaneous vertical and horizontal challenges ended in presidential 
interruptions, six out of ten vertical challenges ended in presidential interruptions and 
zero out of 19 horizontal challenges ended in a presidential interruption. The data also 
seem to indicate that when there is interaction between horizontal and vertical 
challenges, presidents are in peril. There is only one case of a failed simultaneous 
vertical and horizontal challenge, and that is a challenge against President González 
Macchi in Paraguay in September of 2001. It also seems quite clear that institutions 
alone are incapable of removing presidents. Finally, Table 5-2 also indicates that 
vertical challenges alone also display a relatively high success rate with six out of ten 
challenges ending in interruptions.  
 
Despite some variation between authors on which cases to include,156 Table 5-2, 
which compared to Table 5-1 also includes negative, or failed cases, further supports 
previous research that has argued that particularly non-institutional factors help 
explain presidential interruptions in Latin America and elsewhere (Hochstetler 2006; 
Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Kim and Bahry 2008; Pérez-Liñán 2008). What can 
one conclude on the basis of my data with respect to the institutions vs. the streets 
debate? So far, the cited literature have been correct in pointing out that particularly 
challenges including actors from civil society seem to be important in bringing about 
presidential interruptions. The data also indicate that institutions may be important as 
                                                                                                                                      
this chapter, I am not confined to cells in a data matrix created by countries and years, and report only 
the 37 independent challenges.   
156 Compare with Hochstetler (2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), but also with Pérez-Liñán (2007). 
I am more lenient in including horizontal challenges, but apparently more restrictive in including 
vertical challenges than the cited literature. The latter might be due to my conscious coding of general 
level of contention and other types of protests as well, thus only including protests that LAWR reported 
were demanding as a principal objective the removal of the president. My higher number of 
congressional challenges might be due to my including all proposals of impeachments, and also 
proposals of other forms of removing the president. Or, it might be due to my detailed and careful 
reading of LAWR.  
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a triggering factor. In several statistical studies both horizontal and vertical challenges 
turn out significant, and my data support this view. The evidence from my data, and 
my account in the appendix to this chapter, suggest that interaction between the two 
arenas for presidential challenges clearly is the most efficient way for civilian actors 
to remove their president. Furthermore, as Hochstetler (2006) points out, institutions 
alone do not trigger interruptions. No president has been interrupted purely on the 
basis of a horizontal challenge. However, I would add that my conclusions are 
restricted to vertical vs. horizontal challenges as triggering causes, I discuss the 
underlying causes in chapter 6. The cited authors, however, have not made the 
distinction between triggering and underlying causes, and have therefore muddied the 
waters, which again has made it more difficult to reach an agreement on the issue at 
hand. In terms of triggering causes, the conclusion seems clear so far. The questions 
that remain to be answered are which of the challenges tend to appear prior to the 
other.  
 
The primacy of causes: What triggers what?  
Based on the case analysis outlined in the appendix, it is possible to indicate some 
answers with respect to the primacy of triggering causes. However, in some cases it 
has been virtually impossible for this author to identify which arena was first to 
demand the presidential ouster, as the two seem to have acted simultaneously. Each of 
these cases merits an in-depth case-study in order to identify all details of the cases, 
something that sadly is far beyond the capacities of this author.  
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Table 5-3: A reassessment: What came first? Horizontal or vertical challenges? 
Simultaneous 
challenges 
Horizontal challenge 
first 
Vertical challenge first 
(or no horizontal 
challenge) 
No horizontal or 
vertical challenges 
Bolivia 1984/85, 
Ecuador 1997, 
Ecuador 2005, 
Venezuela 1993 
Brazil 1992, Paraguay 
1999,  
(Argentina 1989, 
Argentina 2001), 
(Bolivia 2003), Bolivia 
2005, (Guatemala 
1993?), (Ecuador 2000) 
(Peru 2000)? 
Dominican Republic 
1994 
Notes: Question marks refer to the fuzzyness of the cases. Guatemala 1993 because elites in business 
and the army seem to have been more important than vertical challenges, and protests seem to have 
gathered strength only after June 1 when Serrano was ousted, to oust Espina as well. Peru 2000 due to 
the long time lag between the challenge of Fujimori (La marcha de los cuatro suyos), in late July 2000 
and his flight to Japan in November the same year.  
 
Table 5-3 is based on, and sums up, my case-based analysis, spelled out in the 
appendix to this chapter. In four cases I could not distinguish which actor challenged 
first, these cases are the challenges against Siles Zuazo in Bolivia, Bucaram and 
Gutiérrez in Ecuador, and Pérez in Venezuela. Congress clearly was the first 
challenger in two cases (Collor de Melo in Brazil, and Cubas in Paraguay), in seven 
cases vertical challenges were either prior to (one case) or the only type of challenge 
to the president (six cases), and finally in the Dominican case there were no explicit 
vertical or horizontal challenges. Still, the two cases of Fujimori’s fall in Peru in 
2000, and Serrano’s fall in Guatemala in 1993 are fuzzy with respect to these 
categories, and hard to place correctly.157  
 
The cases where horizontal challenges appear first are recognised by various attempts 
or one continuing attempt, to remove the president by congress. In the Brazilian case, 
congress investigated and pushed the Collorgate case for several months until street 
protests challenged the president just prior to the vote in congress. In Paraguay, the 
killing of Argaña and vertical challenges sped up the process of impeachment of 
                                                
157 If coded differently, Serrano could be categorised as both a vertical and horizontal challenge. 
However, for the Serrano case it might be confusing to decide what to explain: Serrano’s autogolpe, or 
its failure?  
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Cubas, which had been going on in congress for some time. This set of cases fit well 
with the argument of scandals as underlying causes (Pérez-Liñán 2007). 
 
In the cases where vertical challenges appear first, Congress plays a different role. If 
congress acts at all, it rather reacts to what has occurred in the streets. Sánchez de 
Lozada was removed after more than 20 persons were killed in the protests 
demanding his ouster. In three other cases Congress did not act, much due to the 
presidents acting more quickly than congress and resigning before congress was able 
to impeach or attempt a removal of the president. Alfonsín took most people by 
surprise and resigned after widespread protests and lootings in the streets. De la Rúa 
resigned before congress acted after the scandalous killings of protesters in the streets, 
and Fujimori faxed his resignation from Japan, taking everyone by surprise.158 
Mahuad, however, was the victim of a coup from below and the military. In the case 
of Mesa, vertical challenges made him ask Congress twice for a vote of confidence. 
He succeeded the first time, but not the second time. In this set of cases, vertical 
challenges “from the streets” lead directly to presidential action, which is to resign. 
The interruptions therefore may take observers and the societies in which they occur, 
more by surprise. This set of cases also fit better with Hochstetler’s (2006) argument 
of street (vertical) challenges being more important than institutional (horizontal) 
challenges. 
 
In the simultaneous challenges, I have not been able to clearly state from where the 
challenge came first. The case of Bucaram, although registered as a simultaneous 
challenge, follows to some degree the same path as the cases of only vertical 
                                                
158 But as mentioned this is a fuzzy case. Fujimori resigned two months after the last street challenge 
that I coded in my dataset. It is therefore doubtful that Fujimori’s resignation was triggered by the 
vertical challenge. 
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challenges first. The vertical challenge against Bucaram on February 4 pushed 
congress to oust Bucaram on February 5.159 In this case, however, congress acted 
before the president. 
 
The case of Pérez in Venezuela potentially is closer to the cases of horizontal 
challenges first, since Congress had been trying to impeach Pérez for some time, and 
found its perfect excuse to impeach the President in November 1992 when the 
RECADI scandal was exposed. However, Pérez had also been challenged from the 
streets for some time as well, and this continued during the impeachment proceedings 
in the Supreme Court and the Senate in the first months of 1993. In Bolivia with Siles 
Zuazo and in Ecuador with Gutiérrez, congress had been trying and failing for some 
time to remove the presidents, both their vice-presidents had stated they wanted to 
take over, and challenges from the streets occurred frequently.  
 
Finally there are some cases that are not clearly preceded by horizontal or vertical 
challenges. These are cases not explained by the theories and studies of presidential 
interruptions so far. In the fuzzy cases of Serrano in Guatemala, congressional action, 
and inaction, caused Serrano to close Congress, whereas the ensuing elite action, 
supported by some street protesters, outside regular institutions, against Serrano’s 
move, caused Serrano’s ouster. In the case of Fujimori, the vertical challenge 
appeared in late July, whereas Fujimori resigned in November, after having shortened 
his presidency in a decision made in September. Here it may be doubted that the 
challenge triggered Fujimori’s resignation. Both these cases are thus registered as 
                                                
159 The killing of a protester in an anti-government demonstration in January also helped spur the 
challenge on February 4 (LAWR: 97-05). 
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fuzzy cases, but within the set of cases preceded by vertical challenges. In the 
Dominican case, no horizontal or vertical challenge is registered at all.  
Thus, to fully account for these presidential interruptions, one must also include other 
factors than vertical and horizontal challenges.  
 
Compared to Tables 5-1 and 5-2, Table 5-3 further supports the importance of vertical 
challenges, by adding evidence regarding the primacy of the triggering causes. 
Vertical challenges appear first in seven of the 14 interruptions, horizontal challenges 
appear first twice, and in four cases the challenges appeared simultaneously. Since 
causes must appear before outcomes, sequencing the challenges thus constitutes 
another small step towards furthering the current state of knowledge in the debate of 
institutions vs. the streets. In sum, I conclude that the streets are clearly more 
important than institutions as triggering causes of presidential interruptions. 
 
Interaction between institutions and streets? 
A pertinent question to ask is what the patterns of interaction between the vertical and 
horizontal challenges are. Another goal for this chapter was to study the potential 
interaction between congress and the streets, and this is clearly linked to the 
sequencing of causes that I displayed in table 5-3. My data, however, are not good 
enough to come up with any smoking guns of the congressional opposition calling the 
shots in street challenges, or civil society leaders guiding congress-members in voting 
on the president’s survival. Only a series of case-studies with extensive field research 
could come up with this kind of evidence, if it exists at all.  
 
Chapter 5: Triggering Causes. Presidents between Institutions and the Streets 
   
153 
Nevertheless, the tables themselves indicate some kind of interaction, given the fact 
that both types of challenges have preceded seven out of 14 interruptions. The timing 
of the vertical challenges in the cases where congress was first to challenge the 
president, and in the simultaneous challenges, is also congruent with the hypothesis of 
interaction between the two arenas of challenges. In Ecuador (2005), Brazil and 
Venezuela, vertical challenges appeared when congress or the Supreme Court was 
about to take the crucial votes regarding the president’s survival. Furthermore, in 
other cases, it has at least been speculated that party leaders actually encouraged the 
street protests against the presidents.160 And in the cases of Sánchez and Mesa in 
Bolivia, it is hard to ignore the fact that coca leader Evo Morales was also the leader 
of MAS in congress and led attacks both in the streets and in congress against both 
presidents. Also in the cases without clear horizontal or vertical challenges, a 
convergence of factors seems to be required for a successful removal of the president. 
Local opposition aided by international pressure helped oust Serrano and Balaguer.  
 
I think the link and causal mechanism between the two arenas is one that also calls 
attention to the importance of vertical challenges, and pressure from below. To take 
one example: In the case of Ecuador and Gutiérrez, Congress failed to get enough 
votes for its impeachment drive in December of 2004 due to the president’s 
persuasive powers.161 Febrés Cordero had earlier stated that congress would need the 
people’s help to oust the president (LAWR: 04-21).162 The reason is simple. A 
president always has many resources at his or her disposal in order to get support in 
congress, with popular resentment with congressional-presidential collusion, these 
                                                
160 These speculations have been discussed especially in the literature on the Argentine interruptions 
(Malamud 2006).  
161 I write more on presidents’ persuasive powers in Marsteintredet (2008a).  
162 This occurred prior to all three presidential interruptions in Ecuador, see Appendix to this chapter.  
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powers are weakened and congress stands a better chance of obtaining the required 
majority. In these cases the vertical challenges speed up an already initiated process 
by demonstrating a president’s unpopularity not only in the polls, but also in the 
streets. Vertical challenges create a sense of urgency upon congress to finally act, and 
as mentioned, it helps convince wavering congress-members, who have not yet 
decided whether or not to oust the president, to join the opposition. In all of the cases 
that also include horizontal challenges, vertical challenges work to make the 
opposition to the president more cohesive, and muster enough votes in congress to 
remove the president.  
 
Summary and concluding remarks 
This chapter adds new insight into the institutions vs. the streets debate regarding 
presidential interruptions by analysing these factors as triggering causes. The 
chapter’s appendix also provides a summary based on the first complete case-based 
comparison of all presidential interruptions in Latin America. The focus in the 
comparison was solely on the actions in the street and institutions as triggering 
causes. I will discuss the underlying causes of presidential interruptions in Chapter 6.  
 
In sum, I find that Hochstetler’s argument is supported also by my data. First, I 
basically replicated Hochstetler’s analysis in tables 5-1 and 5-2, and found support for 
her arguments based on my own data that clearly distinguished between challenges as 
triggering causes and regular horizontal and vertical conflicts as underlying causes. 
Second, by studying which actor (street or congress) acted first and pointing to 
possible interaction between vertical and horizontal challenges, I added new evidence 
to the current debate. My evidence basically strengthened the view that vertical 
Chapter 5: Triggering Causes. Presidents between Institutions and the Streets 
   
155 
challenges are more important than horizontal challenges as triggering causes of 
presidential interruptions. However, I added that I constrict my conclusions only to 
triggering causes of interruptions. In the next chapter, I briefly also revisit this debate 
in terms of institutions vs. the streets as underlying causes.  
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Appendix to Chapter 5: Case-based evidence surrounding the 
presidential interruptions 
 
Presidential interruptions in Latin America: A case-based analysis 
This appendix discusses and analyses all presidential interruptions according to the 
countries’ alphabetic order, starting with the falls of Alfonsín and de la Rúa of the 
Radical party in Argentina, and ending with the impeachment of Carlos Andrés Pérez 
of the traditional Acción Democrática in Venezuela. The focus is on horizontal and 
vertical conflicts and, in particular, challenges, but I also briefly discuss some of the 
other factors mentioned as potential underlying causes of presidential interruptions in 
Chapter 2 and Figure 2-3. The empirical analysis and material presented in these 
pages also form the basis for the qualitative analyses in this chapter, and in Chapter 7, 
and is mainly based on the same source as my dataset which I presented in Chapter 4, 
and use for statistical analysis in Chapter 6.  
 
The falls of the radicals in Argentina 
The presidential interruptions in Argentina are probably the most analysed of all 
interruptions in the region (e.g. Auyero 2007; Calvo and Murillo 2005; Llanos 2007; 
Malamud 2006, 2008; Schamis 2002; Slatopolsky Cantis 1995), especially the fall of 
President de la Rúa in 2001.  
 
Alfonsín led the first democratic government in Argentina since the early 1970’s and 
managed to preside over democratic elections in April 1989, which gave Menem from 
the peronist opposition the presidency. The transition period was scheduled for seven 
Chapter 5: Triggering Causes. Presidents between Institutions and the Streets 
   
157 
months, at the same time as a deep economic crisis marred the country.163 Alfonsín 
therefore wanted to work early with the Menem team to deal with the economy during 
this transition period, but already a week after the election it was reported that 
Alfonsín due to his failure to deal with the economic crisis, was ready to hand power 
over to Menem early (LAWR: 89-21). At first, however, Menem’s team did not 
accept this idea.164 Just thereafter, on May 23, as a reaction to the economic problems, 
the social uproar with looting began and lasted until June 2 when a state of siege 
began taking real effect.165 There were no demands in congress for Alfonsín’s 
resignation, or any other horizontal conflicts registered during this period. This is not 
to say that elite behaviour did not form part of either the vertical conflict and 
challenge, or Alfonsín’s decision to retire early. Long before the transition was to take 
place, Menem had picked his new government team and presented publicly parts of 
his economic plan. These actions are believed to have uneased the markets and further 
exacerbated the economic problems at the time. Thus one might also sustain the idea 
that the Peronists played a game to remove Alfonsín early. The union CGT, a close 
partner of the Peronist party at the time, finally demanded Alfonsín’s early retirement 
and threatened with taking to the streets (LAWR: 89-24; Slatopolsky Cantis 1995: 
232). Alfonsín himself said that the social upheaval gave him no other choice than to 
accelerate the transfer of power (Alfonsín 2004: 141, 147). On June 12, Alfonsín 
surprised Menem and his team by declaring that he would step down on June 30, and 
not on July 30 as previously agreed. Thus in the case of the fall of Alfonsín, high 
political contention in the streets, a vertical challenge, and potentially elite pressure 
can be attributed as triggers in this case.  
                                                
163 Inflation reached 3,000% and growth was -7% in 1989 (WDI 2008).  
164 See also Alfonsín’s own account (Alfonsín 2004: 140-154). 
165 One might question whether the was a clear motivation among the protesters to remove Alfonsín, I 
nevertheless, register these protests and lootings as a challenge to Alfonsín,  
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In 2001 a radical president was again interrupted, this time president de la Rúa 
leading a coalition government  (Alianza) together with the relative newcomer 
FREPASO (Frente País Solidario). Again the interruption was preceded by looting 
and social upheaval (Auyero 2007), a vertical challenge, and an economic crisis.166 As 
Alfonsín, De la Rúa clearly had problems with congress (Calvo and Murillo 2005), he 
led a minority coalition government with a PJ (Partido Justicialista, the Peronists) 
controlled senate. I have registered that horizontal conflicts with congress increased in 
2000 and 2001, and reached higher levels than during Alfonsín’s rule. Furthermore, 
the level of social contention in number of vertical conflicts registered in my dataset 
reached sustained levels not seen since the late 1980s. Congress, however, never 
challenged de la Rúa or demanded his resignation, its role was more important in the 
aftermath of the president’s resignation (Schamis 2002).167 It was the social protests 
demanding the president’s resignation with the cry “Que se vayan todos” and the 
violent handling of these vertical challenges ending with more than 20 deaths that 
triggered de la Rúa’s ouster in December of 2001. The people protested against the 
economic recession and bad decisions on part of the government, one of which had 
denied people access to their bank accounts. But, the vertical challenges came only 
after the government had been weakened internally with Vice-President Alvarez’s 
(FREPASO) resignation in the fall of 2000 after the outburst of allegations that 
members of the Radical Party had bribed various PJ senators to support a labour 
reform. His resignation came after de la Rúa had promoted several of the politicians 
who were suspected of bribing the senators, instead of following Alvarez’s advice to 
                                                
166 Inflation, a problem of the 1980’s and first half of the 1990’s in Latin America was under control, 
but 2001 was the third consecutive year of negative growth in the country.  
167 It seems clear, though, that the Argentine governors played a more dubious role prior to de la Rúa’s 
ouster (Malamud 2006).  
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do a house cleaning in the administration. In March of 2001 the coalition split yet 
again after four ministers resigned in protest over the administration’s own economic 
policies, and later in June the Alianza lost several FREPASO congress members to 
the opposition. De la Rúa also struggled with congress, and the opposition PJ created 
problems for the administration on several economic issues by increasing 
expenditures in the 2001 budget, and rescinding on the economic czar Cavallo’s 
discretionary powers in the fall of 2001.168 To these problems came a bad electoral 
result in the fall of 2001, which deprived the Alianza of a plurality in the Lower 
Chamber and led to the election of Ramón Puerta of the Peronist party as president of 
the Senate and second in line after president de la Rúa. Congress did not challenge de 
la Rúa, but the streets did, on the other hand, before that congress did help stumble the 
administration’s dealing with the economy, which again created the vertical 
challenges. With a country in upheaval, the tragic killing of demonstrators in the 
streets, another Radical president was left with no other option than to resign and 
leave the presidency to the peronists. 
 
The falls of presidents Siles Zuazo, Sánchez de Lozada and Mesa in 
Bolivia 
Together with Ecuador, Bolivia is the country that experienced most presidential 
interruptions during the period under scrutiny here, with three interruptions. Siles 
Zuazo was forced to call early elections in 1984 and organise these in 1985, Sánchez 
de Lozada in his second term as president, was convinced by international leaders to 
leave the presidency after a vertical challenge had ended with the killing of over 20 
                                                
168 The choice of former economy mininster under Menem, Domingo Cavallo, as a “market reassuring” 
economy minister under de la Rúa also created internal ruffles in the administration, especially with the 
FREPASO members of the coalition.  
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people. Mesa, Sánchez’s Vice President, resigned in 2005 after offering his 
resignation to Congress for the second time due to continued vertical challenges.  
 
President Siles Zuazo of the left-wing UDP (Unidad Democrática Popular) came to 
power in 1982 leading a coalition government with MIR (Movimiento de la Izquierda 
Revolucionaria) as the other dominant partner. During his first two years as president 
Siles was challenged by congress twice (once in 1983, once in 1984), experienced 
several splits in his coalition, sustained two coup attempts, one of which involved his 
own kidnapping, was victim of high levels of political protests, twice the levels of Paz 
Estenssoro who would take over as president in 1985, and in 1984 and 1985 strikes 
and protests led by the COB (Central Obrera Boliviana) and the CSUTCB 
(Confederación Sindical Unica de Trabajadores Campesinos de Bolivia) demanded 
his resignation. As far as the level of social and political contention goes, Bolivia 
probably scores higher than all other countries in the region, and Siles Zuazo was no 
exception to this pattern. In my view, horizontal and vertical challenges both played a 
crucial role in triggering Siles’s resignation. Already in November 1983 Vice-
President Paz Zamora of MIR colluded with Hugo Banzer of ADN (Acción 
Democrática Nacionalista) and Victor Paz Estenssoro (MNR – Movimiento 
Nacionalista Revolucionario) to demand Siles’s resignation after his administration 
had submitted a package to congress devaluating the peso, increasing prices on petrol 
with 200% and scrapping food subsidies (LAWR: 83-46). This created immediate 
strike reactions, and congress declared the package unconstitutional. In September 
1984, the opposition again planted the idea of impeaching the president due to 
allegations of him arranging a meeting between his government’s anti-drug team and 
known drug traffickers. This challenge did not succeed, but the opposition did not 
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stop at that. In November 1984, Paz Estenssorro asked Siles to give up his powers to 
the Supreme Court president, while the MNRI (Movimiento Nacionalista 
Revolucionario de Izquierda) was planning to submit a motion in congress to remove 
Siles on a technicality.169 At the same time the COB challenged Siles from below on 
his economic policies. Siles’s decision to call for early elections came some days after 
this and probably prevented a formal impeachment attempt. Siles made the decision in 
the midst of extremely high levels of social contention, frequent strikes, economic 
crisis and rumours of imminent coups. Again in March of 1985 after more months of 
strikes and protests, and further splits in the coalition, did the COB and other unions 
stage a protest in front of the presidential palace to demand Siles’s resignation. These 
latter challenges, however, had the opposite effect as they only postponed the already 
scheduled early elections. The interruption of Siles was preceded by clear vertical and 
horizontal challenges, and high levels of social contention in addition to the internal 
disintegration of the administration. Congress did not vote Siles out, but spurred by 
disagreements over economic policies, the vertical challenges from the unions and 
horizontal challenges from congress together triggered the fall of Siles.  
 
While the fall of Siles constituted the start of Bolivia’s “pacted democracy”, the fall 
of Sánchez de Lozada brought “pacted democracy” to its end.170 The fall of Sánchez 
de Lozada in 2003 came after the 2002 election gave good results for two new parties, 
MAS (Movimiento al Socialismo) representing the politically ignored indigenous 
                                                
169 The argument was that since Siles had been elected originally in 1980 for four years, his term was in 
reality already over.  
170 Gamarra (1997) coined the term pacted democracy for the political regime in Bolivia since 1985. 
The term referred to the agreements and deals reached between the three dominant parties, MNR, MIR, 
and ADN over the negotiations of the presidency in the aftermaths of presidential elections. These 
negotiations were the results of the peculiar election formula in Bolivia that gave Congress the right to 
pick the president among the top three, and later top two, candidates in the presidential elections. 
Gamarra, among others (Jones 1995), argued these pacts led to less inter-institutional conflicts.  
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population (Madrid 2005a, 2005b), and the populist NFR (Nueva Fuerza 
Republicana) both getting about 20% of the seats in Congress’ Lower Chamber 
(Singer and Morrison 2004). Sánchez nevertheless was able to create a majority 
coalition that included his own MNR, MIR, ADN and UCS (Unidad Cívica 
Solidaridad). Yet in 2003 the coalition experienced both vertical challenges, and the 
highest level of vertical conflicts since 1996 according to my data from LAWR, and 
as is known, the government fell after the fatal vertical challenges in October 2003 
that left more than 20 people dead. The president, after international mediation, 
resigned and left the country. Already from the start Sánchez met demands for a 
constituent assembly from the new parties. This demand was avoided with the 
inclusion of MIR instead of NFR in the coalition. Other issues, however, would mark 
Sánchez’s short second presidency, like the decision to export natural gas through 
Chilean ports,171 and an economic package that hinged on U.S. support, which again 
depended on the coca eradication efforts of the administration. Already in February 
2003 protesters in the streets put the first demands of a shortened Sánchez presidency 
forward after bloody riots in La Paz, spurred by increased taxes in the budget. This 
vertical challenge came one month after bloody clashes between the government 
forces and coca farmers protesting against the government’s coca eradication efforts. 
The coca farmers were joined by unions and workers, and argued already then that if 
demands were not met, they would demand the resignation of the president. Later in 
January 2003 Morales also asked for Sánchez’s ouster and the resignation of six more 
ministers. As a result of the La Paz riots, impeachment was also considered, but not 
attempted, against the president for the government’s violent handling of the protests. 
A reshuffling of the cabinet and the withdrawal of the controversial tax issue saved 
                                                
171 Highly controversial since the port was in an area of Chile that the country won from Bolivia in the 
Pacific War in 1879. 
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Sánchez in this instance. Vertical challenges continued, however, especially in the 
Chapare region over the economic and coca issues. And in September 2003, 
challengers in the streets and Evo Morales demanded Sánchez’s resignation again, 
this time on account of gas exports, after Quispe and the CSUTCB had struck and 
organised road blocks for three continuing weeks already. Again, protests turned 
bloody and 26 were reported killed in the protests in El Alto (Buitrago Forthcoming 
2010), and the initial demands for halting gas exports were superseded by demands of 
Sánchez’s resignation. Vice-President Carlos Mesa withdrew his support for the 
government, and then NFR withdrew from the coalition and supported the street 
challengers, and MIR together with NFR demanded a referendum on the gas issue. 
Even though the OAS initially supported President Sánchez, the president had already 
lost his administration. Congress was not important in the fall of Sánchez, and there 
were few direct horizontal conflicts with congress during his presidency.172 Vertical 
challenges were all the more important.  
 
The fall of Mesa in 2005 came as a direct result of Congress accepting Mesa’s second 
resignation, or petition of a vote of confidence, in a matter of months. Upon taking 
over as president after Sánchez de Lozada, Mesa took an above-partisan line for his 
government reading the moment to be very anti-partisan, at least anti-traditional 
parties. He got a truce on several issues from MAS and the main unions that had 
toppled his predecessor, and Mesa yielded to several of the opposition’s demands, for 
instance with regard to the taxing of the gas companies, and agreed to hold a 
referendum regarding the nationalisation of the gas industry in the country. Though 
Mesa tried to meet the opposition in congress and the streets halfway, vertical 
                                                
172 Sánchez de Lozada led a majority coalition government.  
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conflicts continued at high levels, and horizontal conflicts increased to record levels 
for Bolivia in my dataset.173 Protests in the streets now came not only from the new 
left, but also from regionalists and especially the richer Santa Cruz region that 
demanded more autonomy and lobbied against the tax increases promised by Mesa. In 
March of 2005 after having had four of his ministers censured by Congress in 
January, Mesa offered his resignation to Congress gambling on winning a form of 
vote of confidence. By trying to get Congress and especially MAS and Evo Morales 
to reject his resignation, Mesa hoped to quell escalating vertical challenges and 
protests in several departments of the country. Congress unanimously rejected his 
resignation, but this did not end the roadblocks, and conflicts with Congress escalated 
over the highly important hydrocarbons law. Congress passed a heavily amended law, 
which Mesa hesitated promulgating or vetoing. In the midst of vertical challenges and 
horizontal conflicts, Mesa again sent his resignation to Congress. This time around 
Morales and the opposition accepted Mesa’s offer, and Mesa resigned.174 Prior to this 
Jaime Solares, head of the COB, had also asked for Mesa’s resignation (NotiSur 
2005a). Congress formally accepted Mesa’s resignation through a vote, without 
directly challenging Mesa. Vertical conflicts and challenges were constant throughout 
2005 in Bolivia, with regionalist claims adding to the new left and Morales’s demands 
regarding the hydrocarbon industry adding to pressure from Congress against the 
President on the same issues. As such, whereas vertical challenges appeared first 
                                                
173 The increased levels of deadlocks might be due to the fact that even though MIR and NFR stayed in 
the coalition under Mesa, MNR, Sánchez’s party, withdrew and partly blamed Mesa for Sánchez’s fall. 
Thus Mesa’s coalition did not enjoy a majority in congress.  
174 Just prior to Mesa’s resignation, Morales (MAS) and the president of the CEPB (Confederación de 
Empresarios Privados en Bolivia) surprisingly agreed on one issue, the demand for Mesa’s resignation 
(LAWR: 05-22). Whether one should categorise Morales’s demand for Mesa’s resignation as a vertical 
challenge or a horizontal challenge, is a difficult decision given the fact that Morales led both his party 
in Congress, but also his party as a social movement in the streets.  
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against Mesa, it was the interaction between forces inside and outside of congress that 
triggered Mesa’s early exit from the Bolivian presidency.  
 
The impeachment of President Collor de Melo in Brazil 
Collor de Melo was elected as a political outsider to the presidency in 1989 heading 
the party he formed that same year, the PRN (Partido de Reconstruçao Nacional), as 
his electoral vehicle. His sudden rise and outsider-status, also helped bring Collor 
down when the president’s brother in May 1992 accused him of being involved in a 
corruption scheme orchestrated by his former campaign manager, Paulo César Farias, 
as he in the end was left without political allies (Weyland 1993). According to my 
data, the level of general street contention or deadlocks were not higher than during 
the Sarney presidency, but compared to other countries in the region deadlocks in 
Brazil have tended to be pervasive much due to factors related to the federal- and 
party systems (e.g. Ames 2001). During his presidency Collor more than Sarney 
before him, struggled with hyperinflation, which oscillated between 400 and 1,200% 
yearly between 1989 and 1993 (WDI 2008), and Collor was in 1992 in frequent 
conflict with congress over economic policies, wage hikes, and pensions, in addition 
to being hit by several scandals involving his cabinet members. The conflicts with 
congress and the bad economy also forced Collor to change his economic team and 
make failed attempts to broaden his coalition. When the scandal burst in the media, 
congress was early on the case and started investigating the scandal. At first Collor 
was kept out of the investigation, but new media exposures, and congress’ own 
investigation, implicated both him and his wife in the report presented in August 
1992. From June till the local elections in October, the scandal dominated the media 
(and the LAWR reports), but it was not until late September that a vertical challenge 
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appeared. The protests were timed with the scheduled vote in congress, which for the 
opponents of Collor, it was important to hold before the elections. On September 29, 
the Lower Chamber voted 441 to 38 votes to suspend Collor for 180 days.175 
Congress challenged the president before the demonstrations and the vertical 
challenge. The vertical challenge and Collor’s unpopularity, clearly made it easier for 
Congress to vote against Collor.176 One cannot know whether congress would have 
voted the president out of office in the absence of the vertical challenge, but it seems 
clear that the popular pressure increased as a reaction to the ongoing congressional 
investigation and media exposés, rather than the other way around.  
 
The fall of president Balaguer in the Dominican Republic 
It can be questioned whether the fall of president Balaguer in the Dominican Republic 
can be defined as a presidential interruption at all (Marsteintredet Forthcoming 
2010).177 Yet as an incident that breaks with the fixed terms, and the general 
understanding of presidential regimes, it is, nonetheless, relevant for the discussion at 
hand, and more importantly, the case satisfies my definition of a presidential 
interruption. Balaguer fraudulently won the presidential elections of May 1994, but 
the fraud was discovered and proven beyond reasonable doubt by the opposition. The 
international observers therefore had no other choice but to condemn Balaguer’s 
victory. Three months later after local and international pressures, Balaguer was 
forced to agree on a constitutional pact that shortened his (fraudulently won) 
                                                
175 And later in December the Senate voted 67 to three to go on with the impeachment charges. Collor, 
however, had tendered his resignation just prior to the senatorial vote.  
176 Early in 1992 only 8% of the population said they supported Collor (LAWR: 92-01). 
177 The reasons are that the regime potentially should not be regarded as democratic given the electoral 
fraud. Secondly, Balaguer was given two years in power rather than being deprived of two years since 
he had fraudulently won the elections. And, thirdly, he completed his, altered, term.  
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presidential term by two years.178 Balaguer, however, was not forced out by vertical 
challenges, as these were absent throughout the whole 3 month long debacle, political 
tension, however was high throughout this period (Graham 2008). Despite a 
congressional vote to shorten his presidency, Balaguer was not forced out by a 
horizontal challenge either. The main factor explaining Balaguer’s fall, was U.S., 
OAS, and international pressure on Balaguer to resign (Marsteintredet Forthcoming 
2010). Local negotiations led to the compromise of giving Balaguer two years instead 
of having to resign immediately.179 Though the U.S. had initially sought new 
elections, the country was pleased with a peaceful solution. Congress certainly did 
vote Balaguer out of office, but cannot be claimed to have played a large role in the 
process. The main opposition party that was victims of the fraud, the PRD (Partido 
Revolucionario Dominicano), actually ended up abstaining from voting on 
theconstitutional reform that shortened Balaguer’s term,180 whereas Balaguer’s party, 
the PRSC (Partido Reformista Social Cristiano), together with the PLD (Partido de la 
Liberación Dominicana) voted in favour of the reform. The only reason why PRSC 
would vote in favour of the reform was the external pressure from the U.S. Thus the 
fall of Balaguer is a case that is not triggered by vertical or horizontal challenges, and 
therefore cannot be explained in the nexus between institutions and the streets.  
 
                                                
178 For details, see Hartlyn (1994; 1998) and Díaz Santana (1996). 
179 Another reason for Balaguer getting two years instead of being removed immediately is that the 
opposition was split. The Balaguer case shares many similarities with the colour revolutions in Eastern 
Europe. One important difference, however, is that while the Dominican opposition to Balaguer was 
split between the PRD and the PLD, the opposition in the successful colour revolution was united 
(Bunce and Wolchik 2009). Another reason for Balaguer’s deal, is also that the PRD insisted on a 
constitutional formula, but lacked the votes to implement the one they favoured and to veto one the 
party would not favour.  
180 The PRD had negotiated an 18 month term for Balaguer, not a full two year term, and was fooled by 
the PRSC in the hectic moments leading up to the vote in congress. Therefore the party abstained from 
voting over the reform. 
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The interruptions of Bucaram, Mahuad and Gutiérrez in Ecuador 
Ecuador is the country that in my dataset most clearly demonstrates the perils of 
presidentialism. Throughout the 25 years that this study covers, Ecuador is the 
country with most registered horizontal conflicts. Congress time and again censured 
and removed ministers long before the level of social protests and contention began to 
rise in the early nineties (Mejía Acosta 2006), and five times between 1980 and 1992 
congress attempted to remove the president (without success). The increase in vertical 
conflicts registered in my dataset in the early nineties and escalating from the mid-
nineties, is related to the mobilisation of the indigenous movement, CONAIE 
(Confederación de Nacionalidades Indígenas de Ecuador) (Zamosc 2007). Despite 
many horizontal challenges, and inter-institutional conflicts, no president was 
removed until Abdalá Bucaram who became president in the fall of 1996, was 
removed by congress on February 6, 1997. Although unpopular before the launch of 
his economic plan in December, the first deadlocks started to appear right after 
Bucaram presented his plan, which was very much modelled on Menem’s economic 
package when he became president.181 The plan united congress against it, and 
organisations in civil society united against the plan’s price hikes and tax increases. In 
mid-January, after a teacher and student strike, a national protest against Bucaram’s 
economic plan and team was called for February 5, 1997.182 The protest was 
originally not intended to remove Bucaram, but was directed against his economic 
plan (e.g. Pachano 1997: 249), but turned into a vertical challenge after, among 
others, former presidents Borja and Hurtado called for the ouster of Bucaram. The 
                                                
181 Domingo Cavallo was called in by Bucaram to design the plan. Cavallo was for several years the 
finance minister of Menem, and later for a shorter period of President de la Rúa, and one of the 
designers of Menem’s economic package back in 1989. An important part of Bucaram’s package was 
the pegging of the Sucre to the US dollar.  
182 Protesters originally called for the reversal of the economic measures, elimination of the increase in 
fuel prices, the firing of the ministers of education, energy and the procurador general, the opposition 
to the convertibility plan and labour flexibilisation, and respect for the 1995 plebiscite against the 
privatisation of IESS (Instituto Ecuatoriano de Seguridad Social) (Luna 1997: 207-208).  
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overwhelming protests on February 5 led congress the next day to vote Bucaram out 
of office by declaring him mentally incapacitated, a procedure that only required an 
absolute majority in congress. After some help of persuasion from the army, Bucaram 
two days later left the presidential palace. In the case of Bucaram, a series of scandals 
and an apparent failure on his part to be able to govern (Pérez-Liñán 2007: 24-29), 
together with an extremely unpopular economic package, made people take to the 
streets to demand his ouster. Congress was clearly important since it voted to remove 
Bucaram, but did this in reaction to the popular mobilisation the day before, in 
contrast to Collor’s impeachment where congress acted first and people mobilised 
thereafter.183 
 
Jamil Mahuad was elected president in 1998 and removed through a civil-military 
coup in January of 2000. The coup was short-lived since the coup makers did not 
manage to stay in power, but for Mahuad it marked the end of the road as president. 
1999 was a bad year economically with a negative growth of 6% and the Sucre 
depreciated substantially against the dollar. In his State of the Nation speech to 
Congress on January 15, 2000, Mahuad characterised 1999 for the most dramatic year 
in the 20th century for Ecuador (Hernández et al. 2000: 224). Congress and Mahuad 
fought many battles, especially with regard to the economy and measures to please 
the IMF, and the horizontal and vertical conflicts reached levels not seen since 1994 
(according to my dataset). There were no challenges to the president in 1999, but 
former President Borja did ask for Mahuad’s resignation already in mid 1999 
(LAWR: 99-27) due to his unpopularity and his inability to deal with the economy, 
and earlier in the year protests had forced the resignation of Fidel Jaramillo, 
                                                
183 For an interesting parallel account to Weyland’s (1993) account of the rise and fall of Collor, see 
Pachano (1997) for the rise and fall of Abdalá Bucaram.  
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Mahuad’s finance minister. So when Mahuad on January 9 of 2000 declared a state of 
(economic) emergency and decided to dollarise the economy as an answer to the 
Sucre’s depreciation against the dollar, economic retraction and crisis, protests 
spurred immediately. The CONAIE demanded the ouster of all institutions, and set up 
“parliaments” to take over. Congress, which had for quite some time created problems 
for Mahuad’s economic plans, did not trigger Mahuad’s ouster. CONAIE, which only 
had grown in importance since the early 1990’s, allied with mid-rank military officers 
to topple Mahuad. On January 21, before 10 in the morning more than 1,000 persons 
occupied congress, and declared the closure of the three powers of state. International 
actors, like the OAS, condemned the coup and asked for constitutional and 
democratic solutions. The military leadership then condemned the coup attempt 
themselves, but, nevertheless, asked for Mahuad’s resignation to meet the demands of 
the people. Mahuad resigned, and two successive government juntas ruled for some 
hours. The last junta was headed by the head of the army, General Mendoza, who 
surprised everybody by resigning after just a couple of hours, stating that his mission 
was completed as vice-president Noboa was in Quito and ready to take over power. 
The next day, congress convened, condemned the coup, but ratified Mahuad’s ouster 
by declaring his abandonment of power, and ratified Vice-President Noboa as 
President. More clearly than in the case of Bucaram, vertical challenges triggered 
Mahuad’s fall, and this time congress only acted after Mahuad had de facto been 
removed from power.184  
 
                                                
184 Another way of seeing this is to argue that congress created so many problems through gridlocking 
the government in economic and other matters, and thus worsened the economic crisis, which finally 
led to the challenge that ousted Mahuad. For more on congress’ role in the interruption of Ecuadorean 
presidents, see Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich (Forthcoming 2010). 
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Lucio Gutiérrez was one of the leading military coup makers against Mahuad in 2000, 
but after some time in jail, as Hugo Chávez had before him, he came back and won 
the presidency through democratic elections. Gustavo Noboa, Mahuad’s vice-
president, ruled until elections were held in 2002, and Gutiérrez took over on January 
15, 2003. Gutiérrez, supported by the indigenous Pachakutik party, and the leftist 
MPD (Movimiento Popular Democrático), won the elections as the candidate of the 
PSP (Partido Sociedad Patriótica). There were very few horizontal and vertical 
conflicts registered in my dataset for his first year in power, but Gutiérrez’s coalition 
of indigenous and leftist forces split in August 2003 when Pachakutik left the 
government. Pachakutik called Gutiérrez a traitor for having followed neo-liberal 
policies and sought agreements with the IMF. And, in mid 2004, Gutiérrez was 
challenged from the streets, and congress also started considering how to impeach or 
remove the president. Furthermore, Gutiérrez’s vice-president, Alfredo Palacio, shook 
the boat and said he was ready to take over in case Gutiérrez was ousted (LAWR: 04-
17). Febrés Cordero, leader of the PSC (Partido Social Cristiano) and former 
president stated that congress would need the people’s help to remove Gutiérrez (as 
had been necessary in the cases of Bucaram and Mahuad). Congress, however, lacked 
the votes to impeach the president, and the attempts failed on procedural issues and on 
what charge one should attempt to remove Gutiérrez (LAWR: 04-21).185 CONAIE 
also challenged the president through organising an uprising against Gutiérrez, which 
failed, and also marked the weakening of that organisation (Zamosc 2007: 14-15). 
Gutiérrez was also weakened already from the start of his presidency, due to scandals 
related to the funding of his campaign (LAWR: 04-22; Saad Herrería 2005: 39-41), 
                                                
185 Pachakutik wanted Gutiérrez tried for treason, Febrés Cordero and the PSC wanted to declare that 
he had abandoned his post since he left the country for a EU-Latin America summit without congress’ 
approval, and DP (Democracia Popular) and ID (Izquierda Democrática) wanted him removed because 
of ineptitude, i.e. charges similar to the one against Bucaram.  
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and in order to shield his presidency from the impeachment threat, Gutiérrez sought a 
deal with non other than the PRE (Partido Roldosista Ecuatoriana), Abdalá Bucaram’s 
party. As a part of that deal, the return of Abdalá Bucaram seemed to be included and 
Gutiérrez met with Bucaram in Panamá where Bucaram was exiled after having been 
convicted (in absentia) for corruption in Ecuador. Febrés Cordero and the PSC and 
the Pacakutik immediately (in September 2004) again threatened with impeachment. 
To uphold the deal with the PRE, Gutiérrez had to make Bucaram’s conviction 
disappear. Therefore, Gutiérrez sought to reform and remove the Supreme Court and 
replace it with a more politically compliant one. At first, in October 2004, he sought 
mere reforms to depoliticise the Supreme Court, which failed to be supported by 
congress. Then, after his party only received about 5% of the votes in the local 
elections in October, Gutiérrez barely survived an impeachment vote as the PSC, 
Pachakutik, ID and MPD lacked three votes to start the impeachment procedures.186 
With a newly won majority Gutiérrez and congress quickly moved to remove the 
Supreme Court in December 2004, and replace the court with new, more pliant 
members, and in January 2005, despite the lack of quorum, Gutiérrez’s supporters 
elected a new leadership of congress. Both moves were largely believed to help 
Gutiérrez get Bucaram back to the country. Even though the new majority and 
Supreme Court were less pliant and robust than Gutiérrez had expected, and street 
protests picked up during the first months of 2005,187 Bucaram was allowed to return 
as the new Supreme Court annulled all court actions against Bucaram in late March. 
As vertical challenges increased in number and level, Gutiérrez in a desperate attempt 
                                                
186 Rumours of corruption and buying of legislators surrounded this vote, as one member from each of 
the PSC, ID, and Pachakutik voted with Gutiérrez, thus leaving the opposition with only 48 of the 51 
votes required (NotiSur 2004).  
187 From LAWR I did not register any street challenges before April 2005, but NotiSur reports of street 
challenges in February that year. These were only registered as street protests in my dataset (see 
NotiSur 2005b). 
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to stay in power, removed the new Supreme Court, and called for a state of 
emergency, banning street protests in Quito. In the end, this did not help him as 
protests mounted in several cities in the country, all challenging the president, 
culminating on April 19 and 20. Congress then reacted on April 22, and with 60 votes 
declared that the president had abandoned his post and failed to perform his duties as 
president, and the army declared it had withdrawn its support for the president in 
order to ensure public safety. In sum, the rally to remove Gutiérrez already in 2004 
organised in Congress and by CONAIE in the streets, in December the same year the 
challenges re-emerged, but failed due to internal disagreements and lack of 
cohesiveness in Congress. Finally vertical challenges spurred the opposition in 
Congress into action again. The vertical challenges removed the president’s 
legislative shield, and together with the horizontal challenge triggered Gutiérrez’s 
ouster.   
 
Serrano’s failed Autogolpe in Guatemala 
Serrano’s fall in Guatemala in May 1993 is a special case as it is the case of a failed 
autogolpe. Had Serrano succeeded he would, like Fujimori a year before, have ended 
the young democracy in Guatemala. He failed, and was removed, thus his case 
constitutes an interrupted presidency. Although in 1992 both Nobel Peace Prize 
winner Rigoberta Menchú and the Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de León 
Carpio had warned that a coup could occur in Guatemala (LAWR: 92-18, 92-21, 92-
38), people were taken by surprise when Serrano declared his autogolpe on May 25, 
1993. Serrano stated his move was necessary to cleanse the institutions of the country 
from corruption.188 LAWR did not report of any challenges to the president before the 
                                                
188 For his speech in defence of his autogolpe, see INCEP (1993: 33-40) 
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autogolpe, and only of very few horizontal or vertical conflicts. Still, Serrano’s move 
had been preceded by strong reactions to rises in the electricity rates, leaving several 
dead after demonstrations, and bringing the president on the brink of declaring a state 
of emergency (LAWR: 93-21). Just before Serrano’s move, he was threatened by 
impeachment as Rodrigo Rosales of Acción Civica was ready to present a list of 
5,000 signatures to congress demanding Serrano’s ouster (LAWR: 93-22).189 And it is 
believed that Serrano’s problems with congress was what triggered his autogolpe 
(Christensen Bjune and Petersen Forthcoming 2010; Villagrán de León 1993; 
Beltranena de Padilla 2009). Serrano, however, had failed to consult the move 
sufficiently with the army, and another powerful institution in the country, CACIF 
(Comité Coordinadora de Asociaciones Agricolas, Comerciales, Industriales y 
Financieras). The latter, in the face of increasing international pressure against the 
coup, saw itin its best interest to attempt to stop the coup. Popular protests in the 
streets also increased against the coup and turned into a challenge against Serrano, 
and civil society united to lay plans for the ouster of Serrano. Through several 
attempts to unite, the Instancia Nacional de Consenso emerged as a forum joining 
unions, business, civil society organisations and parties in opposition to Serrano. 
When international reactions became clear (INCEP 1993), and it finally became clear 
that both CACIF and the army would not support Serrano, Serrano withdrew from 
power on June 1, and after a failed attempt by his Vice-President Espina to take 
power, Congress elected Human Rights Ombudsman Ramiro de León Carpio 
suggested by the Instancia, as president. Although challenges did occur against the 
coup, the available accounts of its failure focus more on the elite behaviour within 
civil society than the movements in the streets. International reactions, the military 
                                                
189 Not registered as a challenge as nothing more came out of this other than some media attention 
surrounding the handing over of these signatures to Congress.  
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leadership, new democratic institutions and leaders of organisations in civil society all 
seem to have played important roles to return the regime back to democracy during 
the weeks of uncertainty in late May-early June. Congress, on the other hand, did not 
play any important role at all, some congress members supported the coup, and 
congress as an institution did not defend itself when Serrano dissolved it. The lack of 
clear challenges makes me describe the case as fuzzy with respect to whether it was 
the institutions or the streets that challenged Serrano. Ironically, de León Carpio 
would spend much of the rest of his presidency trying to clean congress of corrupt 
elements and remove all legislators, which was what Serrano had failed to do.  
 
The killing of a Vice-President: The impeachment of Cubas in 
Paraguay 
Paraguay is the country with most congressional attempts at presidential interruptions 
registered in my dataset, and considering that the country only entered the dataset in 
1990, this demonstrates a high level of contention between the two elected 
institutions. In 1994 Argaña attempted to impeach president Wasmosy, but the motion 
was stopped on a technicality (LAWR: 94-47, 94-48). In August-September of 1998, 
following President Cubas’s decision to commute former coup general Oviedo’s 
prison sentence, congress attempted to impeach the president.190 Oviedo had 
originally sought the presidential nomination, but even though he was declared 
winner of the primaries in the Colorado party, he was prevented from running. Cubas 
ran in his stead with Argaña as vice-presidential candidate.191 Owing his presidency to 
                                                
190 For Oviedo’s coup, see Valenzuela (1997). Originally General Oviedo had been a strong supporter 
of Wasmosy when Wasmosy lost to Argaña in the primaries of the Colorado party in 1992/93. After 
internal quarreling in the party, Wasmosy with Oviedo’s support, got the presidential nomination of the 
Colorado party and won the presidency.  
191 Originally Oviedo had appointed Cubas as his Vice-presidential candidate, and when Oviedo could 
not run, Cubas took over the presidential candidacy with the loser of the primaries, Argaña, as vice-
presidential candidate.  
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Oviedo, Cubas promised to pardon Oviedo, but by doing so he provoked an 
impeachment attempt against him. The Supreme Court, however, turned down 
Cubas’s Decree 117 that freed Oviedo, and Cubas said he did not accept the Supreme 
Court’s ruling. Congress thus moved to impeach the president again, taking up the 
charges of August, 1998, but uncertainty reigned whether the opposition had 
sufficient votes to successfully remove Cubas. Congress then moved to change some 
internal rules in order to achieve a majority, and when it was certain it had sufficient 
votes, it set the date for the impeachment trial (Abente-Brun 1999). A week later, on 
March 23, Vice-President Argaña was murdered, and vertical challenges to Cubas 
emerged between the 23rd and 26th of March. Congress then on March 24 sped up the 
impeachment proceedings after having obtained the required 2/3 majority, and also 
attempted via international mediators, to persuade Cubas to resign as soon as possible. 
After losing both in the streets and in congress, Cubas decided to flee the country on 
Sunday, March 28, a day before the scheduled vote in the Senate which would have 
removed him as president. Thus, Congress clearly begun this battle against president 
Cubas, and, according to Abente-Brun (1999), had gathered sufficient votes for a 
successful impeachment attempt before the killing of Argaña.192 Both vertical and 
horizontal challenges after the killing of Argaña, nevertheless, made congressional 
opposition to Cubas more cohesive, and triggered Cubas’s ouster.  
 
The fall of Fujimori in Peru 
Fujimori was elected president in 1990 after beating the world-famous author Mario 
Vargas Llosa in the second round of the presidential election that year. If the election 
of the outsider and populist Fujimori was surprising and controversial, his 10 years in 
                                                
192 This slight impeachment majority could of course have been turned around by the president’s 
persuasive powers as was the case with Gutiérrez.  
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power would be even more controversial and create considerable international 
attention.193 In a short time after his election Fujimori ended the war with Sendero 
Luminoso, balanced the budget, got control of the hyperinflation created under his 
predecessor Alan García (APRA – Alianza Popular Revolucionaria Americana), and 
created macro-economic growth (Cheibub 2006; WDI 2008). After Congress had 
considered removing Fujimori in December 1991 and censured several of his 
ministers, Fujimori in April of 1992 closed congress and the judiciary in an 
autogolpe. After the return to some sort of democratic rule, Fujimori was re-elected in 
1995, and after much politico-judicial manoeuvring he was able to run for a third term 
in 2000, an election he won after his opponent Alejandro Toledo of Perú Posible 
withdrew from the second round. Fujimori’s fall was preceded by a regime scandal, 
which demonstrated the high level of corruption in the regime installed by Fujimori. 
The Vladivideos, after the leader of SIN (Servicio de Intelegencia Nacional) 
Vladimiro Montesinos, showed how the Fujimori side had been buying members of 
congress to win a majority (see especially Cameron 2006). Already facing problems 
of low popularity, and meeting international pressure to democratise, the Vladivideos 
and the popular pressure created by them, made Fujimori agree on early elections as a 
way out of the crisis. The highly unpopular Montesinos fled the country, and the OAS 
was present to help Fujimori redesign and improve democracy in the country. 
However, already before the videos were made public in September, Fujimori met 
resistance. In June congress discussed how to remove Fujimori, a futile attempt since 
Fujimori still enjoyed a majority. The regime, however, quickly dissolved from that 
moment as congressional and societal protests increased in numbers and intensity. In 
                                                
193 And, also considerable academic attention: Fujimori’s rise and fall is analysed heavily (Weyland 
2006). See e.g. Carrión (2006), and Cameron and Mauceri (1997), in addition to numerous works on 
populism and competitive or electoral authoritarianism using Fujimori and his regime as an important 
case.  
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July when Fujimori was sworn in, 100,000 were gathered in Lima to challenge 
Fujimori (La marcha de los cuatro suyos organised by Toledo), and Fujimori had to 
shout his inauguration speech due to booing in congress (LAWR: 00-30). In 
September the Vladivideo of congressman Kouri being bribed was released, and 
Fujimori announced early elections and sought to remove Montesinos. Later the same 
month Fujimori lost his majority, Congress voted to disband SIN and unions asked for 
Fujimori’s immediate resignation (LAWR: 00-39). After some disagreements, a new 
election for April 2001 was agreed upon in October. In November, however, the 
congressional majority removes the president of Congress, Martha Hildebrandt, a 
staunch Fujimori supporter, and there is talk of removing Fujimori on account of him 
lacking the moral capacity to rule the country (LAWR: 00-43). A week thereafter, on 
November 20, Fujimori, during a trip to Japan, faxed his resignation to Congress. 
Congress did not accept the resignation, and, instead, the next day Congress declared 
the presidency vacant and abandoned due to Fujimori’s moral incapacity. There was 
never any horizontal challenge towards the president, Fujimori in any case pre-
empted any such decision by his resignation. There was indeed an increasing 
congressional opposition to Fujimori, which started simultaneously with the vertical 
challenge at Fujimori’s inauguration for his third term. On the other hand, there were 
not any vertical challenges registered in the immediate period before Fujimori’s 
resignation, and it is therefore doubtful that a challenge actually triggered his ouster. 
In the period between July and mid-November, increasing congressional pressures is 
what I have registered from the accounts in LAWR.  
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The impeachment of Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela 
Carlos Andrés Pérez (hereafter: CAP) returned to the presidency of Venezuela in 
1989 for AD (Acción Democrática), after having been a successful president in the 
1970’s, during a period of oil-price bonanza for the oil-exporting country. The fall of 
CAP has generally been linked with the fall of the Punto Fijo democracy installed in 
1958, the breakdown of the Venezuelan party system, and the rise of Hugo Chávez 
(Lalander Forthcoming 2010). There were extremely few horizontal conflicts 
registered before CAP took over power, and only a few vertical conflicts registered 
during the last couple of years of his predecessor’s presidency, president Lusinschi. In 
1989 CAP took over a country in bad economic shape with 8% negative growth and a 
yearly inflation of 88% (WDI 2008). Like Menem and Fujimori, CAP quickly broke 
with his campaign promises and launched vast neo-liberal reforms (Stokes 2001), 
dubbed locally as El gran viraje. In February 1989 CAP presented his package, and 
immediate protests and vertical challenges ensued. Congress marked its disapproval 
of CAP’s proposal by voting other projects down, and what has been known as the 
Caracazo erupted (LAWR: 89-10).194 Social protests continued also in 1990 and 
Congress was more defiant than under his predecessors. In 1992 CAP also had to 
endure two coup attempts in February (led by Hugo Chávez) and in November (led by 
a group of generals), but survived them both. The same year also saw an increase 
(again) in horizontal and vertical conflicts, and challenges appeared as early as March 
1992 after CAP had been forced to reshuffle his cabinet. Cacerolazos and protesters 
in the streets demanded his resignation, and Congress considered shortening his term 
with one year (LAWR: 92-11, 92-12), a motion that was finally defeated in August 
1992. It was not until November 8 that the scandal that would cause CAP’s 
impeachment, became public. At that time it became known that just before 
                                                
194 For the Caracazo, see e.g. López Maya (2003).  
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abolishing RECADI (Oficina del Régimen de Cambios Diferenciales) in February 
1989, approximately 250 million Bolivares had been exchanged for US dollars from a 
presidential fund (Lalander Forthcoming 2010). Only four days before this became 
public, the Senate had again attempted to shorten CAP’s term, this time passing a 
proposal with a majority vote to that effect (NotiSur 1992; LAWR: 92-45). This was 
rejected by CAP, but after the RECADI scandal burst, the Senate decided to go ahead 
with impeachment proceedings instead (LAWR: 92-47), the November coup failed, 
and AD did horribly at the local and regional elections. The AD then started 
discussing whether or not to continue (half-heartedly) supporting CAP or abandon 
him. In March 1993, the attorney general decided to send the CAP case to the 
Supreme Court and students led on in a vertical challenge against the president 
(LAWR: 93-13). On May 20 the Supreme Court decided that there was sufficient 
evidence to try CAP, and the day after Senate decided to remove the president’s 
immunity, which automatically suspended CAP from his office, and ended his 
presidency. On August 31 congress finally voted to remove the president from office 
justifying the decision by saying that the constitution only allowed for a maximum 90 
days leave of absence (NotiSur 1993). Congress started the process of finding an end 
to CAP’s presidency in March 1992 at the same time as vertical challenges were 
noted in the streets. From the outburst of the embezzlement crisis, congress was first 
in its demand for CAP’s ouster. Protests ensued throughout that year and the next, and 
Congress continued challenging CAP until finding the perfect excuse with the 
mismanagement of funds and embezzlement. There were no vertical challenges when 
the Senate held its final vote, as there were no challenges when Fujimori fled Peru. 
Yet both congress’s insistence on removing CAP together with the vertical challenges 
and general societal pressures seem to have triggered the impeachment of CAP.  
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Introduction 
The research on presidential interruptions has only recently begun to deal with the 
underlying causes of presidential interruptions. Partly distorted by the institutionalist 
vs. street debate discussed in chapter 5, few scholars have moved beyond triggering 
causes of presidential interruptions. Only recently some authors have focused on 
underlying, and structural causes such as economic and social factors, level of 
democracy, and neoliberal policies (Alvarez and Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010; 
Edwards 2007; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Kim and Bahry 2008).  
 
This chapter focuses on the underlying causes of presidential interruptions and move 
beyond triggering causes such as horizontal challenges, votes in congress and vertical 
challenges. In the subsequent statistical analysis, I have two goals. First, I further 
discuss the debate of institutions vs. the streets, but this time I focus on horizontal and 
vertical conflicts as underlying causes, and not as triggering causes.195 The results are 
quite the opposite from the ones in Chapter 5, since I find that horizontal conflicts, in 
the literature generally referred to as deadlocks, is a significant predictor of 
interruptions and challenges, whereas general vertical conflicts, i.e. strikes, 
demonstrations, cacerolazos, roadblocks, etc. is not significant. Recall that in chapter 
5 I found that vertical challenges were more important than horizontal challenges in 
triggering interruptions.  
 
Since these results are quite contradictory to our general knowledge of interruptions 
and challenges to presidents, I further unravel the variable of general conflicts, 
excluding challenges, into different types of conflicts depending on which cleavage 
                                                
195 Recall the distinction I made in Chapter 4 between challenges, i.e. conflicts with the expressed goal 
of presidential removal, and other, regular conflicts with political and social content.  
Chapter 6: The Underlying Causes of Presidential Interruptions 
   
183 
motivated the conflict, and which organisation was the primary organiser of the 
conflict. These variables of conflicts are proxies that aim to measure the emergence, 
and importance of different cleavages in the countries being studied. The second goal 
is therefore to analyse what types of societal mobilisation explain presidential 
interruptions. My focus is on conflicts mobilised by new, and emerging cleavages, 
and my statistical analyses support the hypothesis that conflicts mobilised on new, 
and emerging cleavages have a significant and positive relationship with the 
dependent variables interruptions and challenges. Furthermore, I find that conflicts 
mobilised by the traditional left-right cleavage does not explain interruptions or 
challenges, and that this explains why vertical conflicts turned out to be insignificant.  
To substantiate these results I perform some comparative process tracing and link my 
findings to other important, and much discussed developments in Latin America, such 
as the rise of the new left(-s), indigenous parties, and a discussion of whether or not 
civil society is weakened in the region.  
 
This chapter continues as follows. First, I make a detour arguing for why it is 
important to study underlying causes, and situate the causes of presidential 
interruption within a broader context of causality in the social sciences in general. 
Second, I use statistical to analyse which underlying factors cause challenges and 
interruptions. The first part of this section revisits the institutions vs. the streets debate 
at the level of underlying causes, the second looks beyond this debate and focuses on 
the emergence of new cleavages as a causal factor. In the final part of this section, I 
use process tracing to link my findings to recent developments in countries in Latin 
America that have experienced interruptions, and substantiate my findings. In the 
third, and final, section, I provide some tentative explanations as to why groups 
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representing new and emerging cleavages attempt to remove democratically elected 
presidents prematurely. I focus on three factors: access to arenas of mediation, 
understandings of democracy, and political history.  
 
Causes in the social sciences and causes of presidential 
interruptions: A case for underlying causes 
Why study underlying causes? This question motivates this section of the chapter. I 
argue that it is important to analyse underlying causes to avoid the “immediacy trap”, 
endogeneity problems, and shallow explanations. And I show that several of the 
studies on presidential interruptions fall prey to these problems. 
 
“Statistical Models are incomplete by themselves...since they ultimately have to rely 
on intuitions about plausible causal mechanisms.” (Elster 2007: 8). These words from 
Elster highlight one of the great schisms in comparative politics (and probably the 
social sciences). Statistical models point to explanatory factors that on average 
increase or decrease the likelihood of the occurrence of our dependent variable (or the 
increase or decrease in the level of our dependent variable), after controlling for the 
effect of other explanatory variables.196 The explanatory factors in statistical models 
are somewhat distanced from the dependent variable,197 and generally do not refer to 
the mechanisms by which the outcome of interest are produced. Thus, statistical 
models often leave a black box that is only treated by (qualified) speculations of how 
the significant explanatory variables might actually go about to produce the outcome 
of interest. To properly demonstrate that the significant results in our statistical 
                                                
196 For a short presentation of causality in case-based vs. population-based social science, see e.g. 
Mahoney (2008) 
197 In time since explanans should occur prior to the explanandum, but also in terms of constituting 
distinct factors so as to avoid tautologies, or self-evident explanations.  
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models are more than mere correlations (even when controlled for other factors), this 
black box should be opened. In general there are two ways to “open” this black box. 
One can either point to some general laws of human and social behaviour (Hempel 
1942), or one can try to pinpoint a causal chain and trace the processes between the 
explanans and explanandum (Elster 1989, 2007; George and Bennett 2005).198 The 
latter strategy, although guided by theory, is much more empirically oriented than the 
first strategy.199 Opening the black box helps explain why questions, and also how 
questions, related to the because or how much statement that follows for instance a 
statistical model (Mooney Marini and Singer 1988: 364-366), and helps to accept the 
causal statements in statistical analyses. Process tracing, however, focuses on a set of 
explanatory variables that are much closer to the dependent variable, and factors that 
point to the mechanism(-s) that produce the outcome of interest. As may have become 
clear from the above description, the causal chain explanations complement statistical 
analyses, or vice-versa.200 
 
Pierson (2003; 2004) discusses a related, yet different topic of how important social 
processes take a long time to develop and by focusing only on immediate, triggering 
factors, social scientists lose a big part of the causal picture. Cumulative causes, 
threshold effects, and causal chains might develop over a long time to produce certain 
social phenomena such as revolutions, distinct party systems, democracy, etc. Think 
only of Stein Rokkan’s various descriptions of the development of party systems and 
                                                
198 George and Bennett use the concept of process tracing for what Elster (1989) calls causal 
mechanism, but which he later (Elster 2007: 32) calls causal chains. The latter concept is more in line 
with George and Bennet’s understanding of process tracing.  
199 To avoid referring to opaque general laws, Elster (2007: 36-37) suggests focusing on what he now 
understands as causal mechanisms, which refer to generally occurring patterns that often may find their 
explanations in psychological human mechanisms. 
200 See Gerring (2007), who argues that case-selection mechanisms should complement findings in 
more broader analyses, and follow from how your case is identified compared to other cases.   
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cleavages in Europe, in which the starting point of his analyses is situated about 1,000 
years ago (e.g. Rokkan 1968; Rokkan et al. 1975). Pierson’s argument counters what 
might be seen as a trend in comparative politics of focusing too much on immediate, 
and triggering causes, instead of long-term developments (Pierson 2004). Following 
Przeworski and Teune (1970), I would argue that the strength of statistical analyses, 
and in part studies following the classical comparative logic, is highest when one can 
show statistically significant correlation in the most challenging of circumstances. For 
Przeworski and Teune this meant studying causal factors and their effects on the 
dependent variable of interest in the most diverse circumstances possible, their logic 
of Most Different Systems Design.201 If the relationship between the variables is 
significant across a variety of different cultures, regions, etc. it is stronger than if you 
only study them in systems that do not differ that much.202 The analogy to Pierson is 
that Przeworski and Teune’s view would translate into studying explanatory factors 
that might have occurred a long time before the outcome of interest occurred.  
 
I will not follow Rokkan’s longue durée historical analysis, but I agree with Pierson’s 
critique, and would like to add that it is especially relevant for statistical studies that 
focus on explanatory variables that are very close to the explanandum. In these cases, 
statistical analyses often resort to “shallow” explanations that are near tautological, 
over underlying, and (often) structural causes (Pierson 2003: 199). This often occurs 
when statistical analyses focus on independent variables (processes or events) close to 
                                                
201 This view is contrary to the conclusion of John Stuart Mill, and most of the writing on comparative 
logic today, of his two methods of comparative logic (Mill 1868; Ragin 1987). The general conclusion 
is that the Indirect Method of Difference (Most Similar Systems Design) is a stronger investigative 
method than the Method of Agreement (Most Different Systems Design), since it is more similar to the 
experiment. Przeworski and Teune, however, argue for combining Most Different Systems Design with 
multi-level analysis, which in their view, strengthens their preferred investigative method.  
202 The reader might here argue that I do not follow up on Przeworski and Teune’s argument as I only 
study cases of Latin America. For the reasons for the limitation of geographical scope, see the 
Introduction. 
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the dependent variable in time (what I call the immediacy trap), or close conceptually 
(almost full tautologies), in order to generate statistically significant correlations 
between the independent and dependent variables.203 These variables are much more 
interesting to study as causal mechanisms and approach with “how” and “why” 
questions relating to the relationship between the explanatory and dependent 
variables, rather than “how much” the explanatory variable correlates with the 
dependent variable. Therefore, these variables that constitute causal mechanisms are 
better studied with process tracing than statistical or comparative analysis.  
 
The reason I find the lack of distance between the explanans and explanandum a 
particular problem in statistical analysis, is that it breaks with what I deem to be the 
strength of regression analysis, namely finding statistically significant correlations 
between variables that are of a different nature (from social structure to event 
outcomes), separated in time, or hold up in a variety of different social settings. 
Process tracing, on the other hand, aims to answer the “how” question in political 
science, whereas the question of which variables cause the outcome of interest is not 
that interesting. In my view, looking at triggering causes through statistical analysis is 
like trying to answer the “how” question by saying “because” or “how much”. In the 
case of presidential interruptions, it is not that interesting to know the size of the 
effect of challenges upon interruptions, but rather why challenges occur, how 
challenges are mobilised, how they reach their critical mass to topple a president, who 
are the challengers, etc.  
                                                
203 Mahoney et al. (2009) have recently argued the opposite, namely that for instance in a chain of 
necessary and sufficient causes, it is often the cause most proximate to the explanandum that is “more” 
important. However, this argument comes close to being absurd when made for a series of necessary 
causes (see, p. 130-131, Figure 9). First of all, opening up for degrees of necessity in necessary causes, 
is conceptually confusing. Second, if a cause is necessary, the absence of that cause is sufficient for the 
non-occurrence of the outcome of interest (Ragin 1987: 98-99). I also find it hard to reconcile the view 
of causality in Mahoney et al. (2009) and Mahoney (2008). 
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This debate is relevant for the current literature on presidential interruptions. Much 
focus has been directed towards the immediate, triggering causes of presidential 
interruptions, which I discussed in chapter 5. Thus, the conclusions have been that 
especially street challenges endanger presidential survival (Hochstetler 2006; 
Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), but that the opposition in congress may play a 
pivotal, or triggering, role (Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008; Pérez-Liñán 
2007, 2008). This debate is interesting only in so far as it addresses the topic of the 
perils of presidentialism (Linz 1990, 1994; Valenzuela 1993, 2004). If street, or 
vertical, challenges, indeed constitute the biggest perils for presidential survival (as 
my Chapter 5 also indicates), then the causal processes indicated by Linz (Cheibub 
2007; Linz 1990, 1994) are not at play, and hence presidential interruptions cannot be 
triggered by the (institutional) perils of presidentialism (at least not directly). Yet, as 
causal explanations, they only point to the commonalities immediately prior to an 
interruption, and offer what one might call a shallow explanation of a presidential 
interruption. The fact that it takes either congressional action (through a vote that 
requires varying degrees of majority) or upheavals in the streets to unseat a president, 
is hardly surprising, and on its own, this explanation only points to the procedures 
(e.g. impeachments), or triggering factors (the president had to flee to avoid the 
storming of the presidential palace), while it devotes little attention to the underlying 
factors that provoked the congressional or street actions.204 Furthermore, if one 
departs from the assumption that all politicians seek power through elections, and re-
elections (where possible), a challenge is more a prerequisite, procedure, or a causal 
                                                
204 Furthermore, a vertical or horizontal challenge is not inclusive enough as challenges go. A president 
may be challenged by international actors (Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010) or by elites that not 
necessarily hold positions in congress (for instance the business organisation CACIF in Guatemala in 
1993, see Christensen Bjune and Petersen (Forthcoming 2010), and potentially COHEP in the case of 
Zelaya in Honduras in 2009). I discuss this further in chapter 7. 
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mechanism, for a presidential interruption than a proper cause. Thus, using challenges 
as an independent variable in a statistical analysis almost amounts to tautological 
explanations, instead of causal explanations. In statistical analysis, this problem can 
be avoided by either using selection models, thus arguing that interruptions only occur 
as a result of challenges, to identify what causes challenges, and what causes 
challenges to succeed (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), or one could argue that 
challenges and interruptions are part of an overarching phenomenon that one might 
call presidential crisis (a term preferred by Pérez-Liñán in a relatively similar 
fashion), and thus use ordered or multinomial probit or logit models to distinguish 
what differences there might be between these two levels of crisis.205 I am not saying 
that studying challenges as an independent variable is not interesting, only that the 
answers that should come out of these studies is not the size, and level of significance, 
of a coefficient, but rather answers that relate to “why” and “how” questions. 
 
Some of the institutional independent variables used to explain interruptions, also fall 
prey to the same fallacies. Take for instance the legislative shield of presidents 
(Pérez-Liñán 2007: 144-147), which is defined as the difference between the 
proportion of congress (or chamber) members loyal to the president minus the 
proportion of votes required to prevent an impeachment. This variable explains in part 
the success or failure of presidents to survive an impeachment attempt. But to say this 
is just to say that if the president has sufficient support in congress to survive an 
impeachment attempt, he or she will! Or, to say that the president was successfully 
impeached because the opposition managed to garner sufficient votes in congress to 
pass the threshold for successful impeachment as set by the constitution. As causal 
                                                
205 See my discussion and analysis in chapter 3. 
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explanations go, this is not very enlightening.206 In addition, several of the 
institutional analyses only include institutional variables (some also include protest 
variables) (Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008; Negretto 2006), ignoring 
structural variables such as growth, level of the economy, etc. which I have argued for 
might be important. The cited analyses might therefore have serious omitted variable 
bias.  
 
A paper by Helmke (2007) falls in the same immediacy trap as she in her complex 
strategic model of interbranch conflicts finds, among other things, that the level of 
public support for an institution is related to the probability of an attack on this 
institution’s survival. This translates into the point that unpopular presidents are more 
likely to be challenged by other institutions, which is not at all surprising. Popular 
presidents will not fall as a result of a street based challenge merely because it will 
become incredibly difficult to muster street, or institutional, support against the 
president. If a popular president is to fall, it is very likely that either the military must 
take power, or there must be an international intervention in that country.207 
 
In my view, the variables of interest are the ones that lie at a distance from the 
outcome, and, thus, are exogenous in causal models. The problem with using 
                                                
206 The author clearly admits to this (Pérez-Liñán 2007: 145), therefore the author seeks to explain what 
affects the size of the legislative shield. But here the author also makes the same “mistake” as he 
studies how presidential style of leadership affects the legislative shield. An isolationist strategy and a 
strategy of confrontation lower the legislative shield. But could it not be that the president was forced 
to adopt an isolationist strategy due to prior congressional actions? Or, could the coding of that variable 
be affected by the general relationship between congress and president? I.e. a president follows a 
strategy of isolation if congress is recalcitrant. In other words, the variable may be endogenous. 
207 The only potentially popular president to fall was Serrano in 1993. He was clearly more popular 
than congress, and just prior to the autogolpe Serrano’s party had performed well in the local elections, 
which goes against Helmke’s general finding, but Serrano was highly unpopular with the army and the 
business sector. With the army due to his acceptance of Belize as an independent state and his wish for 
peace with the insurgents (and even accepting the guerrilla as a legitimate opponent), with the business 
sector due to his eagerness of allowing an international bid for the privatisation of the electricity sector 
in the country (based on interviews with Arellano Rojas 2009; Beltranena de Padilla 2009; Beltranena 
2009; Gramajo 2009; Urrutia 2009). 
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president’s popularity (Helmke 2007), a president’s legislative shield (Pérez-Liñán 
2007), and challenges (Hochstetler 2006), as independent variables is that all are 
likely to be endogenous in the causal models used. Challenges also constitute a 
superset of interruptions, and, thus, part of the same overarching phenomenon (e.g. a 
presidential crisis). To avoid these problems, an interesting institutional variable 
could be a president’s support in congress when elected. In other words to investigate 
whether or not presidents elected with a minority support in congress are more prone 
to deadlock/interruption/breakdown than majority presidents.208 This means, given a 
set of conditions at the starting point of a presidency, how likely is it that a president 
might fall? This serves to distance the query for causal factors from the dependent 
variable and focuses on a variable that is exogenous for politicians when elections are 
over. In other words, studying underlying causes helps avoid endogeneity problems.  
 
A more policy-oriented reason for focusing on underlying causes is that it is more 
interesting for policy makers to know how to prevent challenges and interruptions 
from occurring, than to know that if a president is challenged it is important to quell 
demonstrations without using violence. It is also more interesting for policy makers to 
know if the president’s position vis-à-vis congress upon taking office might affect his 
or her probability of being deadlocked by congress, or surviving in power, than to 
know that if a challenge has occurred, granted, the support a president enjoys in 
congress is important.209 If one is to give advice to policy makers, and especially 
given the fact that a president does not fall if he or she is not challenged, one would 
like to be able to say that given such and such conditions the president is more or less 
likely to be challenged. And, not only state that given a challenge, it would help if the 
                                                
208 I avoid using coalitions as a variable as this is a variable that also may be endogenous. 
209 I thus argue for the importance of focusing on causes that come early in the theoretical causal chain. 
This contrasts with Mahoney et al.’s view on these matters (Mahoney, Kimball, and Koivu 2009). 
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president were popular.210 In sum, to study underlying causes makes sense 
methodologically, and in terms of policy advice.  
 
My point is that one must move beyond the immediate, triggering causes, be that 
horizontal or vertical challenges, and move beyond defending or attacking the 
institutional view and the more specific Linzian understanding of presidentialism, in 
order to more fully comprehend the logic behind presidential interruptions and 
challenges. Despite the focus on institutions vs. the streets, there has been some 
attention lately devoted to models that include underlying, and structural variables. 
Neo-liberal policies have been found to increase the likelihood of presidential 
interruptions (Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009), negative economic 
conditions seem to have a similar effect (Kim and Bahry 2008),211 and scandals are 
sometimes found and sometimes not, to affect presidential survival (Hochstetler 2006; 
Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008). Whereas vertical challenges clearly 
trigger interruptions, the level of societal contention as an underlying cause, despite 
much attention, however has, surprisingly, found little statistical support (Hochstetler 
and Edwards 2009). By splitting up the variable of vertical conflicts, I found in 
Chapter 3 that anti-government demonstrations, but not strikes, potentially cause 
interruptions.212 I follow up on this idea in the next sections that further focus on the 
underlying causes of challenges and interruptions.  
                                                
210 The last comes from Hochstetler and Edwards (2009) finding that challenges that end in violence 
are more likely to succeed. This, however, is maybe due to a flaw in their selection model (one of them 
at least) as they group both horizontal and vertical challenges together as the selection variable. Only 
vertical challenges are likely to lead to deaths as presidents very rarely kill members of congress when 
they are preparing an impeachment. The one that comes closest to something similar is president Cubas 
who maybe ordered, or at least knew about, the killing of his vice-president.  
211 A problem with the Kim and Bahry article is, however, that they conflate presidential interruptions 
with democratic breakdowns, and that they include semi-presidential regimes, a regime-type that 
operates under a different logic than presidential regimes (Sartori 1994).  
212 This is also supported by the findings by Kim and Bahry (2008). We both use Banks data on anti-
government demonstrations, clearly the best source for such a long time-series (my Chapter 3) or for 
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Causal analyses and interpretations 
My dataset is a panel dataset with years as the time variable, and countries as the 
panel variable. Panel data have four advantages over cross-section data. First of all, it 
can deal with heterogeneity in the panel units (countries in my case); a panel dataset 
can analyse more information and variation in the data because it combines variation 
over time within units and variation across units; since panel data have variation over 
time it can address more questions and issues than cross-section data; and finally 
(although not relevant in this case), panel data allow for better analysis of dynamic 
adjustments (Kennedy 2003: 302). There are basically three ways of dealing with 
panel data, either to use fixed effects or random effects estimators, or to pool the data 
and use regular regression.213 Regular OLS regression on panel data may be biased 
since the omitted variables, caught in the intercept, may vary for each unit. A regular 
OLS only works with one intercept for all cross-sectional units. Fixed effects, 
however, allow for different intercepts for all cross-sectional units, and thus deal with 
this problem, but raise other issues. Fixed effects only uses the variation over time 
within each unit, and only variables that vary sufficiently over time can be used in 
these models. Furthermore, one loses several degrees of freedom since the fixed 
effects implicitly use one dummy variable for each cross-section unit to deal with the 
heterogeneity across individuals (or countries in this case). The random effects model 
analyses the different intercepts, or heterogeneity across cases, as random (and 
normally distributed), and can use time-invariant variables. The random effects model 
is thus more efficient, and uses more information in the data than both fixed effects 
                                                                                                                                      
cross-regional comparisons (Kim and Bahry), but a variable that probably conflates the distinction 
between challenges (protests that aim to remove presidents) and more “regular” anti-government 
demonstrations. 
213 The following is based on Kennedy (2003: 300-318), see also Wooldridge (2006) for another 
presentation.  
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and pooled regression, but is fraught with another problem. Whereas fixed effects 
models allow for arbitrary correlation between the country specific unobserved 
variables and the independent variables in the model, random effects must assume 
that all unobserved variables are uncorrelated with the independent variables 
(Wooldridge 2006: 497). This is a major drawback for the random effects model, 
which leads several econometricians to argue that fixed effects is to be preferred over 
random effects models.  
 
In my case, however, random effects is the better choice between the two for one 
important reason. My dependent variables, challenges to presidents and presidential 
interruptions, are both dummy variables and do not vary over time in all countries. By 
using fixed effects models I would lose all observations in countries with no variation 
on the dependent variables. Furthermore, there does not exist any true fixed effects 
probit or logit models. A conditional fixed effects model for panel logit analyses 
exists that works similar to the fixed effects, but with the same drawbacks as any 
other fixed effects model (Wooldridge 2002: 491-492).214 In the choice between 
probit and logit panel analyses, I will use probit analyses, since the logit random 
effects model is not as attractive as the probit due to a lack of available simple 
estimators for the logit model.215  
 
                                                
214 Another problem for me is that since there is no fixed effect estimations for logit or probit panel 
data analyses, the Hausman test cannot be used to test the assumption of zero correlation between the 
unobserved variables and the independent variables. 
215 Furthermore, the probit model can measure the relative importance of the unobserved effects (which 
also measures the correlation between the composite latent error for any two time periods) (Wooldridge 
2006: 486, 490). The latter is also a test for the whether or not a pooled estimators can be used since it 
measures the panel-level variance (StataCorp 2007: 367-368), which helped me pick models for 
robustness tests with statistical techniques only applicable on pooled data, see next footnote.  
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To address the problem with random effects models, and especially the untestable 
assumption of zero correlation between the unobserved variables and the independent 
variables in the model, I will use the generalized estimating equations (GEE), also 
called the population averaged model, or the Chamberlain’s random effects probit 
model (Wooldridge 2006: 486-490). The GEE model averages the effects of the 
independent variables across the distribution of the unobserved variables, and 
therefore relaxes the assumption of zero correlation between the unobservables and 
the independent variables one finds in the random effects model. The GEE also 
allows for serial correlation of variables over time within units, and allows robust 
standard errors that control for this correlation.  
 
Finally, the last problem to address before taking on the analysis is the skewed 
distribution of the dependent variable. There are very few positive instances (only 14 
in the case of presidential interruptions, 40 for challenges) compared to negative 
instances of the dependent variables. This often creates the problem of explaining and 
predicting these events. Pooled logistic analysis will normally underestimate the 
occurrence of such rare events (King and Zeng 2001b, 2001a). King and Zeng thus 
created a correction for these problems with the Rare Events logistic regression. This 
technique only works with pooled data, and thus much information from the panel 
data is not analysed. Despite the fact that Rare Events logistic regression also allows 
for robust standard errors clustering on countries, i.e. I do not have to assume that 
observations within countries are independent across observations, I prefer using the 
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GEE analysis since it also allows robust standard errors, and exploits more 
information in the data.216 
 
Statistical models of presidential interruptions and challenges 
This section presents the statistical results. The results are presented in two different 
tables. The first table analyses the institutions vs. the streets debate as underlying 
causes. In other words instead of using vertical and horizontal challenges as 
independent variables, I focus on vertical and horizontal conflicts and exclude 
challenges. The second table distinguishes between different types of regular 
conflicts, excluding challenges, based on which cleavages motivate the conflict, and 
who organises the conflict, both variables are proxies for the importance and salience 
of different cleavages and the effect of their emergence on challenges and 
interruptions. The difference from the first to the second group of models is that in the 
second the conflicts are split up according to the cleavages the conflicts represent, or 
according to what type of organisation has organised the conflict. The models in this 
table test my hypothesis that conflicts motivated by new, and emerging cleavages 
increase the likelihood of an interruption or a presidential challenge.  
 
Institutions vs. the streets as underlying causes of interruptions and 
challenges 
The first models test whether the general level of contention in the streets has an 
effect on challenges to presidents and presidential interruptions after controlling for 
                                                
216 To test robustness of my models, I ran all models in the tables below with standard Random Effects, 
GEE and Rare Events Logistic regression (only on models with panel-level variance close to zero). The 
results in the tables below were all robust across these three techniques. do files, data, and output 
available from the author. All models are run with the following stata commands on Stata/IC 10.1. 
Generalized Estimating equations xtprobit, pa vce(robust)(equivalent to xtgee..., 
family(binomial) link(probit) corr(exhangeable)).  
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other explanatory factors, and thus refers to the street vs. institution debate 
(Hochstetler 2006; Hochstetler and Edwards 2009; Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-
Liñán 2008; Negretto 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2008; Valenzuela 2004). In the previous 
chapter I found that vertical challenges were more important for triggering 
interruptions than horizontal challenges. However, in line with my arguments above, 
and the model in Chapter 2 (Figure 2-3), in terms of statistical or comparative analysis 
of interruptions and challenges, one should focus on the underlying causes. 
All results in Table 6-1 and 6-2 should be interpreted with caution considering the 
few positive instances of the dependent variables, especially true for models on 
presidential interruptions. To partially control for these problems I also run models on 
challenges to presidents,217 and I provide an extensive comparative process tracing 
analysis after the statistical analysis to substantiate my findings.  
 
All models in both tables control for the following factors, which I summarise here. 
With regard to economic variables, I control for economic growth measured as 
change in GDP/Capita (lagged one year), and yearly inflation. Economic growth, as 
expected from the results in Chapter 3 and theory, has a consistently negative and 
significant effect on interruptions and challenges across all models. Inflation, on the 
other hand, has no effect on either interruptions or challenges. To control for regime-
type within my semi- and full democracies, I tested whether variation in level of 
democracy could have any effect. Clearly some of the cases of interruption have 
occurred in semi-democracies on the lower end of the scale (e.g. the cases of Peru, 
Guatemala, and Dominican Republic), on the other hand an interruption or challenge 
                                                
217 I tried to use Heckman selection models, which would probably have been the best fit for my causal 
model displayed in Figure 2-3 in Chapter 2. However, due to data restrictions in my data material, 
these analyses proved to be very unstable and not robust, a problem also reported in  a more global 
study in which these models were used (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009).  
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require the right to opposition, which should be more developed in more 
institutionalised democracies. I used the Polity index,218 and find that there does not 
seem to be any relationship between the level of democracy (within semi- to full 
democracies) and either interruptions or challenges. Internal problems in the 
administration, and coalition breakdowns, might weaken the president sufficiently to 
make him or her fall (Llanos Forthcoming 2010; Marsteintredet and Llanos 2009; 
Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich Forthcoming 2010). I capture internal problems 
in a presidential administration with a count variable that registers every time a 
minister leaves the government after an expressed conflict with the president.219 This 
variable is positive and significant in the models tested here, which indicates that 
internal problems within presidential administrations increase the likelihood of an 
interruption and a challenge to presidents. I also control for corruption scandals 
involving the president or his close family or advisers, an important factor in several 
cases of presidential interruptions (Pérez-Liñán 2007). However, as expected, this 
variable does not reach standard levels of significance in the models with interruption 
as the dependent variable, but is clearly significant and positive for predicting 
challenges to presidents (see also Morgenstern, Negri, and Pérez-Liñán 2008). Only 
three cases of presidential interruptions are clearly related to a corruption scandal, and 
given that corruption scandals have hit several presidents throughout my period of 
analysis (1980-2005), the “batting average” for this variable is rather low.  
                                                
218 I lag this variable one year since the actual challenge or interruption in a year might affect the 
democracy score in a country.  
219 The variable excludes any conflict related to interruptions and challenges.  
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Table 6-1: Institutions vs. the streets as underlying causes of interruptions and challenges 
Models Model 1: 
Interruptions 
Model 2: 
Challenges 
Model 3:  
Interruptions 
Model 4:  
Challenges 
President’s support in 
legislature 
-.015    
(.006)** 
-.003  
(.006) 
- - 
Horizontal conflicts 
(Deadlocks) 
- - .048   
(.030) 
.049 
(.030)* 
Vertical conflicts .045    
(.071) 
.017  
(.048) 
.005 
(.092) 
.005  
(.055) 
Growth (lagged) -.041  
(.018)** 
-.053  
(.014)*** 
-.033    
(.017)** 
-.056   
(.014)*** 
Inflation (natural 
logarithm) 
-.051    
(.065) 
-.032  
(.061) 
-.019  
(.064) 
-.026  
(.058) 
Polity index (lagged) -.019    
(.043) 
.032  
(.048) 
-.000  
(.040) 
.033  
(.048) 
Internal splits .3414    
(.196)** 
.388  
(.220)* 
.432  
(.212)** 
.368  
(.201)* 
Corruption (dummy) .550    
(.395) 
.672  
(.275)** 
.531 
(.401) 
.642   
 (.263)*** 
Constant -1.033  
(.536)* 
-1.253  
(.318)*** 
-1.862  
(.394)*** 
-1.485  
(.395)*** 
N (country years) 307 307 314 314 
Notes: All models are population averaged probit models. Robust standard errors clustering on country 
in breackets. I.e. controlling for non-independent observations within units (countries). Levels of 
significance: * <.10; ** <.05; *** <.01. The divergence in N between the models is caused by some 
observations in which president’s support in congress was unobtainable, or not valid for the full year. 
The missing observations are the first years of democracy in Guatemala, Nicaragua, El Salvador, and 
the first four years in Panama. Observations of conflicts in all years of challenges and interruptions are 
truncated to the period prior to the challenge and interruption that year. 
Sources: Economic variables from the World Bank (WDI 2008); President’s support and effective 
number of parties from Nohlen (2005b; 2005a), and updated with official webpages from respective 
countries and electoral reports in Electoral Studies. Deadlocks, vertical conflicts, internal splits and 
corruption from personal dataset based on LAWR. The Polity index can be found here: 
http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, see also Jaggers and Gurr (1995).  
 
It is beyond doubt that vertical challenges are the most important triggering factor for 
presidential interruptions (see Chapter 5, Hochstetler 2006). However, as discussed 
above, this is only one part of the story, and in my view, the less interesting part. The 
models in 6-1 addresses the institutions vs. the streets debate as underlying causes and 
address the questions of whether vertical conflicts, or the general level of contention 
(street protests, demonstrations, strikes) affects the survival of presidents; whether the 
president’s support in congress when elected (a proxy for horizontal 
conflicts/deadlocks) affect the survival of presidents; and finally, whether horizontal 
Chapter 6: The Underlying Causes of Presidential Interruptions 
   
200 
conflicts or deadlocks affect the survival of presidents.220 Since there is a difference 
between “institutions and events” (Marsteintredet 2008a; Hochstetler and Edwards 
2009), I include both president’s support in congress (institutions) and horizontal 
conflicts (events), to look at how the relations between congress and the president 
affect challenges and interruptions. Since they are supposed to measure the same 
phenomenon, the variables are not run in the same model.  
 
It does not matter whether I control for the relations between congress and president 
as institutions (Models 1 and 2), or events (Models 3 and 4), vertical conflicts do not 
have a significant effect upon either challenges or interruptions. The proxy for 
horizontal conflicts, the president’s support in congress when elected, has, as 
expected (Valenzuela 2004), a negative and significant (at .05 level) effect on 
interruptions (Model 1), but not on challenges (Model 2), after controlling for the 
other causal factors. The results, however, from Models 1 and 2 only partially 
addresses the streets vs. institution debate since one of these variables indicates an 
institutional situation within which interruptions may or may not occur, and the other 
indicates an event. President’s support in congress is only a proxy for the variable of 
inter-institutional or horizontal conflicts.  
 
When I substitute president’s support in congress when elected by my measure of 
horizontal conflicts (Models 3 and 4), I provide the first test of the relative 
explanatory power of vertical and horizontal conflicts as underlying causes of 
interruptions and challenges to presidents. When controlling for horizontal conflicts, 
                                                
220 It is important to note here that horizontal conflicts do not include horizontal challenges to 
presidents, and that vertical conflicts do not include vertical challenges to presidents. Both horizontal 
and vertical conflicts are count variables, and I control for the problem of greater coverage of larger 
countries by excluding any country-year with less than six news registered in a country-year.  
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the variable vertical conflicts is not significant in any of the two models. The variable 
horizontal conflicts, on the other hand, is positive as expected, and significant at .11 
and .10 levels of significance for interruptions, and challenges, respectively. Thus it 
seems that the level of contention in the streets (strikes, demonstrations, piquetes, 
protests, etc.) does not affect the survival of presidents, and that this variable only is 
significant when we understand it as a trigger, i.e. as challenges, and not as an 
underlying cause. The reverse is true for horizontal conflicts. Horizontal challenges 
are not as important as a trigger for interruptions, but horizontal conflicts, or 
deadlocks, are positive and significant at conventional levels when analysed as an 
underlying cause of interruptions and challenges.  
 
The findings in Table 6-1 with respect to vertical conflicts is also in accordance with 
my findings in Chapter 3 that indicated that only anti-government demonstrations 
(and not strikes) affected presidential survival. If this is the case, and it clearly seems 
so, then a variable that includes several types of contention, including strikes, is not 
what pins down what is going on prior to interruptions, and challenges. If my 
theoretical and empirical discussions above, are correct, vertical (and horizontal) 
conflicts as a variable should be disaggregated according to the type of cleavage that 
mobilise the conflict, and also according what type of organisations are dominant in 
the conflict.   
 
Social cleavages as underlying causes of interruptions and challenges 
Table 6-2, next page, moves beyond the institution vs. streets debate, and focuses 
further on the emergence of social cleavages as underlying causes of presidential 
interruptions. Basically all the same control variables are used in Table 6-2 as in 
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Table 6-1, and are commented above.221 The main difference between the models in 
Table 6-1 and 6-2 is that the variables of conflicts are split according to cleavages and 
organisers of conflicts in Table 6-2. These variables are proxies for the importance of 
different types of cleavages in the countries being studied. In Models 1 and 2 in Table 
6-2, I distinguish between conflicts motivated by the left-right cleavage and conflicts 
motivated by regional and ethnically based cleavages. In Models 3 and 4 I code 
conflicts according to whether they are organised by parties (basically the same as 
horizontal conflicts in Table 6-1), labour unions, or new social movements and 
peasant organisations. Since who organises a conflict aims at measuring the same as 
the expressed cleavage in the conflict, namely the importance and salience of different 
cleavages in society, Models 3 and 4 can also be read as a validity test of the results of 
Models 1 and 2. To further emphasise that I am trying to capture the emergence of 
cleavages, and that I regard this to constitute an underlying cause, the variables of 
types of conflicts according to either cleavages or organisers, represent moving, 
weighted, averages of the prior and current year.222 Using moving averages instead of 
only the current year’s value of the variables, better captures that I want to get at 
processes that are not instant, but develop over some time, and it helps, to a certain 
degree, to capture a dynamic process.  
 
The conflicts were first coded according to the dominant cleavage expressed in 
LAWR. I used one variable for the traditional left-right cleavage, normally expressed 
by (traditional) unions, through strikes, demands for higher wages, etc.223 And, I used 
                                                
221 The only minor variation in the following models are that Growth is only significant at .13 level in 
Model 3, Table 6-2, and Internal splits is only significant at the .12 level in Model 4 in the same table. 
222 Current year has weight 2, and past year has weight 1.  
223 I exclude all conflicts I could not determine the cleavage of, the same is valid for all conflicts I 
could not determine who organised. Mostly, LAWR was very clear about who the organisers were and 
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one variable for cleavages generally not previously represented in the party systems in 
Latin America, namely conflicts based on either one of three cleavages: The variable 
regional and ethnic conflicts include conflicts with centre-periphery, international 
centre-periphery, and peasant-consumer conflicts, and finally conflicts with a clear 
cultural, or ethnic-based, cleavage (see Table 4-3). These four types of cleavages were 
merged into one variable for three reasons: First, they generally represent a new 
cleavage in the countries where they appear; second, since I deal with 18 countries, 
and new cleavages that appear vary from country to country, collapsing some of these 
makes my variable is more generalisable; and third, three of these cleavage pertain to 
the same dimension of centre-periphery or urban-rural cleavages. For the type of 
organisation orchestrating the conflict, I distinguish between conflicts organised by 
political parties, by labour unions and by new social movements and peasant 
organisations (see chapter 4 for details).  
                                                                                                                                      
what the motive for the conflict was. I also exclude all conflict motivated by the other cleavages and 
organised by other groups than the ones included in Table 6-2. One reason is that these are few and far 
between, another is that some are only relevant for a shorter time-period in a country (military as 
organisers of conflicts in Argentina prior to 1989 for instance). A third reason is that I have no 
theoretical expectation of any of these conflicts affecting the survival of presidents.  
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Table 6-2: Underlying causes of interruptions and challenges 
Models Model 1: 
Cleavages 
and 
Interruptions 
Model 2: 
Cleavages and 
Challenges 
Model 3: 
Organisation 
and 
Interruptions 
Model 4: 
Organisation  
and  
Challenges 
Regional and ethnic conflicts 
(MA) 
.210    
(.117)* 
.294   
(.052)*** 
- - 
Left-Right conflicts (MA) .015    
(.047) 
-.081   
(.056) 
- - 
Peasants and NSM conflicts 
(MA) 
- - .196  
(.120)* 
.339  
(.113)*** 
Union conflicts (MA) - - -.054  
(.081) 
-.034    
(.085) 
Political party conflicts (MA) - - .079 
(.044)* 
.105 
(.037)*** 
President’s support in 
congress 
-.013 
(.00* 
-.004 
(.007) 
- - 
Growth (lagged) -.048  
(.022)** 
-.064   
(.016)*** 
-.031     
(.018)* 
-.051   
(.011)*** 
Inflation (natural logarithm) -.034    
(.065) 
.012  
(.071) 
.005   
(.083) 
.012    
(.066) 
Polity index (lagged) -.038    
(.040) 
.031  
(.049) 
-.016    
(.040) 
.019     
(.048) 
Internal splits .419    
(.158)*** 
.469    
(.230)** 
.444    
(.191)** 
.378   
(.220)* 
Corruption (dummy) .608    
(.391) 
.722   
(.283)*** 
.464    
(.446) 
.599    
(.289)** 
Constant -1.130 
(.648)* 
-1.353 
(.395)*** 
-1.97   
(.483)*** 
-1.810    
(.385)*** 
N (country-years) 307 307 314 314 
Notes: All models are population averaged probit models. Robust standard errors clustering on country 
in brackets. I.e. controlling for non-independent observations within units (countries). Levels of 
significance: * <.10; ** <.05; *** <.01. NSM: New Social Movements. MA: Moving, weigthed, 
average of two years, prior and current year.  
Sources: See table 6-1. All types of conflicts from my dataset from LAWR. All of the conflict variables 
count the number of such conflicts in a country-year. Observations of conflicts in all years of 
challenges and interruptions are truncated to the period prior to the challenge and interruption that year. 
 
The models in Table 6-2 aim to capture the effect of conflicts mobilised by new, and 
emerging cleavages on presidential interruptions and challenges to presidents.  
 
The interesting parts of Table 6-2 are the variables that constituted vertical and 
horizontal conflicts in Table 6-1. The variable Left-Right conflicts is actually 
negative, but not significantly different from zero in Models 1 and 2. This is 
potentially a surprising finding. However, remember from the analysis in Table 3-1, 
Chapter 3, that the variable strikes from the Banks dataset was negative (but not 
significant) in that analysis. However, the other type of conflicts, the regional and 
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ethnically motivated conflicts, is positive, and significant at the .1 level in Model 1 
predicting presidential interruptions. In Model 2 with challenges as dependent 
variable, regional and ethnic conflicts maintains the positive sign, and is significant at 
the .01 level. This means that conflicts mobilised around regional and ethnic 
cleavages, and by leaders often challenging the status quo, is positively and 
significantly affecting presidential interruptions and challenges to presidents. Thus, it 
is not all types of contention, but rather, as discussed above, new cleavages emerging 
that challenges the president, the regime and the status quo that seem to affect the 
likelihood of a presidential interruption and a challenge to the president. Given the 
fact that conflicts motivated by the left-right cleavage had a negative effect, while 
conflicts motivated by the regional and ethnic cleavages had a positive effect, it seems 
likely that when these variables are merged into one the effects of these two variables 
would be equalled out. This also explains the somewhat contradictory finding that 
vertical challenges were important triggers for interruptions, whereas vertical 
conflicts were not significant as an underlying cause of interruptions.  
 
To further test the notion of new emerging political actors mobilising on new 
cleavages, I look at who organises the vertical and horizontal conflicts. Here I 
separate between political party conflicts, which is much the same variable as the 
horizontal conflicts in Table 6-1, labour union-conflicts, which is almost a perfect 
correlation with strikes, from non-union conflicts mobilised by peasants or New 
Social Movements. This is a different measure of the same relationship as I try to 
capture with the variables covering different types of social cleavages. Models 3 and 
4 in Table 6-2 confirm the results in Models 1 and 2. The variable of conflicts 
organised by Labour union is negative, but not a significant predictor of either 
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presidential interruptions (Model 3) or challenges to presidents (Model 4). The 
variable NSM and peasant conflicts, which aim to capture conflicts mobilised by new, 
and emerging cleavages, is positive and significant at the .1 level in Model 3 with 
presidential interruptions as dependent variable, and positive and significant at the .01 
level in Model 4 with challenges to presidents as dependent variable. The variable 
Political party organised conflicts is positive in both models, as was horizontal 
conflicts in Table 6-1, and significant at the .1 and .01 level in Models 3 and 4, 
respectively. These results strengthen my confidence in the findings related to the 
conflicts motivated by regional and ethnic cleavages in Models 1 and 2. Again I find 
that it is particularly one type of vertical conflicts, or general level of social 
contention, namely conflicts organised by new social movements and peasant 
organisations that increase the likelihood of a challenge to the president and a 
presidential interruption. 
 
To conclude, my statistical models support the idea that presidential interruptions 
seem to be linked to new, and emerging, political groups representing new cleavages 
that challenge the status quo of political regimes. These groups may have a lower 
threshold for creating protests that destabilise governments and presidents than more 
traditional interest groups such as labour unions, which represent the traditional left-
right cleavage. I therefore conclude that, after controlling for other underlying causes, 
the emergence of new cleavages represented by new political groups in congress and 
in civil society is one of the more important underlying causes of presidential 
interruptions in Latin America. One should, however, be careful with over-
interpreting the statistical results given the many assumptions linked to such types of 
analyses, and the few cases of interruption and challenges. On the other hand, the 
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empirical discussions using more qualitative techniques support the findings in the 
statistical analyses.224 Nevertheless, the next section seeks to substantiate my findings 
with more descriptive, and qualitative data. In other words, I attempt to open up the 
black box by linking conflicts motivated by regional and ethnic cleavages, and 
organised by new groups to the cases of challenges and interruptions in Latin America 
new political organisations in the party system and in the civil society. 
 
Process tracing the findings 
This part provides some additional evidence and substantiates my findings with more 
qualitative data and analysis. The goal is to link challenges and interruptions of 
presidents with the emergence of new cleavages, or new types of organisations in the 
democracies of the region. First I look at and explain the general trends in the data, 
and then I analyse the cases of interruption. 
 
Trends of protests and challenges to presidents in Latin America 
There are clear indications of a trend in Latin America that has led to an increased 
representation of leftist parties (of various denominations), indigenous parties, 
increasing party system instability and fractionalisation, and that new cleavages have 
become represented in various party systems (Arditi 2008; Birnir and Van Cott 2007; 
Castañeda 2006; Doyle 2009; Madrid 2005a, 2005b, 2007; Sánchez 2008, 2009; Van 
Cott 2005a, 2005b; Yashar 1999; Zamosc 2007). A debate has also run in the pages of 
World Politics of whether neoliberalism has weakened participation and, 
consequently, democracy in Latin America, or strengthened participation and 
                                                
224 As mentioned above, I also tried to be very careful in terms of meeting the assumptions in the 
models. Tests using other types of analysis, such as the Rare Events logistic regression, and alternative 
measures of conflicts, such as the proportion of conflict to news, all indicate that my results are robust 
across different statistical techniques.  
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democracy (Arce and Bellinger Jr. 2007; Kurtz 2004).225 On the one hand, unions and 
peasant movements seem to have been weakened, and thus democracy outside 
electoral institutions is weakened. On the other hand, the literature on presidential 
interruptions focus time and again on how popular challenges and protests increase 
the likelihood of a presidential interruption (e.g. Hochstetler 2006; Pérez-Liñán 2007), 
and how this increases accountability to some extent (Marsteintredet 2008b). While 
there is some truth, probably, to all claims, the above-mentioned authors forget to 
distinguish between different types of social contention, and therefore come up with 
diverging results. My data show that while there is clearly a decline in union activity 
and strikes, new social movements and other organisations in civil society not based 
on the tradition left-right cleavage, have increased their protest activity (see Figures 4-
5, 4-6). In the regression analyses in Table 6-2 I also showed that the distinction 
between different types of societal contention was important for explaining 
interruptions and challenges to presidents.  
 
Figure 6-1 shows how the increase in challenges noted in Chapter 4 is caused mainly 
by an increase in vertical challenges to presidents in Latin America since the start of 
the 1990s. From 1999 there is not one year till the end of my dataset in 2005 in which 
there has not been at least two separate challenges to presidents in the region.226 In the 
1990-1999 period there was between one and two challenges per year, and until 1990 
there was between zero and one challenge each year for the whole region.  
                                                
225 A recent article argues that the relationship between economic reforms and democracy takes the 
form of a J-curve. In other words, economic reforms initially are detrimental to democracy, but has a 
positive effect in the longer run (Gans-Morse and Nichter 2008), which confirms Przeworski’s (1991: 
136-187) early analysis of the topic. 
226 There seems to have been a dip in the number of challenges after 2005, but in 2009 there are at least 
two challenges in two countries. Against President Colom in Guatemala in relation to the Rosemberg 
case, in Honduras where Zelaya was deposed (and also challenges against his successor, Micheletti). In 
Argentina, political leaders asked in the media for Christina Fernandez’s resignation due to a bad mid-
term election, and in Paraguay President Lugo has been challenged for having fathered two children 
when he was a Catholic Priest.  
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Figure 6-1: Trends of conflicts and cleavages 
 
Source: Personal dataset based on LAWR 1980-2005. 
 
Figure 6-1 also supports the evidence from Table 6-2 by showing that at the same 
time as vertical challenges increase, there is an increase in both regional and ethnic 
conflicts registered and also an increase in conflicts organised by new social 
movements and peasant organisations. So far so good, but clearly the regional trends I 
show are probably driven by a few countries in the sample. This is true, but this fact is 
not a weakness for my statistical analysis, it only shows that one should be careful 
when making inferences about the results. It is clear, however, that the variables I 
focused on fit as explanatory variables for some cases of interruption better than for 
others. Compared to other explanatory models of interruptions, mine cover more 
cases than the others. Pérez-Liñán’s (2007) analysis of impeachments and scandals 
only covers three-four cases of interruptions, Hochstetler’s (2006) focuses on vertical 
challenges, but is more occupied with triggering causes, Negretto (2006) only 
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includes institutional variables, and Helmke’s (2007) key variable of institutional 
legitimacy or popularity is in my view endogenous.  
 
Explaining a trend towards increasing number of challenges and 
interruptions 
But, why is there an increasing trend of challenges, and interruptions linked to new 
cleavages only from the mid 1990s? This trend is noted by other scholars (Hochstetler 
and Edwards 2009), but not explained so far in the literature. Why not earlier? And, 
why were there so few challenges immediately after democratisation in the respective 
countries in this study?  
 
I believe my key variables of emerging new cleavages hold some part of the answer to 
this puzzle. According Birnir and Van Cott’s (2007) reading of Lipset and Rokkan’s 
thesis of the freezing of party systems after the full extension of the suffrage, the party 
systems in Latin America should have been settled soon after democratisation (Lipset 
and Rokkan 1967a, 1967b). And, executive instability should occur prior to the 
freezing of the party systems, in other words, immediately after the introduction full 
suffrage, that would open for representation of new, hitherto unrepresented, groups. In 
Latin America this was not the case, yet the belated instability in party systems, 
executives, and the increase in challenges do not contradict Lipset and Rokkan’s party 
system hypothesis, as Birnir and Van Cott argue. The reason for the delayed 
developments in terms of cleavages, and also challenges and interruptions in Latin 
America lies in a prerequisite for a presidential interruption, namely the process of 
democratisation.  
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The process of democratisation in Latin America since 1978 has facilitated a host of 
important changes in the region that I maintain are prerequisites to presidential 
interruptions. The stability of minimal or electoral democracies in the region, has 
given new groups opportunity and time to organise, compete and even win both local 
and national elections. Many of the social movements cum parties, or old parties of 
the left that previously were prevented from taking power, are now in power.227 The 
surge of new cleavages and new parties that challenge the status quo often create 
conflicts. This is not new or original for Latin America, what is unique in the Latin 
American experience is that many of these groups did not win power immediately 
after being able to organise and participate fully in elections. Figures 4-5 and 4-6 in 
chapter 4 indicated that it took until the mid-1990s for conflicts related to non-left-
right cleavages to become more important, and the so-called leftist wave took hold 
towards the end of the 1990s.228  
 
A relatively long period of restricted democracy facilitated the fight for full 
participation in Western Europe. In Latin America, full participation was secured in 
all countries with the Third Wave transitions to democracy, countries that in previous 
democratic spells restricted participation to the literate part of the population, or on 
the basis of gender, land ownership or income, now opened for full participation for 
all citizens (see Hartlyn and Valenzuela 1994). The period before full suffrage, 
                                                
227 Since Hugo Chávez became president in Venezuela in 1999, and Ricardo Lagos became president in 
Chile in 2000, however, the left has won power in a number of countries. Lula for PT in Brazil became 
president on January 1, 2003; Nestor Kirchner took the PJ to the left in 2003, and was succeeded by his 
wife Christina in 2007; Tabaré Vásquez (Frente Amplio) became president in Uruguay in 2004; Evo 
Morales (MAS) won the presidency at the end of 2005 in Bolivia; Michelle Bachelet took over the 
presidency in Chile in 2006, Rafael Correa won the Ecuadorean presidency in 2006; Daniel Ortega 
gained the presidency of Nicaragua in 2006; Fernando Lugo became the first non-Colorado president in 
Paraguay in 2008; and, finally, in 2009 Mario Funes of the former revolutionary guerrilla organisation 
FMLN won the presidency in El Salvador. 
228 Some presidents on the left held power prior to this wave as well. Presidents Guzmán and Jorge 
Blanco in Dominican Republic 1978-1986, Alan García in Peru 1985-1990, and Siles Zuazo in Bolivia 
1982-1985 are some examples. 
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however, was dominated by clear authoritarian regimes, not restricted democracies as 
in Europe.229 In Western Europe democratisation was a slow affair that developed in 
regimes that were relatively open to contestation and critique. Leftist parties and 
unions were relatively free to organise, so that when the struggle universal (male) 
suffrage was won, labour parties were ready with a political party “package” to sell to 
their constituencies. In Latin America, however, leftist parties, unions and especially 
their leaders had been persecuted under the previous dictatorial regime. Many were 
killed and many were driven into exile. Even though parties on the left generally were 
able to participate in the founding elections, they were much less prepared than their 
Western European counterparts that had organised and fought over a long time for 
their rights to compete in elections, become represented at the national level, and have 
their core, labour, supporters vote for them in elections. The situation for 
underrepresented indigenous groups was not much better at the time of 
democratisation. Furthermore, the core of their supporters generally has had less 
experience with political participation than their labour counterparts. It is therefore no 
surprise that both leftist parties and parties mobilising on the basis of ethnic or 
cultural cleavages were not ready to fill the political space with party alternatives at 
the moment of the transition to democracy.  
 
Thus, the increasing trend of party system fragmentation that one observes in Latin 
America since the moment of democratisation, and the belated mobilisation of new 
cleavages should come as no surprise even though it contrasts with the Western 
European experience. The different regime legacies prior to the latest extension of the 
suffrage, explain why the mobilisation of new cleavages that has led to more 
                                                
229 This important difference between the extension of suffrage in Western Europe and Latin America, 
a non-appreciated difference that in my view has led to the unfair or unfounded criticism of Lipset and 
Rokkan’s thesis. 
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challenges and interruptions in some countries in Latin America did not occur 
immediately after democratisation as one interpretation of the Lipset and Rokkan 
freezing of party system hypothesis would suggest (Birnir and Van Cott 2007), and 
the regime legacy in Latin America explains the trend of the increase in number of 
challenges and interruptions. 
 
Cases of interruption, new cleavages and organisations 
This section links the mobilisation of new cleavages, new organisations, challenges 
and interruptions in a set of cases in Latin America. As mentioned, the key variables 
in the explanatory model does not explain all cases equally well, but the following 
should demonstrate that the key variables have explanatory value in a number of the 
cases of interruption. In cases such as Bolivia, Ecuador, Argentina, Venezuela, and 
Peru, interruptions can be linked to the rise of new cleavages. Furthermore, in the 
same countries one can observe that challenges go from being horizontal to vertical, 
the latter constituting a greater peril to presidents than the former.  
 
In Bolivia there was only one vertical challenge before the year 1999 when Evo 
Morales first was represented in congress, namely against Siles Zuazo in 1984/85. 
After 1997 when ASP (Asamblea Soberano del Pueblo) won 3.7% of the national 
vote, the highest proportion at the time for an indigenous party, and after Morales’s 
successful arrival on the national political scene, Sánchez de Lozada was challenged 
twice, and Mesa once in only two years. The challenges were successful. Evo 
Morales, his new party MAS, Felipe Quispe and his party MIP, and the farmer 
organisation CSUTCB (led by Quispe) were all active and important in the challenges 
to both Sánchez de Lozada and Mesa. These new organisations also represented 
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newly mobilised cleavages that previously had only been latent, pertaining to 
cultural/ethnic traits, or on centre-periphery related issues.  
 
In Ecuador a similar development as the one in Bolivia may be observed. All 
challenges in the 1980s were horizontal, i.e. institution-based, but from the mid 1990s 
vertical challenges also appear. The escalation of vertical conflicts and challenges 
since the mid 1990s is clearly linked to the strengthening of the CONAIE (Zamosc 
2007).230 The challenge against Bucaram in 1997 was both horizontal and vertical, as 
Congress challenged Bucaram spurred by street actions organised by the CONAIE 
and Pachakutik. Two challenges in 2000 (against Mahuad and Noboa) were also 
vertical challenges organised by the CONAIE, the same goes for the challenge against 
Gutiérrez in 2005. The CONAIE clearly participated in the coup against Mahuad, and 
attempted to form a new government after his ouster. In 2005 the organisation was 
weakened, but had a year earlier challenged president Gutiérrez, and was present in 
the continued challenges to the president. However, an analysis from a 
Latinobarómetro survey taken in August of 2005, showed that having indigenous 
mother tongue was a positive, and significant predictor of protest participation 
(Edwards 2009). The indigenous party Pachakutik also played a role in Congress by 
voting Gutiérrez out of office.  
 
Parties such as MAS in Bolivia, Pachakutik in Ecuador were very successful at the 
national level, and even in Venezuela and Colombia, where the indigenous population 
constitute a minuscule minority, did indigenous parties have moderate success (Van 
Cott 2005b: 175-211). While some of these parties clearly evoked a leftist rhetoric, 
                                                
230 Various indigenous movements merged and formed CONAIE in 1986 (see, http://www.conaie.org/).  
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they mobilised along ethnic lines, thereby waking up a latent cleavage of ethnic 
politics, which also merged with cleavages related to regional issues, in particular in 
Bolivia (Centellas 2009; Pape 2009). In Ecuador and Bolivia, the ethnic parties 
sprung out of movements in civil society that fought for indigenous (and peasant) 
democratic rights and other demands. While gaining representation in national 
congresses, the parties maintained their links to the effective organisations, putting 
double pressure on the rulers to meet their various demands. Prior to the latest 
democratic period, Latin American party systems have not been divided along ethnic 
lines (Coppedge 1998; Madrid 2005a), thus these movements manifested new 
cleavages. Therefore, the rise of ethnic parties has also contributed to an increase in 
party system fragmentation and electoral volatility in the region (Birnir and Van Cott 
2007; Madrid 2005a).231 A more fragmented party system of high volatility has 
generally been linked to problems of governability (Mainwaring 1993; Mainwaring 
and Scully 1995; Mainwaring and Zoco 2007; Wolinetz 2006). 
 
In Venezuela and Argentina no indigenous or clearly regional cleavages mobilised the 
people against Pérez and de la Rúa. Both countries, however, can be categorised as 
having labour-moblilising party systems in which the “labour” party implemented 
neo-liberal reforms (Roberts 2002).232 In both countries, challenges might be said to 
come from the left, but not the “left” constituted by the traditional AD in Venezuela 
or PJ in Argentina. In Venezuela, there were two coup-attempts in 1992, one of them 
led by the new “leftist” leader Hugo Chávez,233 in 1993 a vertical challenge not led by 
                                                
231 Aided by the rise of leftist parties since leftist parties generally have offered a larger number of 
electoral alternatives than the right (Coppedge 1997). 
232 The parties are of course, Acción Democrática in Venezuela, and Partido Justicialista in Argentina, 
the presidents are Carlos Andrés Pérez in Venezuela and Carlos Menem in Argentina.  
233 Chávez represents what some have dubbed the new and populist left (contrasted with an older and 
moderate left) (Castañeda 2006).  
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the traditional union CTV (linked to Pérez’s party AD) and the institutionally 
anchored impeachment attempt drove Carlos Andrés Pérez out of power. Before 1992 
there had been no challenges in Venezuela. The increase in vertical conflicts and 
challenges during Pérez’s presidency is not related to the principal union, the CTV. 
Even though the CTV lobbied and organised strikes against the neo-liberal reforms of 
the Pérez led administration (Ellner 2005), the CTV did not challenge Pérez. Other 
protesters participated in the Caracazo, and the increase in vertical conflicts and the 
intensity of vertical conflicts in Venezuela during Pérez’s presidency is not related to 
unions and strikes, but to new movements and related to demands of constitutional 
and democratic reforms in addition to the repudiation of violations of human rights 
(especially after the Caracazo) (López Maya and Lander 2005). Chávez became 
president in 1998 in Venezuela, and has since then incarnated a new cleavage in the 
country, which later led to two street-based vertical challenges in 2002/03, and 2004. 
These, however, were led by the traditional labour union CTV in an unholy alliance 
with the business organisation Fedecámaras, but the cleavage was new, and clearly 
strong enough to unite these two traditional opponents (Ellner 2005).  
 
In Argentina, there had been only one vertical challenge before the rise of the  
piquetero protests (Wolff 2007) and the challenges against de la Rúa in 2001. 
Alfonsín was challenged and removed early in 1989. The vertical challenge in 1989 
cannot be attributed to the traditional labour union CGT, but I have not registered that 
challenge as belonging to any particular cleavage or being organised by a particular 
organisation. In 2001, however, unemployed and disgruntled people organised the 
piquetero movement(-s), which mobilised against neo-liberal reforms, deteriorating 
living standards, and a deep economic crisis under de la Rúa, and later continued the 
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mobilisation against Duhalde in 2003, which forced him to resign early. Again, the 
union linked to the tradition “labour” party, in this case the CGT and the PJ, was not 
the principal actor in the challenges against president de la Rúa (or Alfonsín), but new 
movements mobilised in the wake of increasingly deteriorating socio-economic 
conditions.  
 
In Peru, although not related to a surge of a new left or indigenous cleavages, 
President Fujimori became the focus for the creation of a new cleavage in that country 
when he decided to run for a third electoral term in the election of 2000. The Peruvian 
party system had totally changed its nature after Fujimori came to power in 1990 and 
especially after the reconstitution of the regime in 1993 with a new constitution and 
the elections of 1995 (Levitsky 1999). The opposition in Peru united in support of 
Alejandro Toledo and his party Perú Posible, and after withdrawing from the second 
round in the presidential election, the movement against Fujimori organised the first 
vertical challenge against any president in Peru since democratisation in 1980. 
Fujimori as Chávez before him, became the focus for a new cleavage that mobilised a 
new party and organisations in civil society against the president.  
 
The vertical challenges and interruptions in Argentina, Bolivia, Ecuador, and 
Venezuela, constitute two thirds of the vertical challenges in Latin America recorded 
in my dataset from LAWR and nine of the 14 interruptions. Furthermore, only two 
vertical challenges (in Bolivia in 1984/85, and in Argentina 1989) occurred before the 
surge of new left or indigenous movements in these four countries. Furthermore, these 
new leftist and indigenous movements have played an important role in these 
challenges. It seems to me that there is a correlation between the so-called new left or 
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indigenous parties, and vertical challenges. Vertical challenges, which is the more 
important trigger for presidential interruptions, have accompanied the mobilisation of 
new groups representing new cleavages in a subset of countries in Latin America, and 
in all these countries presidencies have been interrupted. 
 
What about labour unions? The only case in which labour unions have played a major 
role, is in the case of the fall of Siles Zuazo. However, even in this case, their actions 
actually delayed the early election already called for (LAWR: 85-13). In the case of 
the fall of Alfonsín, the unions finally demanded the president’s resignation, but at 
that time Alfonsín had already decided to resign, and unions were not a protagonists 
in the lootings that made Alfonsín speed up even more the handing over of power to 
President-elect Menem. Traditional labour unions of course also played a role in 
Bolivia during the 2000s as well, but their role seemed to have been secondary to the 
one played by new movements and other cleavages than the tradition left-right 
cleavage. Finally, union-based challenges have been few and far between, and 
generally not been a threat to presidents.  
 
Thus, what is clear from a look at the challenges to presidents, is that the debate on 
participation in Latin American democracies, should focus more on distinguishing 
between distinct types of participation based on types of actors and cleavages that 
mobilise people. If not, two opposite trends (decrease in union actions, increase in 
mobilisation of new groups) will even each other out, and the answer to these 
questions will be flawed. This potentially explains why some scholars talk about the 
deterioration of civil society and democracy based on data on mobilisation (Kurtz 
2004), the deterioration of class-based cleavages due to neo-liberal policies (Roberts 
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2002), whereas others based on similar data focus on a re-mobilisation and potential 
deepening of participatory democracy (Arce 2008; Arce and Bellinger Jr. 2007; 
Hochstetler 2006). According to my data, both strands are correct. There is a decrease 
in traditional left-right labour union mobilisation, and an increase in conflicts or 
protests focused around new regional and ethnic cleavages that are organised by new 
organisations and movements in civil society. Only the latter, however, cause 
challenges and interruptions.  
 
Explaining the results 
The previous section argued first statistically that there is a positive relation between 
conflicts mobilised by regional and ethnic cleavages and challenges and interruption, 
and, secondly, provided some qualitative and descriptive data to support the statistical 
findings. This section aims to explain the results by providing some further qualified 
speculation on the matters at hand. Why does a rise in new cleavages, and new 
political organisations inside and outside political institutions linked to the new left 
(and not the old) and ethnically based parties and organisations, entail more 
challenges to presidents and presidential interruptions? I provide some tentative 
answers in the three parts that follow, and suggest more research into this and related 
questions. First, these new organisations operate outside the arenas of mediation 
between civil society and political institutions; second, they advocate a new view on 
democracy, emphasising a more direct form of political participation, and popular 
sovereignty as Coppedge (2003) argues for in the case of Venezuela; and third, since 
the groups in question are rather young, they lack the historical experience of 
exclusion and persecution under prior authoritarian spells that other political groups 
on the left to have experienced and learnt from.  
Chapter 6: The Underlying Causes of Presidential Interruptions 
   
220 
 
Arenas of mediation 
Unions have traditionally had access to certain arenas of mediation and intermediation 
with politicians and business leaders, through which they have been able to raise their 
demands for better pay, more job security, pensions, etc. This system, called 
corporatism (Schmitter 1974), clearly varies between countries, and this is clearly also 
true for Latin America as a region as well. Roberts (2002) and Murillo and Schrank 
(2005) differentiate between labour mobilising party systems and regimes, and 
populist or elitist party systems and regimes, and unions have clearly had different 
alliances with nominally leftist parties across the region (Murillo 2001). Furthermore, 
Roberts (2002) argues that neoliberalism has undermined the mediating role of the 
corporate channel, and eroded class based cleavages. The common goal of corporate 
systems, however, is to institutionalise inherent conflicts between different interests, 
organisations and stakeholders in society. Despite weakened unions, and the 
weakening of their channels of mediation, unions have had some access to these 
channels even after the introduction of neoliberalism, and labour rights have even 
improved in some countries in Latin America (Murillo and Schrank 2005: 975). Still, 
my data from LAWR demonstrate that union based conflicts is down (at least until 
2005), and that labour union mobilisation does not affect the likelihood of challenges 
or interruptions. New emerging actors, on the other hand, have increased their 
mobilisation according to my data.234 The new left in Venezuela, excluded from the 
                                                
234 The pattern I describe more in general about the decline of traditional union action on account of 
neoliberal reform, and the subsequent mobilisation of new social actors is also confirmed in a recent 
case-study of Bolivia (Haarstad and Andersson Forthcoming). The authors argue that it was the 
implementation of neoliberal reforms that actually created political space for indigenous communities, 
and politicised them. For more on the effect of neoliberal reforms on political practices in Bolivia, see 
Haarstad (2009). 
Chapter 6: The Underlying Causes of Presidential Interruptions 
   
221 
tight alliance between CTV and AD, is one example; Morales’s coca farmers,235 
excluded from mediating drug policy with the Bolivian governments, is another 
example; and CONAIE, the indigenous federation in Ecuador, did not enjoy any 
special status in terms of mediation regarding their demands on the government. 
Furthermore, the piquetero movement in Argentina was in part joined by disgruntled 
workers that had lost their jobs, and not connected to the traditional union CGT (or its 
later off-shots) in Argentina. Finally, the anti-Fujimori movements in Peru clearly did 
not enjoy access to the state, either.  
 
These were the main actors behind several of the presidential interruptions in these 
countries. Without access to a mediating arena, direct actions in the street seemed to 
be the rational action to take to make their varying demands heard, be that on anti-
drug policy, issues of ownership of national resources, economic support for 
unemployed, indigenous rights, or demands for democratisation. The level of street 
contention created by these groups through unorthodox actions such as cacerolazos, 
piquetes, road blocks, marches, hunger strikes, and so on, was thus more direct, and 
expressed demands that were harder to satisfy than those of traditional unions, which 
could be met with wage increases, be negotiated through corporative channels, or 
through the cooptation of union leaders by the leaders of business or government.236 
That these new groups and cleavages were excluded from (admittedly weak or 
weakening) arenas of mediation may have played a role in their decision to take direct 
actions to present both demands for political change, and to challenge their presidents.  
 
                                                
235 Though in Bolivia Felipe Quispe, the leader of MIP won control over the CSUTCB, which is a more 
traditional peasant union. 
236 Wolff (2007), however, argues that one weakness of the indigenous movement in Ecuador and the 
piquetero movement in Argentina is precisely that they have been easy to tame through clientelist 
integration or cooptation.  
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New visions of democracy 
Another potential explanatory factor is related to what Castañeda would call the 
“wrong” left (Castañeda 2006). The “new” left expresses different views on 
democracy and argues that the old democracy,237 and its actors (parties) and 
institutions (Congress, Supreme Court, Presidency and party system) have failed. 
Coppedge (2003) argues that Venezuelan democracy under Chávez has taken a turn 
from liberal democracy towards a model of popular sovereignty that clearly resembles 
the delegative model of democracy (O'Donnell 1994).238 Likewise in Bolivia and 
Ecuador, new leaders have argued for changing the political system totally, cleansing 
it of previous corrupt leaders and parties, and implementing new constitutions in order 
to reach those goals. The MAS, Evo Morales’s party, called for the elimination of old 
party practices, which involved the so-called “pacted democracy” in the country, and 
for a bigger role for movements in the political system (Gamarra 2008: 125-127, 134-
135). Rafael Correa after he came to power, although clearly not representing the 
CONAIE or the Pachakutik, went into direct confrontation with Congress to elect a 
new Congress and write a new Constitution. And CONAIE, through its participation 
in the coup against Jamil Mahuad, also demonstrated that its view of democracy was 
not that of a liberal democracy, but rather that of a direct democracy in which all 
actions are valid as long as there is a belief that a majority supports their actions. 
Correa in Ecuador, Morales in Bolivia, and Chávez in Venezuela, have passed new 
constitutions more to the liking of their political views.239 All three constitutions 
                                                
237 The new left would be constituted by self-proclaimed groups on the left that did not exist at the 
moment of democratisation. For instance Hugo Chávez’s MVR, Morales and Quispe’s parties, 
Pachakutik in Ecuador, etc. 
238 Coppedge (2003: 165) quotes Chávez on the following: “we will advance in the construction of a 
true democracy, of a true political, economic, and social system which we will build because they 
destroyed it during these last years...”. 
239 Accompanying this new view of democracy to replace the old, and in their view, failed model of 
democracy, is a new view of the economic order. While the falls of Siles Zuazo and Alfonsín in the 
eighties were the precursors of the neoliberal reforms and the movement away from the ISI (Import-
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include more forms of direct democracy, such as the recall of presidents. These 
reforms have also passed through referenda, often after referenda on the question of 
deciding to elect a Constituent Assembly or deciding on the need for a constitutional 
reform, a tool of direct democracy.240 Clearly these reforms have occurred after the 
fact, i.e. after the interruptions in the countries in question, but the reforms have been 
driven forward partly by the same actors that challenged the presidents in these 
countries in the past. 
 
Thus, the new social movements and parties representing new cleavages challenging 
the status quo outside old and weakened systems of mediation, also express a new 
form of democracy that is more direct, and reject the old and indirect form of 
democracy as well as the main protagonists of these old democracies. These groups in 
these three countries, in addition to the Argentine case of presidential interruptions 
(De la Rúa and to a certain degree also Duhalde) view the presidential interruptions as 
victories for a new time-order, and milestones on the route towards another type of 
democracy. Protesting and pushing to remove presidents is a natural form of political 
action if your view of democracy emphasises popular sovereignty as the most 
important criterion of democracy. It is therefore no surprise that within the leftist 
wave in Latin America, the countries in which new parties representing the “new” left 
have taken power, have experienced presidential interruptions. These are Venezuela, 
Ecuador and Bolivia. In other countries in which leftist parties have taken over power, 
such as Uruguay (Frente Amplio), Brazil (PT), Nicaragua (FSLN-Frente Sandinista 
                                                                                                                                      
Substitution Industrialisation) model, implemented by Paz Estenssoro and Carlos Menem, and possibly 
to a certain degree helped the initiation of these plans, the falls of de la Rúa, Sánchez de Lozada, Carlos 
Andrés Pérez, and Abdala Bucaram, Jamil Mahuad, and Lucio Gutiérrez were executed by the hands of 
groups seeking to reverse the neoliberal reforms, and to varying degrees have also done so. More on 
this in Chapter 7. 
240 In Ecuador the referendum has also been used earlier as many as four times in connection with 
interruptions and constitutional reform (Breuer 2008: 64).  
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de Liberación Nacional), Chile (PS and Concertación), there have been no 
interruptions. The exception to this pattern is Argentina, in which the PJ has changed 
from being a party for the workers with fascist leanings in the early days, to Menem 
jumping on neoliberalism, and finally towards a more leftist leaning under the 
Kirchners. And also to a certain extent Paraguay where President Lugo clearly 
representing a new “left” in that country, won the presidency in 2008. In Paraguay, 
however, challenges have been frequent since the fall of Cubas in 1999. 
 
Historical experiences 
One could expect that unions, given the increased economic inequality caused by 
neoliberalism and the weakening of the arenas of mediation, would come in more 
direct conflict with the political system. However, I believe there may be historical 
reasons for unions and the “traditional” left being more cautious in terms of 
destabilising presidents. In the Southern Cone breakdowns of the democratic regimes, 
caused the left, union and parties, to be persecuted, killed, arrested, and forced into 
exile. There was a clear political learning on the part of the left with regard to failed 
policies, and political tactics, and a clear notion of “never again” (see the edited 
volume, McCoy 2000). The left was also severely persecuted in other authoritarian 
regimes, Guatemala is one example, among several others. This history, I think may 
have made unions and traditional leftist parties less inclined to promote actions that 
could destabilise governments given that conflict-ridden presidents in the past was the 
precursor for the military to intervene as the poder moderador.   
 
The new groups emerging on the left, and indigenous groups, even though persecuted 
in the past, do not have that same inclination. These organisations did not exist under 
Chapter 6: The Underlying Causes of Presidential Interruptions 
   
225 
the previous authoritarian spells, and indigenous peoples may have been equally 
persecuted or ignored in previous democratic regimes, thus the memories of a contrast 
between democratic and authoritarian regimes in the past may be less pronounced. 
Furthermore, these groups continued to be ignored after the start of the latest 
democratic period, making them less inclined to support the current rules of the game. 
In the traditional left the organisational links and personal continuities from the last to 
the current democratic period is more pronounced. 
 
These factors are clearly only qualified speculation and provide only tentative 
answers to the patterns found in the analyses above, but evidence from surveys in 
Guatemala at least, indicate that there might be something to the variable historical 
experiences. Booth (2000: 79) reported that persons having experienced less political 
violence in the past, were more inclined than others to support political actions of 
civil obedience and confrontational tactics. If these results can be generalised, it can 
account for the difference in political strategies between new social movements and 
unions with longer political trajectories. Booth also found that the indigenous 
population to a significantly higher degree than the ladino population supported civil 
disobedience and confrontational tactics, and the indigenous population had a 
significantly higher fear of participating in traditional political activities such as 
running for office than the ladino population (Booth 2000: 76-77). A recent study of 
contentious political participation in Ecuador, also shows that people with indigenous 
mother tongue, and members of civil society organisations are more likely to engage 
in political protests (Edwards 2009). Again, if these results are valid for indigenous 
populations in other countries, these results support my argument above, and at least 
do not contradict the findings in this chapter.  
Chapter 6: The Underlying Causes of Presidential Interruptions 
   
226 
 
Conclusions 
This rather long chapter has aimed at finding the underlying, causes of presidential 
interruptions (and challenges to presidents). The first sections highlighted that causal 
analyses of presidential interruptions have so far been rather narrow in their focus and 
have studied the causal mechanisms or triggers of interruptions instead of the 
underlying causes of the phenomenon of interest. I linked the debate on presidential 
interruptions to causality in the social sciences in general, before I took on the 
statistical analysis. The statistical analyses demonstrated first, that in relation to the 
institutions vs. the streets debate as underlying causes vertical conflicts, or the level of 
contention in the streets do not cause interruptions, and that horizontal conflicts, or 
deadlocks, were positive and significant predictors of interruptions and to a lesser 
degree, challenges. Secondly, the statistical analyses showed that vertical conflicts 
mobilising on new cleavages related to regional and ethnic issues, or conflicts 
organised by new social movements and peasant unions, caused interruptions and 
challenges. I supplemented the findings in the statistical analyses with examples that 
these actors were important in the toppling of presidents as well as in creating vertical 
challenges in particular. Finally, the chapter ended with some qualified speculation as 
to why these new political movements representing new cleavages might be more 
inclined to attempt to remove presidents than for instance traditional labour unions. I 
argued that there could be three explanations for the pattern discovered in this 
chapter. The first reason was that new political actors have less access to established, 
albeit weakened, arenas of mediation in the countries where they emerged. Secondly, 
I argued that their view of democracy was in line with more confrontational actions 
and direct democracy, and that attempting to remove presidents within this view, 
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clearly could be defended democratically. Thirdly, I argued that the different 
historical experiences between the “old” left and the unions on the one hand, and new 
political movements on the other, could make unions and the “old” left less inclined 
to take actions that could destabilise the current presidents, whereas for the new 
political actors the memories of past failures of democracy would not be that 
pronounced.  
 
This chapter thus demonstrated that only some vertical conflicts as underlying causes 
matter for challenges and interruptions, after controlling for other factors. The vertical 
conflicts that matter are those mobilised by new cleavages and are organised by new 
political actors operating at least just as much outside as within political institutions.  
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Introduction241 
Are all presidential interruptions equal in terms of causes and outcomes? Do 
presidential interruptions differ in any systematic manner? These are central questions 
to be raised in this chapter that mostly focuses on outcomes of presidential 
interruptions in Latin America. The literature on presidential interruptions in Latin 
America has basically treated the phenomenon as being the same across all cases of 
premature exits of presidents in the region, and with the exception of the latter part of 
Chapter 3, this dissertation has done the same. Treating all cases of presidential 
interruptions as the same value on the dependent variable makes sense in many 
circumstances. For one, it facilitates statistical and causal analysis, using e.g. 
presidents’ completed terms in office as a control group. Secondly, it facilitates 
comparisons of this new form of executive instability with previous forms of 
instability in the region, such as democratic breakdowns. The same arguments are 
valid for treating all interruptions as equal when interruptions are treated as an 
independent variable.  
 
All cases of interruptions are caused by popular and/or elite opposition to actions 
taken by a president and the administration. Yet, analysing the cases of presidential 
interruptions, one is struck by the great internal variation among the cases both in 
terms of what caused the presidential challenge in each case, and in terms of the 
different aftermaths or outcomes of the presidential interruptions. While the analyses 
using the statistical approach have taught us a great deal about the phenomenon in 
question, other approaches may be complementary and even make important 
contributions to the two most prominent debates regarding presidential interruptions 
                                                
241 Parts of this chapter was presented as a paper at the 2009 meeting of the American Political Science 
Association in Toronto, Canada, September 3-6, 2009.  
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in Latin America. In the first debate presidential interruptions operate as a dependent 
variable: Whether institutions or actors in the “streets” are more important for causing 
the early exits of elected presidents. In Chapter 5 I found that the streets were more 
important as triggers, whereas in Chapter 6 I found that institutions were more 
important as underlying causes of interruptions. In this chapter I discuss why the 
streets (in general) are more important in some cases, and other arenas in other cases. 
In the second debate, presidential interruptions operate as an independent variable. 
This debate discusses whether presidential interruptions entail positive or negative 
implications for presidential democracy, and related to this, whether or not 
presidential interruptions solve the ongoing crisis of the political system at the time. 
Analyses treating all cases of interruptions as being the same provide answers of the 
average effect of causal factors on presidential interruptions, and the average effect of 
presidential interruptions on a set of dependent variables. However, to properly 
address these questions, a differentiation between presidential interruptions may be 
called for in addition to the approach I have used above. 
 
The goal of this chapter is to map the cases of interruptions, explore and systematise 
the differences between the cases in order to address the two debates mentioned 
above. Taking as point of departure the actors’ motivation or reasons for an 
oppositional reaction that challenges the president, I argue that presidential 
interruptions in Latin America fall into basically one of three types. One type of 
interruption is the personal presidential scandals: presidents removed due to reactions 
against a president’s illegal behaviour. Another type of presidential interruptions is 
linked to reactions against a president’s behaviour that constitutes a breach of the 
constitutional order, and core democratic principles. A third type of presidential 
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interruptions is related to the public reactions to policy-issues, and a president’s 
policy decisions, rather than illegal or anti-democratic behaviour. These three types of 
presidential interruptions also entail three different paths during and after the 
interruption. First of all, the importance of different actors varies across the types of 
interruption. Second, whereas others have found few discernable implications of 
presidential interruptions, I argue that the consequences depend on the type of 
interruption.  
 
The chapter proceeds as follows: first, I discuss typologies in relation to the topic of 
presidential interruptions in Latin America. Second, I present why and how I code the 
cases according to the opposition’s motivation for challenging the president. Third, I 
analyse the cases with a special focus on the implications of the interruptions, but also 
on the central actors challenging the president. Fourth, I summarise my analysis and 
ask whether this inductive grouping of the cases of interruptions can be seen as a 
potential typology of presidential interruptions.  
 
The lack of answers in two debates: Who challenges? What 
are the outcomes? 
A presidential interruption is defined by a premature, extraordinary and forced exit of 
an elected president that does not lead to a democratic breakdown (see Chapter 2), 
and all cases satisfy this definition. With the sole exception of the fall of Balaguer in 
the Dominican Republic, the interruptions also have in common that they are 
triggered by vertical or horizontal challenges to a president’s actions or inactions. 
According to my definition, fourteen cases qualify as presidential interruptions since 
the start of the Third Wave in Latin America (see table 1-1 in the Introduction).  
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An important part of concept-formation and typologies is to relate the phenomenon at 
hand to other, similar phenomena (Collier, La Porte, and Seawright nd), this was the 
goal of chapter 3 in this dissertation (see also, Carey 2005; Marsteintredet and 
Berntzen 2008; Mustapic 2005; Pérez-Liñán 2007: 61; 2008). In that chapter I 
compared presidential interruptions with democratic breakdowns, and parliamentary 
changes of government, and made some procedural distinctions between types of 
interruption. The procedures chosen at the point of a president’s early exit, however, 
might be fortuitous, and procedures do not seem to be the crucial distinguishing factor 
between the cases of interruption.242 Another strategy has been to move up the ladder 
of abstraction and explain which cases of inter-institutional conflict the president 
seems to win, and which the military, congress or the supreme court seem to win 
(Pérez-Liñán 2005; Helmke 2007).  
 
Despite these distinctions, the literature generally treats presidential interruptions as 
sharing the same value on the dependent variable, and few have offered systematic 
analyses of the variation among the cases of interruption.243 The reason is that the 
cases studied all satisfy the definition given above, and that treating them all equally 
facilitates causal analyses. A further distinction among subtypes of presidential 
interruption would, given the relatively few instances of the phenomenon, make 
comparative statistical analyses at the macro level, very difficult.  
 
                                                
242 The procedures of interruption are important, however, when used to analyse the validity of Linz’s 
and Valenzuela’s argument on presidentialism as the above-cited authors do. The international 
reactions to the removal of Manuel Zelaya in Honduras also indicate the importance of procedures. A 
military removal and forced exile of a president in pyjamas, seems to draw the line between what the 
international community defines as an interruption and a coup.  
243 A caveat here is made for the work of Pérez-Liñán who mainly studies a subgroup of presidential 
interruptions, the presidential scandals, and includes analyses that point to different pathways to 
presidential interruptions. These, however, are not fully explored in his analysis. 
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The greater debate in terms of causes has been whether or not it is the challenges from 
the “streets” or institutions that are to blame for a president’s early exit (see Chapters 
5 and 6, Valenzuela 2004; Hochstetler 2006; Negretto 2006; Morgenstern, Negri, and 
Pérez-Liñán 2008; Pérez-Liñán 2008; Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich 
Forthcoming 2010), a debate centred around Linz’s (1990; 1994) contributions on the 
perils of presidentialism. In an effort to analyse the merits of the institutions vs. the 
streets, I found it useful to distinguish between triggering and underlying causes of 
interruption (see Chapters 5 and 6). This distinction has not been made in the 
literature, and might be one of the reasons for the disagreements in the debate. In this 
chapter, however, I compare only the cases of interruption and look at the relative 
importance of horizontal and vertical challenges in interrupting the president and 
explain why this varies systematically across cases.  
 
In terms of the consequences and outcomes of presidential interruptions, less is 
known, but a debate about the desirability and implications of presidential 
interruptions has, nevertheless, ensued. Analysing presidential interruptions through 
the lenses of the perils of presidentialism, Valenzuela (2004) clearly sees presidential 
interruptions as a problem for presidential democracies. Others have argued the 
opposite, namely that presidential interruptions seem to counter the perils of 
presidentialism since the regimes in question have managed to find salidas to serious 
political conflicts (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008). Distinguishing between the 
above-mentioned pessimistic and optimistic views of presidential interruptions, 
Hochstetler and Samuels (Forthcoming) argue that the consequences are few, and 
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reequilibration seems to be the trend.244 Finally, others focus on a strengthened 
congress vis-à-vis the presidency (Pérez-Liñán 2005), and that presidential 
interruptions may increase the levels of both horizontal and vertical accountability 
(Marsteintredet 2008b).  
 
The above-cited comparative analyses do not distinguish between the cases of 
presidential interruptions, i.e. all units are considered identical. Furthermore, the 
comparative analyses all assume causal homogeneity, i.e. that the explanatory 
variables have the same effect on the dependent variable across all cases or across 
units of time.245 If, however, one can identify different causal patterns among 
subgroups, or subtypes of the phenomenon to be explained, the effect of assuming 
causal homogeneity is that these systematic differences are averaged out, and the 
results may be misleading, and biased. This, I claim, may be a problem that is 
particularly relevant for the two debates mentioned above. Furthermore given the few 
cases of interruptions in Latin America, as I mentioned in relation to my own 
statistical analysis in the previous chapter, caution is warranted when using statistical 
techniques, since any misspecification and errors may seriously affect the analysis.  
 
Variation between presidential interruptions in Latin America 
Even though all cases satisfy the definition of the phenomenon, a cursory review 
makes it clear that there is great variation between the cases of presidential 
interruption. In the cases of presidents Alfonsín in Argentina, Bucaram in Ecuador, 
and Sánchez de Lozada in Bolivia, vertical conflicts and challenges are factors 
                                                
244 This is maybe not surprising since reequilibration of democratic regimes is part of the definition of 
the concept of presidential interruptions, while similar phenomena such as coups that end democracy 
are excluded from the concept.  
245 For a discussion and definitions of causal homogeneity in the social sciences, see the Brady and 
Collier vs. KKV debate (Brady and Collier 2004; King et al. 1994).  
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difficult to ignore. However, in the case of Balaguer there were no vertical or 
horizontal challenges or conflicts (Marsteintredet Forthcoming 2010), and in the case 
of Fujimori the greatest vertical challenge and demonstration against the president 
occurred in late July (La marcha de los cuatro suyos) (LAWR: 00-30), while Fujimori 
fled to Japan months later in November 2000 (shortly after having lost the majority in 
Congress). In Guatemala in 1993 business elites and international pressure seem to 
have been just as important as pressure in the streets and congress in the ouster of 
presidents Serrano and Espina. Likewise, in terms of the outcomes of presidential 
interruptions, the variation is equally clear. The impeachment of President Cubas was 
interpreted as an important step in the democratisation of Paraguay (Abente-Brun 
1999), and Schamis (2002) argues that the military absence during the crisis in 
Argentina in 2001-02 was an important step in that country’s consolidation of 
democracy. Few would argue that the early exits of presidents such as Fujimori and 
Balaguer harmed democratic regime development in Peru and Dominican Republic, 
respectively. On the other hand, recent military actions in Honduras against President 
Zelaya, and the coup that removed president Jamil Mahuad in Ecuador, clearly 
suggest that the implications of presidential interruptions vary from case to case. 
More indirectly, presidential interruptions have also been linked to concepts such as 
crisis of democratic representation (Mainwaring et al. 2006), and democratic erosion 
(Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005a). Another interesting variation across cases is 
that some interruptions are followed by more challenges, crises and interruptions 
(Ecuador, Bolivia), whereas after other interruptions, street or congressional 
opposition die out, and the interruption seems to be an isolated event (e.g. Dominican 
Republic, Brazil). That there is variation across cases is therefore beyond doubt. The 
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questions I raise, however, is whether these variations are systematic, and how one 
can explain the variation. 
 
Constructing types of presidential interruptions 
Presidential interruptions are opposition-driven processes; therefore I believe that in 
order to investigate the implications and consequences of interruptions, it is important 
to link these with the main causes of the opposition to the presidents in question. I 
argue for this approach in Chapter two. The mobilisation of a challenge to a president 
is motivated by a reaction to some sort of presidential behaviour, which the 
opposition argues qualifies the demands for the president’s ouster and a change in the 
status quo. As such, I understand presidential interruptions as corrective measures 
that, first and foremost, aim to end some type of unwanted behaviour and/or hold 
someone accountable for that behaviour.246 Therefore the theoretical expectations in 
terms of implications and consequences for the presidential regimes in question, are 
related to the motivation of the interruption. In other words, by extension, if one 
accepts that an opposition’s motivation at least is remotely related to one or more of 
the main causes of the interruption, then the outcomes are linked to the causes of 
interruptions.  
 
In the following I therefore group the cases of interruption based on the type of 
presidential behaviour that first motivated the opposition to demand the president’s 
ouster.247 I also hasten to add, that I code the cases not based on mere causality, but 
on what has been registered in LAWR as the opposition’s principal motivation for 
                                                
246 Another way to put this would be to use the lingo of path dependent scholars. In that sense, a 
presidential interruption is the result of a reactive sequence set in motion by an antecedent event, for 
instance a scandal. See Mahoney (2000).  
247 See Table 5-3 in Chapter 5 for a similar distinction between the cases of interruption.  
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seeking the president’s removal. From an inductive analysis of the similarities and 
differences in the principal motivation of the presidential challenge (Table 7-1), I 
group the cases of interruption into types (Table 7-2). The reason for this approach is 
that I believe that what is used as motivation or arguments for removing a president, 
is important for how an interruption “pans out”, and what the consequences are. 
Furthermore, given the fact that the presidential interruptions are the results of a 
complex set of causes, a clear-cut coding based on notions of the “most important” 
cause, or the single triggering, or underlying, cause, would be difficult to defend.  
 
As mentioned above, causes of interruption may be described as a perfect storm of a 
variety of factors,248 and in many cases there is a variety of motivating factors for 
challenging a president. I will discuss the consequences of this in terms of fuzzy cases 
and mixed members below. Nevertheless, to code the cases of interruption into types 
of interruption, I insist on a simplifying rule that codes interruptions according to the 
first registered challenge, for four reasons. First of all, a clear rule makes 
discriminating between cases easier. By focusing on the first registered challenge in 
LAWR that can be connected to the removal of the president, coding becomes clearer, 
and I can refer to a clear source for the coding, which is also replicable, and verifiable 
(see Table 7-1). This does not deny the fact that there are clearly mixed members of 
the types of interruption, and within-type variation.249 Second, it makes sense to focus 
on the opposition’s motivation for the first challenge. In the cases of interruption, the 
first challenge to the president has often started a chain of factors (“the perfect 
storm”) that further destabilised the president and the administration. Therefore, the 
subsequent factors that later became additional motivations for the opposition to 
                                                
248 The term “perfect storm” is coined by Mejía Acosta and Polga-Hecimovich (Forthcoming 2010). 
249 As George and Bennett (2005: 238, n.11) remind us, unless types are so finely grained that there is 
one type for each case, there will always be variation at some level even within types.  
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challenge the president, may be endogenous to the process of presidential 
interruption, and be caused in turn by the process started by the first serious challenge 
to the president in question. Third, even though some cases are fuzzy members, one 
could argue that even according to that logic, a case would often be more a member of 
one type than of another (Ragin 2000).250 In my view, the first challenge towards a 
president is the one that has most weight in defining the membership of a case, and 
therefore categorises cases within one type, even cases with mixed membership. The 
first challenge, as I argue at the end of Chapter 2, is important for the causal path that 
interruptions take. Finally, a challenge to all coding of qualitative phenomena is to 
make objective rules to avoid doubts about the coding. A clear rule involving the first 
challenge to the president reported in LAWR, is as transparent, replicable, and 
objective a rule as can be made in terms of distinguishing between qualitative types of 
a phenomenon.  
 
                                                
250 Only in the case in which membership gets the score 0.5 would a case not belong more to one type 
than another. I will, however, not quantify fuzzy or mixed memberships here, only admit that several of 
my cases are mixed members of several types of interruption. 
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Table 7-1: Coding and Sources for types of Presidential Interruptions 
President First challenge Issues Source 
Siles Zuazo Strike (COB) and congress, 
vertical and horizontal 
Economic policies, hyperinflation LAWR 
84-45 
Raúl Alfonsín Looting in the streets, vertical Economy, hyperinflation LAWR 
89-22 
Collor de Melo Threat of impeachment, 
horizontal 
Campaign financing scandal LAWR 
92-25 
Carlos Andrés 
Pérez 
Street demonstrations, 
cacerolazos, vertical 
Economy, against neoliberal reforms 
and new cabinet, then exchange 
scandal 
LAWR 
92-12,  
92-47 
Jorge Serrano Street demonstrations, USA, 
OAS, CACIF 
Against autogolpe LAWR 
93-22 
Joaquín 
Balaguer 
USA, PRD announced 
demands 
Against electoral fraud LAWR 
94-27 
Abdalá 
Bucaram 
Street protests, strikes, 
opposition in Congress, 
vertical and horizontal 
Economy, against austerity 
programme, price hikes 
LAWR 
97-05 
Raúl Cubas Congressional impeachment 
attempt(-s), horizontal 
Release of General Oviedo (later 
murder of VP Argaña) 
LAWR 
98-33,  
99-07 
Jamil Mahuad FP organised, protests, vertical Economy: New tax measures (later 
also dollarisation of economy) 
LAWR 
99-45 
Alberto 
Fujimori 
Street demonstration, vertical Rejection of Fujimori’s electoral 
mandate 
LAWR 
00-30 
Fernando de la 
Rúa 
Street protests, lootings, 
cacerolazos, vertical 
Economy, IMF, bank deposit freeze  LAWR 
02-01 
Gonzalo 
Sánchez de 
Lozada 
Peasant protest, roadblocks, 
and strike, vertical 
Policy: First budget, tax shock, then 
to stop gas export to the USA 
LAWR 
03-07,  
03-38 
Lucio 
Gutiérrez 
Demonstrations and 
impeachment attempts, 
vertical and horizontal 
Policy: First economy, IMF deal, 
social policies, then Supreme Court 
removal, return of Bucaram. 
LAWR 
04-01, 
05/14 
Carlos Mesa Peasant protests, roadblocks, 
autonomist protest, vertical 
Policy: New hydrocarbon law LAWR 
05-21 
Notes: FP: Frente Patriótico, OAS: Organisation of American States, CACIF: Comité Coordinador de 
Asociaciones Agrícolas, Comerciales, Industriales y Financieras, PRD: Partido Revolucionario 
Dominicano, COB: Central Obrero Boliviano, IMF: International Monetary Fund. Source: Latin 
American Weekly Report, referenced as year-number. Other sources cited in the text below validate the 
coding based on LAWR. See also the Appendix to Chapter 5 for further references and analyses. 
 
Based on empirical evidence of what initially motivated the oppositional reaction to 
the president and its demands for the presidents early exit (see Table 7-1, above), 
presidential interruptions in Latin America fall into three types: 1) Presidential 
scandals, that is media-exposed scandals involving the president, the president’s 
administration and/or party, or close family members or advisors (Pérez-Liñán 2007: 
65); 2) A president’s violation of the democratic order. Since violations of civil 
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liberties and human rights often occur in several of the regimes being studied here, the 
focus is on violations of the core democratic principles of contestation and 
participation (Dahl 1971); 3) A president’s policy decisions, in which challenges 
initially are based on disagreements or disgruntlement with an administration’s 
current policies.  
 
These three criteria also correspond roughly to three of the five underlying causes 
depicted in the causal model of presidential interruptions presented in chapter two 
(Figure 2-3): Scandals, economic and policy performance, and level of democracy.251 
The types created on the basis of my coding rule above, and the typology that follows 
are intended to discover distinct causal paths, and outcomes (George and Bennett 
2005: 262).  
 
Three types of interruptions and their cases 
In the discussion of the cases my focus is on two questions. Which actors were the 
driving forces behind the presidential interruptions in each case (and why)? And, 
more importantly, what were the outcomes or implications of the presidential 
interruptions (and why)? I believe the answers to these two queries depend on the 
type of interruption. First, however, the cases are organised according to types in 
Table 7-2, following the rules laid out above, and the definition of first challenges 
presented in Table 7-1. Below, I argue briefly for the categorisation of the cases, 
discuss fuzzy cases and whether there should only be two types of interruption instead 
of three. 
                                                
251 I exclude the institutional factor of minority governments since this is a factor that is common to 
almost all interruptions (Valenzuela 2004), and therefore does not distinguish between the cases, and 
the variable of the mobilisation of new cleavages since this is a factor that does not involve a 
president’s actions, but rather who challenges.  
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Table 7-2: Cases and types of presidential interruption in Latin America 
Presidential scandals Democratic violations 
Collor de Melo, Brazil, 1992 Jorge Serrano, Guatemala, 1993 
Raúl Cubas, Paraguay, 1999 Joaquín Balaguer, Dominican Republic, 1994/96 
 Alberto Fujimori, Peru, 2000 
  
Policy interruptions 
Siles Zuazo, Bolivia, 1984/85 Fernando de la Rúa, Argentina, 2001 
Raúl Alfonsín, Argentina, 1989 Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada, Bolivia, 2003 
Carlos Andrés Pérez, Venezuela, 1993 Lucio Gutiérrez, Ecuador, 2005 
Abdala Bucaram, Ecuador, 1997 Carlos Mesa, Bolivia, 2005 
Jamil Mahuad, Ecuador, 2000  
Notes: Based on Table 7-1.  
 
The placement of most of the cases above based on the motivation for the first 
challenge to the presidents in question, should be uncontroversial, and adds some 
degree of construct validity to my coding rules (Adcock and Collier 2001: 542-543). 
Some cases, however, are fuzzy or mixed-members, and will merit some discussion. 
The two presidential scandals are relatively straightforward. In the case of Collor de 
Melo in Brazil, popular reactions and the impeachment were beyond doubt motivated 
by the corruption scheme involving the president and his campaign manager (Cheibub 
Figuereido Forthcoming 2010; Weyland 1993).252 The case of Cubas in Paraguay is 
somewhat less clear, congress having attempted to remove Cubas at an earlier stage 
(LAWR: 98-33). As such the impeachment trial following the murder of Vice-
President Argaña was not the first attempt at his removal. However, the prior attempt 
to remove the president was also motivated by an abuse, or scandal: the release of 
                                                
252 It can also be argued that the case of Collor is just as much a case of policy-interruption and failure, 
and that the discontentment with hyperinflation also inflated the reactions against Collor after the 
exposé of Collorgate. Inflation was between 400% and 2,700% yearly in the period 1990-1992. The 
year of Collor’s impeachment, inflation reached 900% (WDI 2008). In other words, had his Collor-
plans been successful in combating hyperinflation, Collor might have survived the Collorgate. I do not 
argue against that. The case of Collor is indeed a mixed member of a scandal and a policy-interruption. 
However, given my coding rules, the case is clearly a case of a scandal. Hyperinflation undoubtedly 
undermined support for Collor, and affected his legislative shield, but the monthly level of inflation 
was stable around 20-25% from October 1991 (CEPAL 2008), and despite some short-lived successes 
of controlling inflation, Collor had fought the issue of inflation since taking power in 1990. The first 
challenge to Collor, however, only came after the exposé of Collorgate. Furthermore, inflation is not 
found to be a significant predictor of presidential interruption in the statistical analyses in Chapters 3 
and 6. 
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former coup maker General Oviedo. One could also argue that the case of Cubas 
should rather be a case of democratic violation than a case of a scandal given the fact 
that the President released a former coup-maker, and was considered responsible for 
the killing of his own Vice-President. Despite the fact that the survival of the 
democratic regime clearly was at stake in Paraguay in 1998-99, I focus on violations 
of the core democratic principles of contestation and participation, and therefore the 
case of Cubas is considered a scandal and not a violation of democratic principles. 
However, this case also shows that interruptions that take the form of either 
presidential scandals or violations of democratic principles, may be hard to 
distinguish. I discuss this further below. The most surprising within this type of 
interruptions is probably that Venezuela is not in the category. I return to this below.  
 
There are three cases of presidents interrupted due to opposition generated by a 
president’s violation of core democratic principles. They have further in common that 
the presidents attempted to illegally and undemocratically extend their terms as 
presidents, and that these actions created opposition both within and outside the 
regimes in question. Fujimori got the Supreme Court to agree on a dubious 
interpretation of the Constitution, which allowed him to run for a third term in 2000. 
The election was then organised in a manner that did not satisfy democratic standards 
(OAS 2000). Protests ensued in July against the stealing of the election. And, when 
the corruption scandal later burst, Fujimori fled to Japan. Occurring prior to the 
exposé of the scandal involving the Vladivideos the violation of the democratic order 
started the chain of factors leading to his demise. Thus the opposition and the 
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challenges to Fujimori were motivated by demands to restore democracy.253 But 
clearly the case of Fujimori is, as the case of Cubas, another case of fuzzy 
membership between the types of scandals and democratic violations. The case of 
Serrano is more clear-cut. The autogolpe organised on May 25, 1993, was a clear 
authoritarian move that started the protests against his actions, and the demands for 
his ouster. In the case of Balaguer, the fraudulent elections in May 1994, which gave 
him four more years in power, led to the partisan protests and international pressure 
and mediation that shortened his term by two years.  
 
The cases of policy interruptions all have in common that the protests leading to the 
interruptions of these presidents were motivated by policy demands in addition to 
demands for the removal of the president. The most surprising case in this category is 
probably the case of Carlos Andrés Pérez. He fell as a result of an impeachment after 
taking personal advantage of the exchange system RECADI just before his new 
policies abolished it. Before this scandal burst in November of 1992, Congress had 
attempted to remove Pérez several times, he had survived two coup attempts, and 
protests in the streets had demanded reversals of his neo-liberal reforms in addition to 
Pérez’s ouster. Thus the protests and challenges initially included political demands 
that turned into demands for the removal of the president. The scandal and 
impeachment were not the first in a chain of attacks on the president, rather their 
culmination. The RECADI-scandal, and the subsequent horizontal challenges, 
however, clearly contributed greatly to the ouster of President Pérez. The exposure of 
the scandal, however, may have been provoked by the president’s unpopularity due to 
                                                
253 The Vladivideos was also a scandal of a different nature than in Brazil, as it exposed the corrupt 
nature of the regime created by Fujimori and his close collaborators and not only exposed the president 
as being corrupt. For a discussion of regime causes vs. the Vladivideos in the case of Fujimori’s fall in 
2000, see Cameron (2006) and McClintock (2006).  
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Pérez’s policy decisions, and as such be endogenous to the initial policy-related 
challenges to the president since the exposé of the scandal occurred after the initial 
demands for the president’s removal. In the two Argentine cases political demands 
and protests against failed economic policies led to the early exits of Presidents 
Alfonsín in 1989 and de la Rúa in 2001. In the case of President Siles Zuazo in 
Bolivia, the pressure outside Congress from the unions was clearly politically 
motivated, since the COB pressured the president for equal representation on the 
board of state industries, and also demanded half of the posts in the administration. 
Parties to the right of Siles’s administration (and within Siles’s administration) fought 
every concession Siles ceded to the unions. For Gonzalo Sánchez de Lozada the 
demands for his ouster first began with protests against tax hikes in the budget, and 
continued with other policy issues such as the gas war that ensued after the 
president’s decision to export gas through Chilean ports, the economic programme in 
general and the coca eradication programme in particular. For Carlos Mesa, the same 
political problems continued, and although he attempted to appease the opposition, it 
was not enough to survive the full term. The Ecuadorean cases follow a similar 
pattern, and even though Bucaram was the “crazy” president, and was immersed in 
scandalous behaviour (Pérez-Liñán 2007), it was a political protest against his new 
economic policies involving price hikes that toppled him on February 5, 1997. 
Mahuad also fell as a result of contested economic policies, and particularly the 
reaction against the new economic measures taken in January 2000. Gutiérrez, on the 
other hand, seemed to be doomed from the day that he betrayed his partner, 
Pachakutik, and his promises of new policies, and instead decided to follow a more 
neoliberal path. Towards the end of his presidency the democratic regime was at 
stake, and even right after being elected Gutiérrez’s presidency was tainted by a 
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campaign financing scandal. Nevertheless the first demands for his ouster were 
motivated by policy decisions, in particular reactions against the president’s economic 
policies.  
 
The presidential scandals 
Both in Brazil and in Paraguay the actors driving the impeachment procedures were 
elites in congress, but actions in congress were supported by popular pressure in the 
streets. The vertical challenges against Presidents Collor de Melo and Cubas were 
rather concentrated in time, and began after congress had started moving along the 
impeachment procedures against the presidents. In Paraguay, the vertical challenges 
appeared as an instant reaction to the murder of Argaña, but Congress had at that time 
already worked on several impeachment attempts against Cubas, and in Brazil the 
commission inquiring into the Collorgate case was already at work when the first 
vertical challenge against Collor appeared.  
 
In terms of consequences, the street protests were short and concentrated before the 
impeachments, and died out instantly after the impeachments. The goal of the protests 
had been reached, the oppositions’ battle had been won, and there were no longer any 
reasons to continue the protests in either country. Whereas street protests were 
concentrated around the impeachment proceedings in congress, a more long-lasting 
consequence for the presidential democracies in question may be increased levels of 
horizontal controls over the presidency. This has been clearly stated by observers of 
the Brazilian case (Cheibub Figuereido Forthcoming 2010; Stokes 2001), despite dim 
early evaluations of the fall of Collor de Melo (Weyland 1993). Given the fact that the 
case of Collor indeed could be understood as a mixed-member case between a scandal 
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and a policy interruption, one might expect changes in the policy arena as well. There 
is indeed a short reversal towards more statist solutions after the impeachment of 
Collor (Weyland 2002: 210), which supports a placement of the case as a policy 
interrupution, but it is the continuation or moderate changes of Collor’s market 
reforms both under Franco and Cardoso that best describe the developments after 
Collor (Weyland 2002: 135; Stokes 2001: 14). The changes in Brazil are of a different 
nature than the ones following after policy interruptions, and as Weyland (2002: 135) 
argues: “...while failing politically, Collor did help to reshape Brazil’s economic 
agenda irreversebly”.
254
 In Paraguay, all presidents since Cubas have been 
challenged by congress on account of what can be defined as scandalous presidential 
behaviour. In Brazil congress has investigated cases of corruption involving both 
successors to Collor or their close collaborators. Thus, congress seems to have 
strengthened its role vis-à-vis the president as a result of the successful impeachments 
in these two countries. Interruptions motivated by presidential scandals, however, do 
not entail implications for presidentialism as a regime type, or for the regime’s level 
of democracy.  
 
Presidents violating core democratic principles 
If a president violates the democratic rules of the game, either the president leaves 
power (the case of Serrano), or democracy ends (the case of Fujimori). As with 
scandals, the main actors operating to remove the president are elites, supported by 
popular pressure. What is interesting to note, however, is the much greater 
involvement by international actors than in other types of presidential interruptions, 
particularly in pressing for a solution that involves the removal of the president. The 
                                                
254 The most important difference between the economic policies before and after Collor, is that while 
Collor failed to control hyperinflation, Cardoso succeeded.  
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type of interruption in question explains their participation in these crises. With 
democracy as the most dominant game in the Latin American town, the end of the 
cold war, resolution 1080 of the OAS, international actors make their voices heard 
when democracies are in peril (Mainwaring and Pérez-Liñán 2005a). The already 
very precarious democratic regimes were in peril in Guatemala, Dominican Republic, 
and Peru prior to the interruptions in these countries. In Guatemala, international 
reactions were swift and clear against Serrano’s autogolpe,255 helping and convincing 
national actors to stand firm against Serrano, and convincing notorious anti-
democratic actors such as the CACIF and the army to oppose Serrano’s move (Booth 
2000; Villagrán de León 1993).256 In the Dominican Republic the US and the OAS 
were the most important factors explaining Balaguer’s early exit through a 
constitutional deal with the opposition (Graham 2008; Marsteintredet Forthcoming 
2010; Hartlyn 1998). Without this pressure, Balaguer would surely have stayed on as 
president until 1998. In Peru, the OAS were present in the country to negotiate 
between Fujimori and the opposition after the opposition-boycotted elections, and the 
U.S. had increased its pressure for democratic reforms prior to the elections in 2000 
(Palmer 2006: 237), but international actors played a minor role compared to the 
cases of Serrano and Balaguer. However, the international presence and pressure was 
probably more important in Peru than in the cases of other types of interruption.  
 
                                                
255 For a detailed list of international reactions to Serrano’s coup, see INCEP (1993).  
256 Serrano not only misread the internal situation in the country (he believed he had strong support for 
his moves), but also the different situation of Guatemala and Peru. Guatemala, a much smaller country 
than Peru, and much closer to the USA, was in a relatively speaking, much weaker position to end 
democracy than as Peru a year earlier. The increased linkage and leverage the USA had with 
Guatemala compared to Peru (Levitsky and Way 2006), probably also played an important role. 
However, judging so far by the case of Zelaya’s ouster in Honduras, linkage and leverage seem to be 
more effective when elites are split on the matter of contention. In Honduras, the elites have so far 
remained united in opposition to Zelaya and the international pressure.  
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One might argue against this type that there was indeed international presence in other 
interruptions as well. Granted, in Paraguay in 1999, Brazil and Mercosur negotiated to 
prevent a further escalation of the crisis in the country, but only after the murder of 
Argaña and Congress’s subsequent initiation of impeachment proceedings against 
President Cubas. The same can be observed in the case of Gonzálo Sánchez de 
Lozada, in which Argentina and Brazil intervened to secure a “peaceful solution” 
after he had been challenged in the streets, and the security forces’ killing of 
demonstrators had made the situation spiral out of control (LAWR: 03-41). In this 
way, neighbouring countries have facilitated peaceful solutions by offering asylum for 
ousted presidents also in other cases.257 The diplomatic solution in Paraguay was to 
offer Cubas asylum in Brazil, and in Bolivia to facilitate Sánchez de Lozada’s exit out 
of the country. In the cases of Serrano and Balaguer, on the other hand, USA and the 
OAS demanded the presidents’ ouster,258 and even in the case of Peru the OAS and 
the USA demanded reforms after Fujimori’s “election” in 2000, and made unveiled 
threats as to the consequences if these were not met (LAWR: 00-26).259 Therefore, in 
the cases of presidential violation of the democratic order, the international 
community is one of the first actors to push for the removal of the president, thus 
appearing on the scene prior to or at the same time as the first challenge to the 
president as coded in Table 7-1, above. In the other cases, international actors appear 
after the first challenge to negotiate and facilitate a solution (be that an interruption, 
or not).  
 
                                                
257 For instance Panama by receiving Abdalá Bucaram, and the Dominican Republic that received 
Carlos Andrés Pérez. By contrast, in the case of Zelaya, the international community immediately 
insisted on the return of the president to his home country.  
258 In Bolivia in 2003, two days before Sánchez de Lozada’s resignation the OAS still argued that his 
resignation would be unconstitutional. 
259 The U.S. Congress also blocked 1.3 billion USD in funding for an anti-drug package, thus 
informally imposing sanctions on Peru (LAWR: 00-28). 
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In addition to the greater involvement of international actors, this type of interruptions 
can also explain why these presidents were not impeached despite impeachment-
qualifying behaviour. The reason is that this type of presidential interruption is more 
likely to occur within regimes in which the degree of democracy is already in 
question.260 The interruptions in Guatemala, Dominican Republic and Peru constitute 
the lowest scores on the Polity index for any country-year with a presidential 
interruption. Guatemala registered a 3 on the combined Polity-scale, the Dominican 
Republic 5, and Peru 1.261 In these regimes lingering between delegative democracy 
(O'Donnell 1994) and electoral authoritarianism (Schedler 2002), presidential powers 
tend to be comparatively stronger, and institutional autonomy relatively weaker, than 
in more institutionalised democracies. Therefore the institutions that should hold a 
president accountable for his or her actions, were not strong, or independent enough 
to do so. In the Dominican Republic, Congress was not, and has never been, strong 
enough to hold a president accountable for his actions even on minor issues 
(Marsteintredet 2009: chs. 4, 6), and the Supreme Court was politicised and under 
presidential control until 1996. In Peru, Congress and the Supreme Court lost power 
in the 1993 Constitution implemented by Fujimori, and both institutions were packed 
with his supporters (Mauceri 2006: 45-46).262 In Guatemala, on the other hand, 
Congress was a relatively stronger actor, but highly discredited due to widespread 
rumours of corruption. In fact it was Congress’s opposition to the President, and 
legislators’ demands for bribes to support the president, that were the immediate 
causes of the autogolpe (Beltranena de Padilla 2009). The Supreme Court, however, 
was politicised (Alvarez Aragón 1999). The President of the Supreme Court at the 
                                                
260 Which leads some to exclude these cases from their analysis, see Hochstetler and Edwards (2009).  
261 The polity data can be found at: http://www.systemicpeace.org/polity/polity4.htm, see also Jaggers 
and Gurr (1995).  
262 Fujimori lost his majority in Congress right before fleeing to Japan, and his resignation may have 
prevented an impeachment attempt.  
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time, Juan José Rodil Peralta, won his position after a deal with President Serrano, 
and was more known for his corrupt behaviour than anything else (Hernández 1992). 
Thus the controlling institutions, as is expected in weakly institutionalised 
democracies, were either too weak and/or discredited to take action against the 
president. Thus, the elites confronting the presidents were not acting within these 
institutions.  
 
The outcomes of these interruptions relate more to the level of democracy than to 
presidentialism as a regime form. The regimes in question were borderline electoral 
authoritarian, and the outcomes improved the level of democracy in the regimes.263 
Furthermore, linked to the interruptions, constitutional reforms to remove 
“democratic” problems in the constitutions were implemented. Though constitutional 
reforms and entirely new constitutions have been written at numerous junctures in 
other countries as well, the reforms after the interruptions within this type are directly 
linked to the interruptions, and their causes.  
Table 7-3: Presidential interruptions and constitutional reforms 
Countries Guatemala Dominican Republic Peru 
Reforms In 1995: Increased 
control of president, 
relations congress-
president, new 
elections of congress 
and Supreme Court 
(arts. 157-158, 160-
164, 165e,j, 173, and 
184) 
In 1994: Ban on 
immediate re-election, 
professionalisation of 
Supreme Court, 
separation of elections 
(arts. 49, 64, 121-122) 
Ban on re-election (art 
112). In 2002: 
Decentralisation (arts. 
188-190) 
Sources: Political Database of the Americas (PDBA 2009): 
http://pdba.georgetown.edu/Constitutions/constudies.html; Nolte (2008) 
 
                                                
263 Guatemala went from 3 to 8 from 1993-1995 on Polity’s combined democracy scale, Dominican 
Republic from 5 to 8 from 1994-1996, and Peru from 1 to 9 from 1999-2001. As a comparison, the 
fuzzy case of Paraguay, which it may be argued is a case of a violation of the democratic order, scored 
a 7 on the combined Polity scale in 1999, and maintained that value for the years 2000 and 2001.  
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The reforms are closely connected to what has been perceived as the democratic 
problem causing the interruption. In both the Dominican Republic and Peru the re-
election of authoritarian-minded presidents was clearly perceived as a problematic 
factor, and subsequently banned. In Peru, several of the centralising reforms Fujimori 
implemented in 1993 were reversed two years after Fujimori left power. In 
Guatemala, the constitutional reforms strengthened the control over the presidency to 
prevent the potential for a constitutional excuse for future autogolpes. Furthermore, 
the reforms became an elegant solution for the calling of early elections and renewing 
the corrupt Congress and Supreme Court (Arellano Rojas 2009). Constitutional 
reforms are regular and even frequent in some Latin American countries, but in the 
three countries in question, there have been very few reforms during the last 
democratic spell. The one in Guatemala is the only one since democratisation, in the 
Dominican Republic it was the first since 1966, and in Peru the reforms in 2000 and 
2002 were the first since Fujimori’s constitutional renewal in 1993. There should be 
no doubt then, considering the substance and the timing (and low frequency) of 
reforms in these countries that these worked to amend previous democratic problems 
and secure a transition towards more democracy.264  
 
Policy interruptions 
The previous two types of interruptions are triggered by behaviour that warrants an 
impeachment, and challenges to these presidents have all been motivated by this 
behaviour. These interruptions are thus events that qualify for executive removals in 
any type of regime. It will become clear that several of the presidents in the group of 
policy interruptions also committed crimes that could qualify for impeachment. The 
                                                
264 Constitutional reforms in connection with full transitions to democracy is also quite regular, and is 
important for the consolidation of new democracies (Linz and Stepan 1996: 81-83).  
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difference is that in the two types of interruption presented above, this behaviour 
motivated the first challenge to the president, whereas in the cases that follow, the 
impeachment-qualifying behaviour occurred as a result of the challenge to the 
president (for instance in the violent handling of protesters in Argentina in 2001, and 
Bolivia in 2003, among other cases).265  
 
The policy interruption, which is empirically the most important group with nine 
cases, is clearly different from the other two types. No constitutional ground exists for 
the early removal of presidents on account of policy differences in presidential 
systems. This group of cases thus affects both presidentialism, by relaxing the fixed 
terms, and democracy as such by removing presidents on dubious constitutional or 
even unconstitutional grounds and procedures.  
 
As a contrast to the other two types of interruptions, the vertical challenges and 
conflicts are relatively more important for policy interruptions. The reason is 
connected to the lack of constitutional grounds to remove a president. Whereas in the 
two previous types of interruption, the cause for the interruption immediately trigger 
either institutional or international reactions, failed, or unpopular economic (or other) 
policies do not. This also explains why for instance in Ecuador, congressional elites 
and former presidents Borja, Hurtado and Febrés Cordero urged people to take to the 
streets to help them oust presidents Bucaram. Mahuad and Gutiérrez (LAWR, 97-05, 
99-27, 04-21; Pachano 1997: 249). Lacking a constitutional rationale for  a 
presidential removal, popular pressure creates a generalised sense of an ungovernable 
situation that helps put pressure and strains on the administration, and convinces the 
                                                
265 And, as Hochstetler and Edwards (2009) argue, the police and military handling probably 
contributed to these presidents’ downfall. 
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other institutions such as congress or the supreme court to act against the president. In 
Argentina, Alfonsín himself said that his decision to resign early was clearly 
connected to the lootings and social upheaval in the last week of May 1989 (Alfonsín 
2004: 140-154), and in the case of de la Rúa the pictures of looting and protesters 
crying “¡Que se vayan todos!” were broadcast across the world.266 Likewise, in 
Ecuador, Bucaram’s ouster was preceded by a vertical challenge that also called for 
the reversal of several economic measures the day before Congress declared Bucaram 
mentally incapacitated (Luna 1997: 207-208). The same pattern of generalised 
popular protests with political demands in addition to demands of presidential 
removals can be found in the two other cases of interruptions in Ecuador, the three 
cases in Bolivia, and in the case of Pérez’s impeachment in Venezuela.  
 
The popular pressure in these cases, however, is not confined to the removal of 
presidents, but rather popular protests start with political demands, and only after 
some time, develop into demands for presidential removals. The removal of the 
president in these cases only satisfies one of the demands of the opposition. The 
political demands are not immediately satisfied, or easy to satisfy at all. Therefore, in 
the aftermath of presidential interruptions of this type, the high level of conflict 
continues, and may even lead to more challenges and interruptions.267 These 
interruptions are part of processes of social change. The successors of the interrupted 
presidents immediately meet demands of policy changes, and of fixing whatever is 
defined to be wrong at the moment.  
 
                                                
266 See Ayuero (2007) for an analysis of the 2001 lootings, in particular.  
267 Upon evaluating the level of conflicts after the interruptions I here include both challenges and 
regular conflicts since I am interested in the more general level of contention.  
Chapter 7: Linking Causes and Outcomes. Three Types of Presidential Interruption 
   
254 
In Argentina, a count of political street protests registered in LAWR shows a higher 
number of these protests in 1990 than the preceding years, also horizontal conflicts 
continued at the same level throughout 1990 (see also Corrales 1997). Not until 1991 
when hyperinflation, one of the principal causes of the fall of Alfonsín, was brought 
under control did the levels of conflicts in the streets and in congress go down (see 
also Weyland 2002: 126-127).268 In Bolivia, after Siles Zuazo’s early exit in 1985, 
one can find some of the same pattern, vertical conflicts and strikes continued at a 
high level even after inflation was brought under control in 1986-1987. In Venezuela, 
according to my registration in LAWR, the protests and pressures on both successors 
to President Pérez (first Ramón Velasquez as caretaker, and then Rafael Caldera), and 
the level of street protests against the deteriorating economic conditions increased 
every year until the election of Hugo Chávez in 1998.  
 
In the interruptions in Ecuador (1997, 2000, 2005), and the more recent interruptions 
in Bolivia (2003, 2005) and Argentina (2001), not only did the level of conflict 
remain high after the interruptions of the presidents, but more interruptions and 
challenges followed.269 In Ecuador, Bucaram was toppled after the initiation of his 
economic policies built on Menem’s model of reforms and with Domingo Cavallo as 
his advisor. The conflicts regarding economic policies led by newly mobilised 
indigenous groups continued into the Mahuad presidency and signalled the downfall 
of him as well (Zamosc 2007). In 2000 Lucio Gutiérrez allied himself with the 
                                                
268 Inflation reached levels of over 3,000% in 1989, 2,000% in 1990, and only 133% in 1991, and from 
then on it continued to decrease further (WDI 2008). 
269 Here I must qualify the case of Argentina. My definition excludes the early exit of President 
Duhalde as a presidential interruption since he was a caretaker president. However, also Duhalde left 
the presidency early by way of an early election he was forced to organise due to popular pressures 
against his presidency. Whether or not the case qualifies as an interruption is not important for the 
arguments here. It does, however, demonstrate that the level of conflict did not go down after the ouster 
of President de la Rúa in December of 2001. Several authors treat the Duhalde case as an interruption, 
see e.g. Llanos (Forthcoming 2010) and Hochstetler and Samuels (Forthcoming). 
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indigenous movement to topple Mahuad, and in the 2002 elections went to the polls in 
alliance with the indigenous party Pachakutik. Nevertheless, Gutiérrez’s continuation 
of his toppled predecessors’ policies earned him strong opposition in Congress and 
the streets, which ultimately led to his ouster. In Bolivia, the gas export issue 
generated enough opposition against Sánchez to oust him from the presidency, and 
despite Mesa trying to ameliorate the relations with the strong opposition led by 
Felipe Quispe and Evo Morales, congressional and street pressure against him was no 
lower than against Sánchez de Lozada. In 2005 Mesa, unable to satisfy the 
opposition’s political demands, fell as well. In Argentina, the economic crisis led to 
de la Rúa’s early exit, but the piquetero movement continued its pressure from the 
streets against Duhalde, who as Mesa, tried to satisfy the political demands he was 
confronted with. Pressure from congress and the streets, however, did not end, but 
rather ended the presidency of Duhalde early, in April 2003.  
 
To conclude, even though presidential interruptions indeed are “corrective” measures 
of prior undesired behaviour of presidents, they fail to solve the ongoing political 
crisis when the demands of the opposition are broader than only the removal of the 
president. This explains why in some cases of interruption protests in congress and 
the streets continue, while in other cases these die out immediately after presidential 
interruptions. Protests and pressure against presidents will continue until the 
additional policy-related demands are confronted or dealt with by the incoming 
administrations. Failure to meet these demands will in all likelihood increase the risk 
for another interruption. Whereas in the two other types of presidential interruptions, 
the principal demand of the opposition is already met with the removal of the 
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president, in the policy interruption, the presidential interruption is only part of the 
solution.  
 
Policy change and policy-interruptions 
Another aspect sets this group of interrupted presidencies apart from the others: the 
vast policy changes that seem to follow in their aftermath.270 And, as Elster (1989: 
163) reminds us: “There are two mistakes governments can and do make in a 
disequilibrium situation: to concede too little or too much.”271 Analysing the levels of 
success of the interrupted presidents’ successors within this type of interruption, the 
more successful presidents are not the ones that makes the mistake of conceding too 
little to the opposition, but rather the ones that do too much (or just enough).  
 
There are two models for policy changes to be observed in the aftermath of 
presidential interruptions of this type (see Table 7-4). One immediate and vast, and 
one where only minor changes are implemented first, followed by repeated 
interruptions, and then vast changes.272  
                                                
270 I am not saying that the interruption necessarily helps the implementation of all details of vast 
policy changes, such as neoliberal reforms (for a wider discussion on this, see Corrales 1997), rather 
that it may help the initial presentation and launching of such changes. This argument seems to be in 
line with Weyland’s (2002) more general argument on market reform. However, Weyland as well as 
Corrales, focus more on economic crises. My argument relates more to political crises, and one 
particular type of presidential interruptions.  
271 And, then Elster (1989: 163) adds: “Often, they do the former out of fear of doing the latter.” 
272 Due to the timing of these interruptions, the two models also indicate policy changes in two separate 
directions: from heterodox, or import substitution industrialisation policies, towards neoliberalism in 
the early cases, and from neoliberal towards post-neoliberal policies in the latter cases.  
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Table 7-4: Two models of policy interruptions and policy change.  
 Interrupted president and successor Direction 
Immediate and 
vast 
Alfonsín –> Menem 
Siles Zuazo -> Paz Estenssoro 
From ISI to 
neoliberalism 
Minor changes, 
repeated 
interruptions 
CAP-> Caldera -> Chávez  
Bucaram-> Mahuad -> Gutiérrez ->Correa 
Sánchez de Lozada->Mesa->Morales 
De la Rúa->Duhalde->Kirchner 
From Neoliberalism to 
post-liberalism, and new 
perspectives on 
democratic regimes in 
new constitutions 
Notes: Bold indicates vast changes, italic indicates minor changes. The concept post-liberalism is from 
Arditi (2008), and is used for lack of a better word.  
 
The immediate and vast changes describe well the changes after the two first 
presidential interruptions in Latin America, in Bolivia in 1985, and in Argentina in 
1989.273 In Bolivia, Paz Estenssoro initiated the period of pacted democracy in 1985 
with decree 21060, which changed the economic course of that country, and signified 
a sudden break with his interrupted predecessor’s policies. It is not inconceivable that 
the political and economic crisis and the total failure of the previous model helped 
muster support within the established political parties for this radical change. In 
Argentina, Menem in July of 1989 launched his neoliberal reforms helped by advisors 
from Bunge and Born, and market-reform friendly Alvaro Alsogaray from the centrist 
UCeDé (Unión del Centro Democrático) (Weyland 2002: 112-115, 120-121). Again 
the previous failure of Alfonsín in dealing with the economy facilitated an initial tacit 
support from the political parties and the CGT at the time (Levitsky and Way 1998). 
In the period between Menem’s takeover in July till the inauguration of the new 
congress in December, the Radical party helped the passing of reforms by providing 
quorum in Congress and by not voting against Menem’s measures.274  
 
                                                
273 Another element that differentiates the early from the late cases of policy interruptions is the 
apparent policy motivation of the challenge to the president. In the early cases the challenges are 
motivated by an uproar against failed attempts to stem and control hyperinflation, whereas in the latter 
cases the uproar has been reactions to the social consequences of neoliberalism. I thank Simone R. 
Bohn for bringing this to my attention.  
274 Alfonsín (2004: 145) himself argues that his prior failure to complete his term and deal with the 
economy indeed helped Menem implement what Alfonsín defines as reactionary policies. 
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I am not saying that interruptions caused changes in economic policies, different 
forms of neoliberal reforms occurred in most countries throughout Latin American in 
the eighties and nineties (see Stokes 2001: 3). However, I do think they may alleviate 
reactions to the neoliberal reforms that are the results of surprising policy switches. A 
cursory comparison of the three “most stunning” switches, support this notion (Stokes 
2001: 45) The relative success of Menem and Paz Estenssoro stands in sharp contrast 
to the fate of President Pérez and his introduction of neoliberal reforms in 1989 in 
Venezuela. President Pérez’s gran viraje was met with the Caracazo, the great 
demonstration that ended in terrible violence. As such it seems that a prior crisis 
facilitates at least the initial presentation of neoliberal reforms. Menem’s relative 
success also contrasts with Fujimori’s “successful” neoliberal shock treatment, to the 
extent that Fujimori’s surprising policy switch created so much opposition in 
Congress that Fujimori in April 1992 decided to close it.275 Both Fujimori and Menem 
were reelected, but only Fujimori had to close congress and turn autocratic to do so. 
 
Despite continued pressure from congress and the streets Menem and Paz Estenssoro 
survived in office, and Menem even managed to reform the constitution and win a 
second term in office. On this count, the destiny of these two presidents contrasts with 
that of the ones that did not meet, or only came with half-hearted responses to, the 
demands that had accompanied the challenges to their predecessors. In the case of 
Venezuela, President Caldera initially reversed many of the economic policies of 
Pérez (Weyland 2002: 210). But about halfway through his presidential term, Caldera 
ditched his more heterodox approach to the economy, sought the support of the IMF 
and re-introduced several of the reforms his predecessor Pérez had introduced in 1989 
                                                
275 This move, on the other hand, was not unpopular at the time, and the results of the shock treatment 
were well received among most classes. Fujimori’s problems at the time was with competing elites, see 
Stokes (2001: 130-133). 
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(Weyland 2002: 218-219, 225-227).276 Caldera failed to stem the social changes going 
on in Venezuela, and Chávez won the election in 1998. Chávez, on the other hand, 
soon implemented not only vast changes in the economic policies over the years, but 
also reformed the political regime through a Constituent Assembly and the writing of 
a new Constitution. The level of conflict in society did not recede, however, and in 
2002 Chávez barely survived a coup, and attempts continued in the streets and via the 
constitution to remove Chávez through a recall referendum.   
 
In Ecuador, Bucaram’s successors continued with what the opposition defined as 
internationally supported neoliberal reforms. The lack of policy change spelled the 
demise of not only Mahuad, but also Gutiérrez after him. Correa elected in 2006, later 
changed the course of the economic policies demanded from the outset of the rise of 
the indigenous movements in the country, organised elections for a Constituent 
Assembly in September 2007, held a referendum on the Constitution a year later, and 
new congressional and presidential elections in April 2009. During this process 
Correa also followed Chávez in closing Congress upon the election of the Constituent 
Assembly.  
 
Mesa conceded somewhat to the pressure on the gas issue by holding a referendum in 
July 2004 on increased taxes for international companies extracting natural gas in the 
country, but fell prey to what Elster called “doing too little”, and, ultimately, lost a 
vote of confidence in Congress and resigned from the presidency in June of 2005. Evo 
Morales, elected in December of 2005, promised and delivered vast political changes 
by among other things nationalising the gas industry on May 1, 2006. In his efforts to 
                                                
276 Some of the same pendulum effect can be observed in Brazil, but to a much lesser extent than in 
Venezuela (Weyland 2002: 212-213). 
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found a new Bolivian State and regime, a Constituent Assembly was elected in 2006, 
and after a tumultuous and protracted process, a referendum over the new 
Constitution was held in January 2009. One observer has called this Bolivia’s third 
revolution (Dunkerley 2007).  
 
In Argentina, Duhalde, the peronist successor of the Radical de la Rúa, also aimed to 
reverse some of the failed policies of his predecessors. He implemented some 
emergency social policies, and clearly dissociated himself from the economic policies 
recommended by the World Bank. Yet, the changes were not sufficient to stave off 
continued pressure from below and in congress, and Duhalde was forced to hold early 
elections. The election of Kirchner in 2003, however, did mark the beginning of a 
clear move towards the left and new economic policies with more state intervention 
(Levitsky 2008: 109-110). 
  
It is early to judge, especially the presidencies of Morales and Correa, but a pattern of 
the above analysis of policy interruption is clear. All policy interruptions are followed 
by rather vast policy changes, and this outcome is not found in the other types of 
presidential interruptions. Furthermore, despite continued political protests, the 
presidents who do “too much” after a presidential interruption tend to survive. Due to 
the previous discredit of the president, his or her policies, and the political or 
economic crisis in general, bold policy moves seem to be facilitated. Presidents who, 
on the other hand, linger on with failed policies (e.g. in Ecuador), or only make half-
hearted attempts to please both the pressure from below, and international lenders at 
the same time (Mesa, Bolivia), experience that their survival is as much at risk as that 
of their fallen predecessors.  
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In sum, policy-interrupted presidents have implications for presidentialism by 
relaxing the fixed terms in a manner not constitutionally permitted in presidential 
regimes, for democracy by being constitutionally and democratically questionable 
incidents, and, on the face of it, for policy since these interruptions are followed by 
vast policy changes.  
 
Two or three types of interruptions?277 
Two of the three types of interruption are primarily motivated by what I would define 
as a president’s impeachment-qualifying behaviour which motivate challenges to 
presidents:278 the scandals, in which the president violates the law, for instance 
through corrupt behaviour, and violations of core democratic principles. Both types 
may also be defined as scandals involving the presidents. Furthermore, both types of 
interruption have in common that the challenges to the presidents are confined to the 
removal of the president, and that the social and political turmoil die out immediately 
after the presidential interruption. The two cases of scandals were also considered 
fuzzy cases, Collor between scandals and policy interruption, and Cubas between 
scandal and democratic violation. The case of Pérez in Venezuela, which by many is 
defined as a scandal, was also a fuzzy case that I code as a policy interruption. 
Therefore, one could argue that the set of scandals is empty.279 Should scandals and 
democratic violations be analysed as being the same type of interruption? Or, should 
                                                
277 This section has benefited from comments and criticisms made by Kathryn Hochstetler of a 
previous version of this manuscript. 
278 Again I insist on the difference between impeachment-qualifying behaviour that motivated the first 
challenge to presidents, and impeachment-qualifying behaviour that come as a result of a challenge to 
presidents.  
279 One could even argue for the use of Boolean minimation, which would make scandal as a 
motivating factor for successful challenges redundant (Ragin 1987: 93-95) 
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scandals be excluded as an independent type of interruption? My answer to both 
questions is no. 
 
I believe that despite being close cousins, there is sufficient variation between the 
cases of scandals and democracy violation interruptions for them to be treated as 
distinct. First of all, democratic violations tend to occur in regimes that are semi-
democratic at best, and the nature of the regime affects the logic of the interruption. 
The nature of the “scandal” is also one that induces international actors to actually 
demand or pressure for a presidential removal, and not only, as in other cases, 
intervene to secure a peaceful outcome. Furthermore, the outcomes of interruptions 
linked to democratic violations are different: only in these cases can one register a 
significant change in the democratic level, and with the exception of the constitutional 
reforms in Ecuador in 1998, only in these cases can one observe constitutional 
reforms linked to interruptions. Therefore, the distinct outcomes of scandals and 
democratic violations validate maintaining both types (Adcock and Collier 2001).  
 
In relation to the second question, I think that previous contributions in the field 
focusing on scandals validate including the scandals as a proper type (Baumgartner 
and Kada 2003; Pérez-Liñán 2007). The type is also clearly defined by the use of the 
procedure of impeachments (Marsteintredet and Berntzen 2008). Nevertheless, since 
scandals always seem accompanied by other factors, the question draws attention to 
the causal complexities behind each and every interruption, and also indicates that 
scandals, which I in my Chapter 2 argued was an underlying cause, maybe are 
endogenous to challenges to presidents, and are exposed only as the result of the other 
underlying factors.  
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Conclusions. Three types of presidential interruptions, and a 
typology? 
Above, I argued that the cases of presidential interruptions in Latin America fall into 
three types. In table 7-5, below, I summarise the commonalities within and 
differences between the types of interruptions.   
Table 7-5: A summary of the three types of interruptions 
Location of primary 
challengers 
 
 
  
President 
Institution 
(International) 
Street 
Related 
consti-
tutional 
reforms 
Significant 
changes in 
democratic 
level 
Posterior 
Policy 
switches 
Conti-
nued  
turmoil 
More 
interrup-
tions 
Collor de 
Melo 
Y N N N N N N Scandals 
Cubas Y N N N N N N 
Serrano Y (I) N Y Y N N N 
Balaguer Y (I) N Y Y N N N 
Violations 
of 
democracy 
Fujimori Y (I .5) Y (.5) Y Y N N N 
Siles 
Zuazo 
Y (.5) Y (.5) N N Y Y N 
Alfonsín N Y N N Y Y N 
Pérez N Y N N N (.5) Y N 
Bucaram Y (.5) Y (.5) Y N N Y Y 
Mahuad N Y N N N Y Y 
De la Rúa N Y N N N (.5) Y Y 
Duhalde N Y N N Y Y N 
Sánchez 
de 
Lozada 
N Y N N N (.5) Y Y 
Gutiérrez Y (.5) Y (.5) N N Y Y N 
Policy 
Interruptions 
Mesa N Y N N Y Y N 
Sources: Stokes (2001), Weyland (2002), Nolte (2008) my dataset in LAWR, and the Political 
Database of the Americas (PDBA 2009). I in brackets means international challenge. The value .5 
indicates a fuzzy case, and partial value on that variable.  
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Table 7-5 summarises with a focus on the factors considered above and provides a 
structured comparison of the cases of interruption. The cases are organised according 
to type following Table 7-2, above, and are also in accordance with the coding in 
Table 5-3 in Chapter 5. It should be clear from the discussion above that the 
importance of the streets vs. institutional actors, and the implications of interruptions 
depend on the type of interruption. All presidents removed on account of scandals and 
democratic violations were primarily (and initially) challenged by national or 
international institutions. The only exception is Peru, where the march on July 28 was 
the first clear challenge to the president, and the international pressures were more 
empty threats than real challenges. Challenges from the streets were more prominent 
in six of the nine policy interruptions, or equally important as institutional challenges 
in the remaining three interruptions. These differences across the cases of 
interruptions have been largely ignored since all cases of interruptions mainly have 
been treated as being equal in terms of their causes and consequences. Congress, 
supported by popular protests and outrage, plays a crucial role in presidential 
scandals. When presidents violate core democratic principles, international actors also 
enter the arena negotiating with national elites, while popular protests in the streets, 
though clearly important, seem to play a relatively minor role. On the other hand, it is 
impossible to explain the cases of policy-interrupted presidents without referring to 
the vertical challenges including popular outrage, protests, lootings, etc. in the streets. 
In these cases, Congress and other institutional actors, rather play catch-up with 
whatever is going on outside their offices. The reasons for these differences seem to 
be related to the main cause or motivation for opposition to the president.  
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In terms of the outcomes of presidential interruptions, I also argue that there are 
systematic differences across the types of interruptions. The scandals dealt with 
through impeachment proceedings show that congress can hold presidents 
accountable despite previously held beliefs that impeachments are too cumbersome to 
be used (Linz 1994). Apart from this implication, this type of interruption seems to 
have few other implications for presidentialism, democracy or policy. Interruptions of 
presidents having violated democratic principles entail important, positive 
implications for the democracies in question, and can be linked to subsequent 
constitutional reforms. Only in the case of Ecuador in 1998 have I registered another 
constitutional reform directly linked to the interruption of a president. Despite 
constitutional reforms in the aftermath of the presidential ouster, there are few 
implications for presidentialism as a regime type, or the course of important policies. 
In contrast to the two above-mentioned types of presidential interruptions, to remove 
a president when the uproar against the chief executive is motivated by displeasure 
with the administration’s policies, does not automatically resolve the situation. 
Therefore, protests tend to continue even after the interruptions, and unless policy 
switches occur, more interruptions may follow. In none of the other types of 
interruptions did I register continued turmoil, challenges or interruptions. Policy 
interruptions thus affect presidentialism as a regime type by removing presidents for 
reasons not grounded in the constitution, democracy (but not in a uniform or 
predictable manner), and policy.   
 
Do the types of interruption constitute a typology of presidential interruptions? A type 
should share a combination of features that distinguishes it from other types of the 
same overarching phenomenon, and the types of a typology should ideally be 
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mutually exclusive and jointly exhaustive (George and Bennett 2005: 237-238). A 
good typology indicates a meaningful difference among types that may be explained 
as an outcome, or that may be used to explain other outcomes. The suggested types of 
presidential interruption may fall short of being jointly exhaustive, and maybe also of 
being mutually exclusive, but these are two ideal goals that are difficult to fully 
satisfy within the social sciences. Nevertheless, I think that the differences between 
the types of interruptions are meaningful, and Table 7-5 also indicates that, although 
falling short of creating mutually exclusive types, the patterns are evident enough to 
argue that the types discriminate well on a number of independent factors.  
 
In terms of the two debates mentioned above, the suggested types help distinguish and 
explain why in some cases the challenges to presidents come from the streets, and in 
other cases from institutions nationally or internationally, and why in some cases the 
political and social turmoil continue after the interruption whereas in other cases the 
nightmare ends with the interruption. The explanations of these patterns also validate 
the typology.  
 
In Chapter 2 I argued that outcomes of interruption would probably be linked to or 
depend on the causes of interruptions, and, since interruptions are forms of holding 
presidents accountable, that the outcomes would be a reactive sequence related to 
prior incidents. All interruptions seem to be followed by some sort of reactive 
sequence, but the prior incidents vary and thus the nature of the reactive sequence 
varies too. Granted, each case is preceded by a set of complex causes, but by 
simplifying this picture and focusing on the principal and explicit motivation of the 
challenges to the interrupted presidents, I have shown that the outcomes indeed 
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depend on a proxy for the most important cause of the interruption. Furthermore, one 
can discern a pattern of reactive sequences after interruptions that are related to this 
cause. Policy-interrupted presidencies seem to be followed by switches in policy, 
interruptions after democratic violations induce constitutional reforms to “fix” the 
democratic problem, and impeachments may have few consequences, but one 
consequence may potentially be increased controls of presidents to contain potential 
future agency loss. 
 
No matter whether or not this relatively inductive exercise of creating types of 
presidential interruptions will survive as a typology, the exercise has highlighted that 
the outcomes of presidential interruptions are not uniform across all cases, and that 
the importance of the different actors in these processes also vary across cases. 
Furthermore, these differences seem to be systematic and have so far been overlooked 
in existing analyses. Therefore, this exercise of focusing on different causes of 
interruptions and different outcomes of the same phenomenon, represents a nuanced 
contribution to the debates regarding this new form of executive instability in Latin 
America.  
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Introduction 
This dissertation has dealt with the new phenomenon of executive instability in 
presidential regimes in Latin America that I have called presidential interruptions. I 
approached the topic through the use of conceptual, and causal analysis applying 
qualitative, comparative and case-study analytical techniques, and quantitative, 
statistical techniques. The main data material for the dissertation came from a dataset 
on political conflicts in democratic countries in Latin America I created based on 
reading the Latin American Weekly Report, in addition to open data sources, 
secondary sources such as academic articles and books, and some interviews (Chapter 
4).  
 
The concluding chapter first gives a summary of the dissertation and the main 
findings, then it focuses on the original contributions of the dissertation, and it 
continues with some notions of what might become further areas of research, and 
ends with some thoughts of what interruptions mean for democracy.  
 
A summary of the empirical findings 
The goals were to first of all broaden the understanding of the phenomenon of 
executive instability in presidential regimes. I accomplished this through a 
comparison of the causes and procedures of presidential interruptions with other 
forms of executive instability such as the democratic breakdown and unscheduled 
changes of government in parliamentary regimes (Chapter 3).  
 
The second goal of this dissertation was to analyse the causes of presidential 
interruptions, i.e. why interruptions occur. To approach this task I distinguished 
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between triggering and underlying causes (Chapter 2), and analysed these separately. 
The reasons for separating these types of causes analytically were that such a model 
better captures the theoretical understanding of presidential interruption, and that it 
enabled me to enter the debate on institutions vs. the streets and presidential 
interruptions. I dealt with the triggering causes applying standard qualitative 
comparative techniques combined with process tracing, focusing primarily on which 
of the horizontal and vertical challenges were the primary trigger of interruptions. In 
Chapter 5 I found that vertical challenges, as expected (Hochstetler 2006), were more 
important than horizontal challenges in interrupting the executive branch. Moving on 
to the underlying causes I found that when controlling for the effect of horizontal 
conflicts, or deadlocks, among a series of other variables, vertical conflicts, or the 
general level of social contention, did not turn out as a significant causal variable for 
either interruptions or challenges (Chapter 6). On the other hand, horizontal conflicts, 
or executive-legislative relations, did have a significant effect on both interruptions 
and challenges.  
 
However, that the level of street protests, cacerolazos, roadblocks, or demonstrations 
should have no effect on the likelihood of interruptions or challenges, seemed 
counterintuitive. My theoretical expectations were that only if conflicts were 
motivated by new and emerging cleavages challenging the status quo, or organised by 
new social movements or newly mobilised groups, would they have an effect on the 
interruptions and challenges. In keeping with my analysis in Chapter 3, based on 
different data, I found that conflicts mobilised on the traditional left-right cleavage, or 
organised by labour unions do not affect the likelihood of either an interruption or a 
challenge to the president. This negative finding of the most dominant type of 
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conflicts originating in the “streets” explains why other scholars have concluded that 
the general level of contention in the streets is not causally related to interruptions or 
challenges (Hochstetler and Edwards 2009). My findings using a variable on conflicts 
motivated by regional and ethnic/cultural cleavages did confirm my theoretical 
expectations, since it turned out to be positively and significantly related to both 
interruptions and challenges. As a validity test, I ran the same model with conflicts 
divided into who organised the conflicts, and the results only confirmed previous 
findings. Conflicts organised by labour unions do not cause interruptions or 
challenges, whereas conflicts organised by new social movements and peasant 
organisations are causally related to interruptions and challenges. 
 
The third goal was to explore the outcomes or consequences of presidential 
interruptions. In order to properly explore this topic, I argued for linking the outcomes 
to the causes of interruption. Since interruptions first of all are opposition-driven 
events, the way the opposition coins the arguments for removing the president is 
important for how the process pans out. Second, since interruptions, I argue, are forms 
of holding a president accountable, they might be considered reactive sequences. 
Therefore, outcomes are linked to causes. To simplify the complicated causal 
processes preceding interruptions, in Chapter 7 I focused on the motivation of the first 
challenge to remove the president. On this basis, I found basically three types of 
motivations for removing presidents: scandals, democratic violations, and policy. I 
found that there were few discernable consequences for presidential democracies after 
presidents interrupted due to scandals, but that congresses’ later impeachment 
attempts against the presidential successors in both Brazil and Paraguay may indicate 
increased levels of accountability. After interruptions caused by democratic 
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violations, I found, not surprisingly, that the levels of democracy increased 
considerably, but also that constitutional reforms to prevent further presidential 
democratic violations were taken. These cases included the interruptions in 
Guatemala, Dominican Republic and Peru. The last group of policy interruptions were 
all followed by, if not helped cause, vast policy changes in the countries in question. 
In the cases in countries that had not implemented neoliberal reforms at the time of 
interruption, interruptions, were, in part, caused by protests against economic crises 
involving hyperinflation. Immediately after the change in the executive branch in 
Bolivia in 1985 and Argentina in 1989, neoliberal reforms followed suit. In the cases 
of interruption that occurred after the implementation of neoliberal reforms, different 
degrees of reversals of these have so far been the end results. These are the cases of 
interruption in Argentina in 2001 (and 2003), Bolivia in 2003 and 2005, and Ecuador 
in 1997, 2000, and 2005.  
 
Original contributions of the dissertation 
One of my more personal goals has been to provide an original contribution to the 
topic of executive instability in presidential regimes and contribute with not only 
systematic evidence on important causal variables explaining the phenomenon, but in 
particular to provide ideas for new approaches and comprehensions of the topic at 
hand. In order to contribute with some original ideas on the topic of interruptions I 
tried to combine various analytical techniques, in particular qualitative comparative 
analysis and quantitative analysis, I tried to use quantitative analysis for other 
purposes than what it normally is used for, I attempted to make some original 
comparisons across time and space, and finally, I sought to analyse interruptions as 
being complex and not only focus on the similarities across these cases, but also to 
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fully analyse the differences between them. In doing so I hope not to have 
contradicted my analyses in which I simplistically treat all interruptions as being 
identical. 
 
In my dissertation I have provided the first comparison of the causes of interruptions 
and democratic breakdowns, thereby looking into the analogy between the two 
phenomena that has been important for much of the theorising and analyses on 
presidential interruptions. The goal was to use empirical analysis to conceptually 
clarify what a presidential interruption is, and is not, in addition to increasing the 
understanding of the phenomenon through comparative techniques. Chapter 3 clearly 
shows that while there are similarities, there are also stark differences between the 
two, even at the causal level. The conceptual clarification in this chapter has also 
consequences for how one should go about theorising the events of interruptions. 
Chapter 3 also provided an original contribution in the form of a comparison at the 
procedural level between presidential interruptions and unscheduled changes of 
executives in parliamentary regimes. It was demonstrated here that procedures in 
presidential regimes for interrupting presidents indeed are similar and equivalent to 
such procedures in parliamentary regimes. This chapter is the first comparison 
between different types of executive instability that involves presidential interruptions 
as one type of executive instability.  
 
Methodologically I hope to have demonstrated why it is a good idea to disaggregate 
variables and concepts in order to improve conceptual and causal analysis. Often in 
comparative politics variables that conflate various dimensions are used for causal 
and other types of analysis. This approach often hides more than it reveals. Through 
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most of my dissertation I used the technique of disaggregating variables, which has 
enabled me to contribute with several new findings in my area of research. In Chapter 
2 I displayed a theoretical model that disaggregated different types of causes: 
triggering and underlying causes. In Chapter 3, I looked at different procedures for 
interrupting presidents to compare interruptions to procedures for executive removal 
in other types of regime. In Chapters 5 and 6 I proceeded to analyse empirically the 
two levels of causality, first the triggering causes, and then the underlying causes. 
This approach helped me to get nuanced answers concerning the institutions vs. the 
streets debate, and also understand why there seems to be a disagreement among 
scholars on this issue. Theoretically in Chapter 2, and empirically in Chapter 6, I 
disaggregated the variable of general conflicts according to the type of cleavages that 
motivated the conflict, and which organisations orchestrated the conflict. 
Disaggregating the variable of general conflicts enabled me to find that conflicts 
mobilised on the traditional left-right cleavage did not affect the likelihood of 
challenges or interruptions, but that conflicts mobilised by new, emerging cleavages, 
in Latin America regional and ethnic cleavages, or organised by new social 
movements, or peasant unions, increased the likelihood of both. The conundrum of 
why vertical challenges triggered interruptions, while vertical conflicts did not cause 
interruptions, was only possible to solve by disaggregating a conflated variable used 
in causal analysis by other scholars. Finally, building on the motivations for 
challenging presidents, I disaggregated the concept of presidential interruptions in 
order to pursue an analysis of the consequences of interruptions. This enabled me to 
show what the consequences of interruptions are, that they vary across the cases in 
Latin America, and that this variation depends on the causes of interruption, and 
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thereby explain why other scholars only have come up with basically null-findings on 
this same topic (Hochstetler and Samuels Forthcoming).  
 
Another original contribution stems from my findings related to the institutions vs. the 
streets debate, where I hope to have come up with clear and concise answers in an 
area in which other researchers have conflated variables and different types of causes. 
My goal was to enter this debate, like Cheibub (2007) did for the regime and 
democracy debate, and provide the first full analysis of every step of the causal chain 
theorised to lead to interruptions. Disentangling the theoretical causal chain was the 
original theoretical idea that led to my original empirical contribution: the streets are 
more important than institutions as triggering causes, as underlying causes institutions 
are more important than the streets at the general level. Disaggregating the variable of 
general conflicts, I showed that contention in the streets affect the likelihood of 
interruptions and challenges if mobilised by new, and emerging cleavages, or 
organised by new social movements or peasant unions. My analysis is surely not the 
last word in this debate, but I believe my contribution has been the most thorough and 
complete so far.   
 
Presidential interruptions and further research 
The phenomenon of presidential interruptions as I have defined it is indeed a Latin 
American occurrence. The only incident outside Latin America is the impeachment of 
President Estrada in the Philippines in 2001 (Fukuyama, Dressel, and Chang 2005; 
Kada 2003). If one also includes semi-presidential regimes, three more cases would 
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be added. The interruptions of President Wahid in Indonesia in 2001,280 President 
Zafy in Madagascar in 1996 (Keesings 2009: 41254; Kim and Bahry 2008), and 
President Shevardnadze in Georgia in 2003 (McFaul 2005).281 Still, there are only 
four cases of interruptions of presidents outside Latin America that satisfy the 
definition I used in this dissertation. There exists only two contributions comparing 
interruptions in Latin America with interruptions in other places (see, Hochstetler and 
Edwards 2009; Kim and Bahry 2008), both are quantitative works, but in view of the 
relative paucity of other cases of interruption outside Latin America,282 these methods 
give relatively limited insight into the uniqueness of the Latin American experience.  
 
Inspired by my approach in Chapter 3, I would rather suggest conducting more 
qualitative comparative analyses between cases of interruption in Latin America and 
similar phenomena across time and space. If one would use the types of interruption I 
constructed in Chapter 7, I think cross-regional comparisons would be easier to 
conduct. How similar or different are interruptions of presidents after democratic 
violations in Latin America from the cases of the coloured revolutions in post-
communist countries? All cases initially lead towards improved levels of democracy, 
all involve removing a less than fully democratic president. Are the requirements for a 
successful interruption of not fully democratic presidents in Latin America, the same 
as in Eastern Europe? How do different international and geographical contexts affect 
interruptions of presidents having violated core democratic principles in Latin 
                                                
280 Wahid was not formally elected, but rather the selected successor to President Suharto (Fukuyama, 
Dressel, and Chang 2005). Polity considers Indonesia a democracy since Wahid’s selection in 1999, so 
I include the case. 
281 I do not include the Orange Revolution in Ukraine since President Kutchma decided not to run in 
that election. One could view Prime Minister Yanukovitch as the incumbent, and include the case, but I 
decided not to.  
282 Kim and Bahry include more cases of interruption outside Latin America but only because they 
conflate interruptions and democratic breakdowns (after being very careful not to conflate interruptions 
and transitions to democracy), and include semi-presidential regimes in their case-selection. 
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America and post-communist Europe? Baumgartner and Kada (2003) have already 
successfully applied such an approach in the study of presidential scandals and 
impeachments, and I think it would be useful to compare the cases of presidential 
interruptions due to democracy violations with similar cases in other regions. 
 
What about policy-interruptions? None of the four cases of presidential interruption 
outside Latin America seems to be cases of policy interruption (see, Fukuyama, 
Dressel, and Chang 2005; Kasuya 2003; Allen 2003; McFaul 2005). As such, this 
type of interruption seems to be unique for Latin America. While scandals and 
democratic violations cause the removal of presidents in other regions, policy failures 
or disagreements, so far, have not. Given the fact that policy disagreements only can 
be considered grounds for removing the executive in parliamentary regimes, provided 
a majority supports such a motion, maybe the interruptions of this type are the cases 
one should compare with parliamentary challenges and failures? Recent cases for 
comparison might be the resignation of Prime Minister Haarde in Iceland after the 
economic meltdown in that country. Since policy interruptions in many cases entail 
the emergence of new cleavages, the reason for Latin, or rather South, America’s 
uniqueness in this regard might be that the presidential and semi-presidential regimes 
in Sub-Saharan Africa, Asia and post-communist Europe are younger and less 
institutionalised, which would make it more difficult for an opposition based on new 
cleavages to emerge.283 Further cross-regional research into the nexus between the 
nature of the regime and presidential interruptions with regard to the level of 
democracy, and the nexus between the institutional configuration (presidentialism vs. 
                                                
283 This would explain why Hochstetler and Edwards (2009: 47-49) find, to their surprise, that level of 
democracy (measured by Polity IV) has a positive effect on interruptions and challenges. 
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semi-presidentialism) and interruptions, could be very interesting and shed further 
light on different types and causes of presidential interruption.  
 
Finally, several of the cases of policy interruption were linked to the emergence of 
new cleavages (Chapter 6). At least the interruptions in Ecuador, the two most recent 
interruptions in Bolivia, and the one in Venezuela fit this pattern. Could one also 
compare interruptions with executive instability across space and time? This would 
require difficult conceptual balancing exercises, but the more challenging the 
comparison, the potentially more rewarding the outcome. In an article, I tentatively 
suggested that interruptions in Latin America could lead to para-constitutional 
practices in the same way that the implementation of parliamentarism for a long time 
was only para-constitutional in several European countries (Marsteintredet and 
Berntzen 2008). In line with such types of comparison, could one also compare the 
rise of new cleavages in the relatively young democracies in Latin America with the 
instability in the early days of full democracy in Europe? The early years of 
democracy after the extension of full suffrage in Europe were characterised by high 
levels of executive instability, but also by the emergence, manifestation, and 
representation of new cleavages in national political institutions. The regimes and the 
time-periods are clearly different, but both processes seem in some way linked to 
recent efforts at democratisation in young democracies. Questions that could be raised 
and maybe answered through such comparisons are: What are the links between 
democratisation and executive instability? What systems, or institutional 
arrangements, fall prey to executive instability due to the emergence of new 
cleavages? And, what systems manage to incorporate these new cleavages and 
institutionalise the conflicts that follow the mobilisation of them?  
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Democracy and Presidential interruption 
Another great debate related to presidential interruptions in Latin America is whether 
or not these are good for democracy, or less normatively, what do they mean for 
democracy, democratic stability, or democratic quality? I have argued that the cases 
of interruptions are cases of holding the president accountable for actions or 
omissions, regardless of whether this type of accountability is spasmodic, intermittent, 
or regular. If it is, or rather was, the case that presidents in Latin America tilted more 
towards being delegative, than being immobile, then increased levels of 
accountability is a good thing. The ideal outcome for democracy would of course be 
that all presidents are able to complete their terms because they behave as in the 
fictitious Cardamom’s Town created by Torbjørn Egner, where everyone “is nice and 
kind to each other”. Then holding presidents accountable would never go to the 
extreme and a presidential interruption would be out of the question. However, it is 
more interesting, and realistic, to look at the question of what is the best outcome 
given a presidential crisis.  
 
Given the presidential crisis leading to the interruption in each case, do better 
outcomes exist? During a presidential crisis, four outcomes are possible within the 
democratic framework: 1) The president is removed; 2) congress (and/or other 
institutions) is removed, 3) Both institutions are removed;284 4) Both (or all) 
institutions survive. In my Chapter 7, I also touched on this question arguing that 
interruptions, Outcome 1, due to presidential scandals, and a president’s democratic 
violations, were clearly positive for democracy. The crisis has occurred due to a 
                                                
284 I exclude here any solution that ends democracy, such as a military coup that closes all democratic 
institutions.  
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president’s involvement in a scandal or undemocratic behaviour, and the three other 
alternatives are clearly worse in light of democratic theory than removing the 
president.  
 
What about policy interrupted presidents? On principle, and in practice, I would argue 
that closing congress, Outcome 2, is always a worse option than removing the 
president. Experience from Latin America shows that this leads either to the 
breakdown of democracy (Peru and Fujimori in 1992), or to increased levels of 
presidential dominance that may harm democracy (Venezuela and Chávez since 
1999) (Corrales 2009). Outcome 3 may be ideal since one could assume that both 
congress and the presidency share the responsibility of the presidential crisis. The 
outcome is not very likely, however, since such an outcome almost by definition 
implies a change from a presidential to a parliamentary regime. Interruptions that 
have been followed by calls for early legislative and presidential elections are the 
ones that come closest to this outcome.  
 
Therefore, the only other alternative that might be better than a presidential 
interruption, given a presidential crisis on policy issues, is that both institutions 
survive, Outcome 4. Under what circumstances is this outcome better than an 
interruption of the presidency? In principle, Outcome 4, the survival of both 
institutions, is better than an interruption under all circumstances, given the dubious 
constitutionality of presidential interruptions by other procedures than impeachment. 
In practice, however, it is not that easy. Presidential crises also entail political 
stalemates, political tensions, and increased polarisation, which need resolving. An 
interruption might be the quickest, and less violent, way out of the crisis, and as such, 
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potentially, a better solution than keeping both institutions intact. Considering the 
history of democratic instability in region, a presidential interruption is clearly a good 
outcome. On the other hand, if democracy is the institutionalisation of the peaceful 
solution of conflicts in a polity, then solving conflicts by breaking, or rather bending, 
the rules constitutes the failure of institutionalised democracy. Furthermore, the 
failure to solve a matter before it is pushed to extremes when presidential removal 
seems the better option is also a fiasco on the part of the political elites and 
democracy itself.  
 
I have been thinking about these questions the last 3-4 years, and I cannot come up 
with any clear answers as to whether or not interruptions are good or bad for 
democracy in general, or in principle. The answer one arrives at depends very much 
on the counterfactual, or frame of comparison. If the counterfactual is democratic 
breakdown, then interruption of a president is a relatively good outcome, if the 
counterfactual is one of the four outcomes possible in a democracy that I sketched 
above, the answer is not that clear. I think that by distinguishing between different 
types of interruptions as I suggested in Chapter 7, I have pushed the debate somewhat 
further by being able to single out some cases of interruption that clearly entails 
positive consequences for democracy, and explain why they are good for democracy. 
I can only hope that my own work in this dissertation can spur further comparative 
research in order to increase our understanding of the causes and outcomes of the 
phenomenon of presidential interruptions.   
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